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Abstract
While small, low-cost satellites continue to increase in capability and popularity, their relia-
bility remains a problem. Traditional techniques for increasing system reliability are well
known to satellite developers. They include the use of radiation-hardened and screened
components, extensive cold redundancy and thorough test campaigns. However, the imple-
mentation of these techniques on small, low-cost satellites is often limited due to intrinsic
mass, volume and budgetary restrictions. Aiming for graceful degradation, therefore, may be
a more promising route.
Inspired by the robustness of single-celled and multi-cellular biological organisms, bio-
inspired computing systems, multi-agent systems, and modular spacecraft concepts, this
work presents the design, implementation and analysis of an artificial, cell-based system
architecture. Named the Satellite Stem Cell Architecture, the proposed system aims to replace
a significant portion of a typical satellite’s bus avionics with a set of initially identical, mass
produced, artificial cells. Analogous to their biological counterparts, the artificial cells can
differentiate during runtime to take on a variety of tasks, thanks to a set of artificial proteins.
Each cell reconfigures its own proteins within the context of a system-wide, distributed task
management strategy. In this way, essential tasks can be maintained, even as system cells
fail.
The Satellite Stem Cell Architecture differs from existing bio-inspired computing systems
by extending the concept to include reconfigurable interfaces to real-world sensors and
actuators, and by its inclusion of a set of middleware which turns each cell into a multi-
agent platform. Furthermore, an emphasis is placed on practical applicability, with power
consumption, volume and production cost driving the implementation. A detailed description
of the artificial cell hardware, and multi-agent middleware, is given. Additionally, two
CubeSat-scale, practical implementations of the architecture are described. While one, which
forms the payload interface computer of the SMESAT CubeSat, demonstrates only a subset
of the proposed multicellular features, the other is a full testbed based on two artificial cells
of four proteins each.
To compare the reliability of the proposed architecture to traditional forms of redundancy, an
analytical reliability equation is derived for predicting the lifetimes of multicellular systems.
It is shown that determining the optimal configuration of proteins per cell and cells per
system is complex, as different configurations are optimal during different phases of the
mission lifetime. Nevertheless, a set of trends in system behaviour are discovered, which
will prove useful to system designers. Using a purpose-developed, multicellular simulation
environment, the results of the analytical work are verified, and further problems relating to
peripheral interfaces and cross-strapping are investigated.
Finally, using measured characteristics of the implemented testbed and the derived analytical
lifetime predictions, the Artificial Stem Cell Architecture is compared against traditional
CubeSat and microsatellite avionics suites. The results show that the proposed architecture
gives increasing reliability and performance benefits with increased scale, and that while
its power consumption overheads make it prohibitive for implementation on CubeSats, it is
well-suited to microsatellites.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A traditional satellite, often weighing several tonnes and larger than a small car, can cost
millions of pounds to develop and launch. However, thanks to advancements in many fields,
including integrated circuits, battery technology, and composite materials, satellites smaller
than a loaf of bread are now commonplace.
Developing, launching, and operating a satellite has always been an expensive exercise.
Therefore, the reduction in satellite size has largely been driven by a desire to cut costs.
Since access to space aboard a rocket is essentially priced per kilogram, any mass savings
are valuable. However, it is not just their small physical size which distinguishes these
satellites from their traditional counterparts. The extensive use of commercial components,
reduced redundancy, simplified test campaigns and shortened development time lines all
characterise the new class of small, low cost satellites. While these satellites continue to grow
in popularity and capability, even enabling new mission concepts, the cost-cutting measures
that have made them possible come with undesirable side effects. To date, one of the largest
has been reduced reliability.
At first, this reduced reliability was not seen as a major concern. The first generations of
small, low cost satellites were primarily educational tools, designed to give students and
hobbyists hands-on experience of satellite design and operation. A few weeks of primitive
on-orbit interactions were often enough to signify mission success, as the majority of the
mission’s goals would have been achieved by the time the satellite reached orbit.
However, as subsequent generations of small, low-cost satellites began integrating more
complex and capable payloads, scientific, governmental and commercial organisations began
to take an interest. Today, this new class of satellites is beginning to challenge the roles of
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traditional, large and expensive satellites, especially in the area of Earth observation. For this
challenge to be successful, however, they must demonstrate a certain level of reliability.
Once outside the Earth’s atmosphere, a satellite is in a position of extreme physical isolation.
On-orbit maintenance is not currently a possibility, and contact with ground stations is
often limited to a few minutes a day. Thus, a satellite, like a biological organism, must
be self-sufficient. Both must harvest energy, recover from damage caused by the environ-
ment, and make life-preserving decisions. Since the process of evolution has resulted in
biological organisms so rugged they can survive in volcanoes and ice fields, this work pro-
poses that a satellite’s system architecture should more closely resemble that of a biological
organism.
Nature has always been a source of inspiration for engineers, and examples of bio-inspired
design are common in everyday life. Velcro, for example, was inspired by the cockleburs
which clung to an engineer’s coat after a walk in the woods. Similarly, the Schmitt Trigger,
which is fundamental electronic component found in almost every digital device, was invented
by an engineer after studying squid nerves. In this case, the proposed system architecture
is inspired by the functions within, and interactions between, the cells of a multicellular
organism.
This work aims to demonstrate the theoretical reliability benefits and practical feasibility of a
proposed multicellular system architecture. This architecture is composed of the Satellite
Stem Cell Hardware and Hybrid Agent Real-Time Platform (HARP) middleware. Together
with the development of the architecture, analytical reliability equations are derived, a
multicellular system simulator is developed, and two physical multicellular systems are
implemented and characterised.
1.1 Research Motivation
The cost-cutting techniques essential to the development of small, low-cost satellites have
several negative effects on system reliability. Firstly, by aiming for small size and low weight,
satellite designers are forced to minimise hardware redundancy. Secondly, by reducing
development time, testing campaigns are cut short and an increased number of design
flaws go unnoticed. Finally, through the extensive use of commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS)
components, a satellite is put at an increased risk of radiation and temperature induced
component failures.
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The trend of reduced reliability in low-cost satellites is most evident amongst CubeSats,
which are a class of satellites typically weighing one to five kilograms. Out of the first
hundred CubeSats to be launched, more than a quarter of industry missions and more than a
third of university missions have been dead on arrival or died shortly after reaching orbit [1].
Thus, while CubeSats and other low-cost satellites provide exciting opportunities, their low
reliability needs to be addressed before they can truly compete with traditional, large and
expensive satellites.
Techniques to increase system reliability are well known to satellite developers. Some
techniques, such as the extensive use of radiation hardened components, are designed to
minimise the probability of failures. Others, such as dual-string architectures, are designed
to make a system fault tolerant. While these techniques have proven to be effective on large,
expensive satellites, their high implementation cost, in terms of money, man-power, weight
and volume, make them poorly suited to low-cost satellites. New solutions to increased
reliability are required for this new class of satellite.
Biological systems have evolved a number of techniques which aid their survivability. A
number of these operate at cellular level, and it is these techniques which provide the
inspiration for the research described in the thesis. By adopting similar strategies for
implementation in man-made systems, this research is aimed at enhancing the reliability of
low-cost spacecraft avionics.
The architecture of multicellular life is of particular interest. It differs significantly from most
man-made systems. In a simplified sense, every multicellular organism starts out as a set of
initially identical cells, called stem cells, which go on to specialise in specific roles within
the organism through a process known as differentiation. In some organisms, this process
is even reversible, allowing differentiated cells to re-differentiate, typically in response to
damage to the organism. This task distribution process occurs through cellular peer-to-peer
communication and without guidance from a central authority.
From a manufacturing standpoint, a system made of initially identical building blocks is
well suited for low-cost, mass manufacture. From a reliability standpoint, the ability of
every building block to potentially take over from any other failed building block within the
system allows high priority tasks to be kept executing, even as partial failures build up. This
represents the global application of functional redundancy, the implementation of which has
traditionally been limited due to the functional separation and bespoke nature of traditional
subsystems (e.g. the attitude control computer may be able to take over some functionality
from a failed main onboard computer).
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Further potential for increased system reliability is presented by the peer-to-peer task alloca-
tion strategy, as it lacks the potential single point of failure presented by a central coordinating
body (such as the main onboard computer in many traditional system designs).
However, while a theoretical, artificial, multicellular architecture promises many benefits,
development of a practical system is challenging. Modularity and multi-functionality tra-
ditionally come with overheads in mass, volume and cost. Furthermore, the reliability
benefits gained through the reconfigurable nature of the architecture may be outweighed by
the negative effects of added module-level complexity. Thus, work is needed to determine
the theoretical reliability, and practical feasibility, of an architecture based on multicellular
concepts.
1.2 Aims & Objectives
This research aims to increase the reliability of small, low-cost satellites by proposing,
analysing and demonstrating a novel system architecture based on key principles of multicel-
lular life.
In pursuit of this aim, the main objectives of this research are to:
1. Conduct a parametrised, empirical reliability study on low-cost satellites to identify
causes of unreliability.
2. Form a set of guiding principles for the development of a robust, low-cost system
architecture by studying aspects of multicellular life.
3. Based on the set of guiding principles:
(a) Develop a hardware building block, inspired by the biological cell, which will
maximise reuse throughout a satellite’s avionics.
(b) Develop a decentralised software architecture which will leverage the cell-based
hardware to maximise system reliability.
4. Derive a set of analytical reliability equations for predicting the lifetimes of simple
multicellular systems.
5. Develop a multicellular system simulator for studying complex multicellular systems
and for validating the derived analytical equations.
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6. Implement a testbed multicellular system for determining practical feasibility and
overheads.
1.3 Contributions
This research includes the following areas of novelty:
1. The conceptual development of a satellite stem cell – This work describes the in-
spiration behind, and development of, a bio-inspired, fault-tolerant, reconfigurable
hardware building block. By focussing on the role of proteins, interfacing directly to
peripherals, and having concern for implementation overheads, the satellite stem cell
allows complex, practical sensor-actuator systems to be implemented using minimal
additional hardware.
2. The adaption of agent computing to multicellular systems - Building on the increas-
ingly popular field of Agent Computing, this work describes the development of a
software framework which turns every satellite stem cell into an agency. These agen-
cies operate as the artificial cells’ macromolecular machinery, ’synthesising’ protein
agents in response to internal and external conditions. The Hybrid Agent Real-Time
Platform (HARP) middlware’s novelty lies in its small memory footprint, enhanced
fault tolerance, and embedded, decentralised task allocation strategy.
3. The theoretical reliability analysis of multicellular systems - Through the derivation of
analytical reliability equations and the development of a multicellular system simulator,
trends in the reliability of multicellular systems are characterised to form a guide for
future multicellular research and systems development.
4. The characterisation of practical multicellular systems - By implementing two systems
based on the proposed multicellular concepts, this work extends beyond theory and
proves the practical feasibility of the proposed architecture. Based on the current
generation artificial cells, microsatellite-scale systems are predicted to benefit from cel-
lularisation, while CubeSats are better suited for the single-celled strategy of ’produce
many and a few will survive’.
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1.4 Thesis Structure
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces the concept of small, low cost satellites by giving a brief overview
of their history and exciting future missions which they are enabling. Through a
literature review of empirical satellite reliability surveys, their relatively low relia-
bility compared to conventional spacecraft is highlighted. Traditional techniques for
increasing reliability and their application to low-cost satellites is discussed, before
coming to the conclusion that new techniques are required. Furthermore, the result of
a parametric survey conducted on 159 CubeSats is presented, showing that there is no
simple ’recipe-for-success’.
Chapter 3 begins with an in depth investigation of the techniques employed by unicellular
and multicellular organisms, which have enabled them to flourish in even the harshest
environments on Earth. From this investigation, the outline of a novel system archi-
tecture, based on the biological processes of protein synthesis, differentiation and
inter-cellular communication, is presented. Further inspiration is drawn from several
other fields, including bio-inspired processors, agent computing, and modular satellites,
which are discussed in the remainder of the chapter.
Chapter 4 expands on the outline of the proposed multicellular architecture by describing
in detail the design of an artificial satellite cell. The cell is intended to act as a generic
building block, replacing unique, discrete subsystems. By mimicking several biological
processes, the artificial cell is able to reconfigure to perform a large variety of tasks
and interface directly to a variety of common sensors and actuators. Furthermore, the
chapter explains how a system can be built up from a number of these cells, and how
this architecture allows for graceful degradation in the event of failures.
Chapter 5 describes a set of middleware, named HARP, which facilitates inter-cellular
cooperation through peer-to-peer communication and distributed task allocation. The
middleware is based on the concept of Agent computing, and distinguishes itself from
other agent platforms through its small memory footprint, real-time task execution, and
fault-tolerance. The middleware’s relation to the Foundation for Intelligent Physical
Agents (FIPA) Abstract Architecture is described in detail, together with its unique
features and additions.
Chapter 6 presents the derivation of analytical reliability equations for simple systems based
on the proposed multicellular architecture. Based on these equations, several predicted
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trends in the behaviour of multicellular systems are discovered and discussed. The
equations are used to compare the theoretical reliability of multicellular and traditional
system architectures. Additionally, a multicellular system simulator, developed in
MATLAB, is presented. It is used to simulate more complex multicellular systems,
and to verify the derived analytical equations.
Chapter 7 describes the implementation of two systems based on the concepts developed
in this thesis. The first system is composed of a single artificial cell, and serves as
the payload interface computer of a CubeSat. The second system is testbed designed
to demonstrate the full functionality of the proposed multicellular architecture. A
series of experiments designed to determine the testbed’s performance, overheads
and scalability, are described. The chapter concludes with two case studies, which
investigate the benefits and overheads of ’cellularising’ traditional sets of satellite
avionics using the testbed cells.
Chapter 8 concludes the work by summarising important results, highlighting key novelties
and proposing areas for future research.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter introduces a class of small, low-cost satellites which are rapidly growing in
popularity and enabling exciting new mission concepts. Thereafter, some basic concepts
of reliability are introduced and their application to traditional, as well as small, low-cost
satellites, is described. With the aid of a literature review of empirical reliability studies, the
poor reliability performance of small, low-cost satellites to date is highlighted and discussed.
A novel, parametrised study of empirical CubeSat reliability is presented, before concluding
that alternative reliability-increasing techniques, better suited to the resource constrained
environment of a low-cost mission, are required.
2.1 Rise of the Small, Low-Cost Satellites
The services provided by satellites are an integral part of modern life. Unfortunately,
developing, launching and operating a satellite has always been, and still is, a very expensive
business. For example, NASA’s 2013 Landsat 8 earth observation satellite, which is the size
of a large car and weighs 2623 kg, has a mission cost of 855 million US dollars [2] (Figure
2.1a). Similarly, the European Space Agency’s (ESA) Sentinel synthetic aperture radar
satellite, which weighs 2300 kg, was built for 280 million Euros [3] (Figure 2.1b).
However, as electronics have gotten smaller and launch opportunities have increased, new
classes of smaller, lower-cost satellites have appeared. These missions employ a combination
of several strategies to achieve their cost savings. Firstly, by building a physically smaller
and lighter satellite, launch costs are significantly reduced. This is because launch cost is, in
a simplified sense, directly related to satellite mass and typically accounts for 30 - 40 % of
9
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Figure 2.1: NASA’s 2623 kg Landsat 8 satellite (a) [4], and ESA’s 2300 kg Sentinel satellite (b) [5],
undergoing testing. These satellites represent examples of the traditional ’big-aerospace’ approach.
total mission expenses [6]. A further benefit of building a smaller satellite is the increased
number of launch opportunities that become available through ride-sharing. Many launch
providers now allow small satellites to take up any excess capacity on the launch of large,
primary satellites. For example, in 2017, a single launch of the Indian Polar Satellite Launch
Vehicle (PSLV) successfully placed the Cartosat 2D primary spacecraft, together with 103
secondary satellites, into orbit [7].
In addition to decreased mass, reduced development time is another major cost-saver. While
traditional satellite missions can take five to ten years to develop, low-cost satellites have
been developed in as little as six months. This is achieved through a combination of reduced
test campaigns, descoped mission aims and the extensive use of commercial subsystems,
instead of custom developments. Additionally, many development time lines are driven
by available ride-share launch opportunities, which may be announced on relatively short
notice.
Finally, the material cost of a satellite can be substantially reduced by using commercial-
grade electronic components, rather than expensive, space-grade ones. Space-grade can be
orders of magnitude more expensive because these components are extensively screened
and have features such as radiation resistance or tolerance, extended temperature operating
ranges, and are made of materials which are stable in vacuum. Using commercial-grade
components comes with risk and will likely reduce the total lifetime of the satellite. However,
this risk can be reduced by choosing components which already have space-flight heritage,
and by implementing certain pre-emptive measures, such as latch-up monitoring circuits.
Furthermore, because the space-industry represents such a small fraction of the market, space-
grade components often lag behind their commercial counterparts in terms of technological
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developments by several years. Thus, using commercial parts can have the benefit of reduced
power consumption and improved performance.
2.1.1 Important Examples
The earliest small, low-cost satellites were designed by clubs of amateur radio operators, and
were literally assembled in home workshops. The earliest of these satellites, named OSCAR
I, was launched in 1961, barely four years after the launch of Sputnik. Three more successful
OSCAR satellites followed, before AMSAT, The Radio Amateur Satellite Corporation, was
formed as an educational institution which aimed to embrace and expand on the OSCAR
project. These early OSCAR satellites had little intelligence and operated mainly as beacons
or radio frequency transponders in aid of amateur radio hobbyists back on Earth.
In 1978, with the aid of AMSAT members, the University of Surrey in England began its
UoSat microsatellite research program [8]. This program aimed to develop cost-effective
techniques for the development of small satellites, demonstrate their capabilities and com-
mercial value, and promote space education and training. UoSat-1, weighing approximately
50 kg and shown in Figure 2.2a, was built within 30 months and with a budget of £250 000.
It was the first microsatellite to feature an on-orbit reprogrammable computer, allowing it to
be far more capable than its amateur radio ancestors. UoSat-1 was a huge success and led
to the development of another 11 UoSat series satellites, each with an average development
time of 10 -12 months and a budget of 3 million US dollars.
In the midst of the program, in 1985, the university spin-off company Surrey Satellite
Technology Ltd (SSTL) was founded. Having proven the capabilities of microsatellites,
especially for earth observation and technology demonstration purposes, SSTL aimed to
commercialise the university’s microsatellite expertise. To date, SSTL has launched 50
satellites, ranging in mass from 6.5 kg to 440 kg and continues to be a world leader in the
small satellite market.
In 1999, another important development in the history of small, low-cost satellites occured.
Bob Twiggs of Stanford university and Jordi Puig-Suari of California Polytechnic State
University proposed the CubeSat reference design [10]. CubeSats adhere to certain physical
dimensions which allow them to be mated and deployed from launch vehicles using a
standardised interface. The smallest CubeSat, named a 1 Unit (1U) is 10 x 10 x 10 cm.
Larger CubeSats, such as the popular 3U (10 x 10 x 30 cm), can be created by expanding in
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Figure 2.2: UoSat-1, the first microsatellite with a reprogrammable onboard computer 1981 (a) [8],
and a number of PlanetLab CubeSats awaiting launch 2014 (b) [9]. Small, cheap satellites like these
are starting to challenge the roles of traditional, multi-tonne satellites.
units of 1U. The idea behind CubeSats was to enable graduate students to receive hands-on
experience of designing, building and operating a satellite.
The first CubeSats were launched in 2003, and the CubeSat reference design quickly became
a standard. Today, mid-way through 2017, more than 700 CubeSats have been launched.
Arguably, the largest contribution of the CubeSat standard has been the universal launch
adapter called a PPOD (several other loosely compatible variants exist). The PPOD is a
spring-loaded container which typically deploys a single 3U, or three 1U satellites at a time.
Many launch vehicles are now compatible with PPODs, providing many additional rides into
orbit. Additionally, the CubeSat standard has led to a marketplace of CubeSat subsystems.
Every component, from the structure, to the attitude control subsystem and radio transceiver,
is available off the shelf, which has allowed many universities and even schools to build their
own satellites. However, as shall be shown in Chapter 3, building a successful CubeSat is
still far from a plug-and-play process.
While CubeSats were largely an educational tool for many years, commercial, governmental
and research organisations are showing increased interest. A CubeSat’s small physical size
makes integrating a useful payload challenging, but it also allows the manufacture and launch
of large constellations. For example, the commercial organisation Planet Labs owns the
largest earth observation constellation of satellites in history, being composed of several
hundred 3U CubeSats (Figure 2.2b). Each CubeSat is able to image the earth with 3-5 meter
resolution, and the constellation as a whole has the ability to image the whole Earth every
day [11].
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The Von Karmen Insitute for Fluid Dynamics (VKI), a Belgian research institute, currently
has a constellation of approximately 50 2U CubeSats orbiting the Earth as part of its QB50
program [12]. The QB50 constellation aims to monitor the Earth’s upper atmosphere in many
locations simultaneously. Each CubeSat was built by a different organisation, from across
the world, and carries a set of instruments supplied by VKI. The QB50 project is likely a
precursor to many future distributed sensing experiments, which have become feasible with
the advent of small, low-cost satellites.
2.1.2 The Future of Small, Low-Cost Satellites
Small, low-cost satellites have grown substantially in capability since the early OSCAR
and UoSat projects. For example, the UoSat-1 camera produced images of just 256 x 256
pixels with a ground resolution of 2 km, while the similarly sized Carbonite-1 microsatellite,
launched in 2015, provides images with a 1 m ground resolution. Similarly, UoSat’s downlink
was limited to 1200 bits per second, while the transmitters of Carbonite-1, operating in X-
band, can downlink at 80 megabits per second [13][14].
As their capabilities keep increasing, small, low-cost satellites are enabling a variety of new
mission concepts. These include:
• Large constellations for distributed sensing and increased revisit times
• In-orbit assembly of larger structures, such as telescope mirrors
• Motherships which release smaller, specialised satellites once in orbit
In addition to the Planet Labs earth observation and QB50 atmospheric monitoring constella-
tions, a good example of a planned mega-constellation is the SpaceX internet project. The
project aims to supply internet to any point on Earth by launching 4425 small, low-cost
satellites into orbit at an altitude of approximately 1200 km [15].
The Autonomous Assembly of a Reconfigurable Space Telescope (AARest) mission aims to
demonstrate the assembly of large structures in orbit. As shown in Figure 2.3, it will consist
of a mothership, which holds the focal plane, and several CubeSats, each of which contain a
portion of the main mirror. Once on orbit, the CubeSats will detach from the mothership and
autonomously reattach in different configurations. If successful, the mission could pave the
way to much larger mirrors and antennas being assembled out of small satellites in the future
[16].
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Figure 2.3: The AAReST mission aims to demonstrate the assembly of a large mirror composed of
small satellites on orbit cite [16].
The RemoveDebris mission will deploy two CubeSats to act as targets for a variety of active,
orbital debris removal techniques. The first CubeSat is relatively dumb and will be targeted
by a ’net-cannon’, which aims to capture the CubeSat before reeling it back in. The second
CubeSat contains a capable attitude determination and control system, whose measurements
will be compared to those made by an experimental, vision-based targeting system on the
mothership [17].
These three examples are just a few of the small, low-cost satellite missions that are expected
to be launched over the next couple of years. Figure 2.4 shows a progression of the number
of sub-50 kg satellites that have launched each year, and the predicted number to be launched
over the next few years. Since the SpaceX megaconstellation is still just a proposal, it is not
included in the prediction. Nevertheless, nearly 2400 nano and microsatellites are expected
to be launched before 2023.
As small, low-cost satellites continue to grow in capability and popularity, they will continue
to challenge the roles of traditional, ’big-aerospace’ satellites, while enabling new mission
concepts. However, in order to be useful and competitive in the future, small, low cost
satellites will require a certain level of reliability, which has, on average, been lacking to
date.
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Figure 2.4: SpaceWorks’ prediction of the number of sub-50 kg satellites to be launched over the
next few years [18].
2.2 Reliability Overview
Reliability is defined as the probability of performing without failure, a specific function,
under given conditions for a specified period of time [19].
Failures can be divided into three categories, namely permanent, transient, and parametric. A
permanent failure, also known as a catastrophic failure, is unrecoverable without external
maintenance. This maintenance may include the replacement of parts, or the manual reload-
ing of firmware. Transient failures are intermittent and either resolve themselves, or are
resolved by the system itself. Examples of recovery include a processor restarting itself, or a
seized mechanism shaking itself loose. Parametric failures do not result in complete loss of
functionality. Instead, they cause a degradation in system performance. Parametric failures
are common as components age and ware out. Examples include a degradation in solar panel
output due to radiation dose, and an increase in current consumption of a mechanism as its
lubrication is expended. This research is mainly concerned with permanent failures.
Early electronic systems based on relays and vacuum tubes were notoriously difficult to
make reliable [20]. Vacuum tubes were the primary cause of unreliability, having to be
replaced 5 times more often than any other component [21]. The rise of semiconductor
components in the 1950’s partially alleviated this problem by allowing vacuum tubes to be
replaced with more reliable, solid-state components. However, the issue of reliability became
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a major concern again in the 1960’s with the dawn of the space age. Satellites and probes are
very expensive to send into space and cannot be serviced once launched; therefore it is very
desirable for them to be highly reliable. Reliability of the systems involved in manned space
flight is even more essential as a failure in these systems can put human lives at risk.
Research on reliability has continued to gain importance as electronic systems have become
more integrated into our daily lives. For example, a modern car contains in excess of 50
MCUs which must operate reliably to avoid putting human lives in jeopardy [22]. These
include anti-lock brakes, airbags, power steering and cruise control.
2.2.1 Fault Avoidance and Fault Tolerance
Traditionally, techniques for increasing system reliability followed one of two philosophies:
Fault avoidance or fault tolerance.
Fault avoidance attempts to minimise sources of unreliability to prevent faults from occur-
ring during system operation. Typical examples include using high quality and screened
components, perfecting assembly and integration processes, performing extensive testing,
and carefully controlling the system’s operational environment. ’Over-designing’ is another
common technique, which involves designing components to withstand conditions far in
excess of what is expected to be seen during normal operation.
Since no system can reasonably be expected to operate completely fault free for the duration
of its lifetime, fault intolerant design aims to decrease the system’s probability of failure to
an acceptably low value. This probability of failure is assessed using known or predicted
failure rates of individual components. In addition, periodic preventative maintenance is
often employed to improve reliability. To assist maintenance, the system may have automatic
fault detection and notification abilities. However, purely fault intolerant systems have no
ability to repair themselves.
Fault avoidance is popular in the space industry. Examples include:
• Using radiation-hardened components.
• Performing assembly and integration in cleanrooms.
• Over-designing and over-specifying with respect to voltage, current, temperature etc.
• Extensive test campaigns including thermal-vacuum and vibration.
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However, some aspects of the fault-intolerant philosophy are difficult to apply to satellites.
For example, on-orbit maintenance is largely impractical to date, and many components are
not available in radiation-hardened versions.
The second approach to achieving reliability, known as fault tolerance, attempts to cope
with failures as they arise. Fault tolerant designs try to assure reliability through protective
redundancy. Faults are expected to occur, whether caused by the environment, operator or
flawed design. Protective redundancy can be classified as either passive or active. Passive
redundancy is very similar to the fault-intolerant concept of over-designing. For example,
several of the cables supporting a suspension bridge can fail before the bridge fails.
Active redundancy can be implemented in four basic ways: hardware, software, information
and time. Hardware redundancy involves adding additional or duplicate hardware com-
ponents. Hardware redundancy is described in more detail in Section 2.2.2. N-version
programming is an example of redundancy applied in software. N-version programming
involves creating two or more pieces of software independently which satisfy the same initial
specifications. The independent pieces of software are run in parallel with identical inputs
to verify their output. Information redundancy includes techniques for error detection and
correction such as Hamming codes. These techniques automatically detect and try to correct
errors in a data stream. Finally, time based redundancy, in its simplest incarnation, performs
every action multiple times in succession to ensure the action is performed correctly. A basic
example would be transmitting every bit of information twice.
Upon experiencing a failure, an actively redundant system is said to recover to either fail-
operational or fail-safe states. A fail-operational system can recover automatically to a fully
operational state. In contrast, a fail-safe system will recover to a safe, but reduced operational
state, while it awaits human intervention to enable full recovery.
Generally, all forms of redundancy require more resources (power, volume, mass) than a
system designed without redundancy. Therefore, instead of aiming for fully fault tolerant
system, designers may aim for a partially fault tolerant system. Such a system continues to
operated after failures occur, but possibly with reduced performance. This concept is also
known as graceful degradation, and, while not ideal, is often better than having the system
fail completely.
An example of graceful degradation can be seen in computer hard drives. A hard drive
can automatically detect damaged sectors on its disks and automatically avoids writing to
those sectors in the future. Besides a reduced memory capacity, the user of the hard drive
will notice no difference in its operation. An example of graceful degradation in the space
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industry is satellite solar panels. Most solar panels are designed with bypass diodes. Bypass
diodes allow current to bypass a damaged solar cell. Without bypass diodes, damage to a
single cell could disable the whole panel. Again, the only difference in performance of the
panel after damage to a cell has occurred will be a reduced power generating capacity.
2.2.2 Hardware Redundancy
The most elementary form of hardware redundancy is cold, or backup, redundancy. When
a fault occurs in a component of a system with no fault tolerance, maintenance staff may
decide to replace the faulty component with an identical spare. In a fault tolerant system
with cold redundancy, spare components are automatically switched in to replace faulty
ones. Therefore, the system must have a series of spare components readily available and
already connected to the system. All the spare components are turned off and consume no
power until they are switched in. This has the added advantage of preventing wear on the
spare components until they are needed. There may be a delay and interruption to service
while the spare is switched in. To minimise the delay, hot redundancy may be used. In a hot
redundant system, the spare components are switched on and are running in parallel with the
primary components. However, the spare components’ outputs are isolated from the system
until the primary component fails. The disadvantage of hot redundancy is that the spare
components are subject to the same wear as the primary components even while they are not
being used.
A more sophisticated form of hardware redundancy is called modular redundancy. Modular
redundancy makes use of a number of identical components (or modules) whose outputs are
compared using a voting circuit. The voting circuit decides which output to forward to the
rest of the system. The individual modules are highly synchronised and receive the same
inputs at the same time. If only two modules are used, called Dual Modular Redundancy
(DMR), and they have differing outputs it is not obvious to the voting circuit which module
is faulty. Therefore, modular redundancy works best if an odd number of modules are used.
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), making use of three modules, is common. A faulty
output from one of the three modules is easily detected by noticing that it differs from the
other two modules. In this case the voting circuit will ignore the faulty unit’s output and
give the majority output. If the faulty unit continues to give erroneous output it may be
permanently turned off. Modular redundancy allows faults to occur in modules with minimal
impact to the system. Unlike cold redundancy, there is usually no interruption while faulty
units are removed from the system. However, modular redundancy requires all modules to
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be powered on and running at the same time, increasing power consumption. The voting
circuitry also adds complexity and is a potential single point of failure. However, the voting
circuitry is usually designed to be simple and reliable.
A third form of redundancy, called 1:N redundancy, uses a single backup for multiple compo-
nents. The backup can take on the function of any one of a number of primary components.
This form of redundancy requires less volume than either backup or modular redundancy,
making it attractive for use on small satellites. The biggest challenge in implementing 1:N
redundancy is designing the backup unit. The backup unit must be able to perform the
function of any one of the primary components. Unless the primary components all have
very similar functions, the backup unit will ultimately be very complex. Routing signals to
the backup unit may also pose a challenge.
Related to 1:N redundancy is the concept of degeneracy. Degeneracy refers to a partial
overlap in the functions provided by different components. A system with degeneracy
requires multifunctional components. These components usually perform distinct functions
but can, under certain conditions, perform the same functions, effectively making them
interchangeable. For example, the SUNSAT satellite has a microprocessor dedicated to OBC
tasks and a microprocessor dedicated to attitude determination and control system (ADCS)
tasks. However, if the ADCS processor fails, the OBC processor can take over its critical
tasks [23]. This is also an example of graceful degradation as the satellite can still function
albeit with reduced functionality.
Designing with degeneracy instead of redundancy can save resources as there is no need for
space-wasting backup components. However, as with 1:N redundancy, designing the multi-
functional components of a degenerate system can be challenging. Components are likely to
become more complex as they become more multifunctional. This added complexity may
lead to increased volume, weight and power consumption, while simultaneously decreasing
reliability.
2.3 Satellite Reliability
In this section, references are made to basic reliability modelling concepts, such as reliability
functions and failure distributions. Readers unfamiliar with these concepts may want to read
Section 6.1 Introduction to Analytical Reliability Analysis, first.
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Figure 2.5: Traditional satellite reliability based on empirical failure data of 1548 satellites (a) and
the most common causes of failure within the first year (b). Reproduced from [24].
Satellites have traditionally been very expensive to design and launch and cannot typically
be serviced once on orbit. For these reasons, satellite designers usually put a large amount of
effort into ensuring the reliability of their satellites. This effort has largely paid off, as shown
by Castet and Saleh in a survey of 1548 Earth-orbiting satellites launched between January
1990 and October 2008 [24]. A statistical reliability analysis, based on a Kaplan-Meier
estimator, was performed on collected empirical failure data. The resultant reliability plot is
shown in Figure 2.5a. The Kaplan-Meier technique has the ability to deal with incomplete
and censored lifetime data. If a satellite survived past its design lifetime or beyond October
2008 its failure date was censored (meaning its reliability is no longer considered past its
design lifetime). According to the graph, approximately 3 % of the satellites surveyed failed
during their first year on orbit. The raw survey data, published in the paper, shows that out of
1548 satellites, only four were dead on arrival in orbit (or died within the first day).
A steep decrease in satellite reliability during the first year on orbit can be seen in the data.
The authors of the study fit a Weibull distribution with β = 0.3875 and ω = 8316 (years) to
the data. With a shape parameter less than one, this Weibull Distribution is characteristic
of infant mortality. Infant mortality is often caused by design faults which were not caught
during testing.
Castet and Saleh also investigated the reliability of individual subsystems by noting which
subsystem was responsible for each failure. Figure 2.5b displays the fraction of failures
(occur-ring within the first year on orbit) caused by each subsystem. The largest contributors
are the tracking, telemetry and command subsystem (TTC) (which is a combination of
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Figure 2.6: Empirical reliability plots for three mass classes of satellites. Reproduced from [25].
onboard computer and communication subsystems), the propulsion subsystem, and gyro-
scopes.
2.3.1 The Poor Reliability of Low-Cost Satellites
In comparison to the average satellite, small, low-cost satellites have shown very poor
reliability to date. This is highlighted by four empirical surveys. It is important to note that
budget information is rarely available for satellite missions, partly as a result of commercial
companies not releasing the information, and partly because the funding of such missions
can be complex and come from multiple sources. Therefore, in the remainder of this section,
low-cost is associated with low mass. As described in Section 2.1, this is a reasonable
assumption to make, as mass is directly related to launch cost and the availability of low-cost
ride-share opportunities.
The first study, produced as a follow-up paper to Castet and Saleh’s survey, was performed by
Dubos and investigates whether satellite reliability can be related to satellite size [25]. The
same 1548 satellites from their previous paper were split into three groups according to mass:
small (0-500 kg), medium (500-2500 kg) and large (>2500 kg). Once again a Kaplan-Meier
estimator was used to generate the reliability plots shown in Figure 2.6.
Several important trends in the reliability plots were noted by the authors. Firstly, the small
satellites drop significantly in reliability during the first six months on orbit. They appear to
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Figure 2.7: Empirical reliability plots of different classes of small satellites, based on Guo, Monas
and Gill’s survey of 222 satellites launched between 1990 and 2010 [26]
.
suffer more from infant mortality than satellites from the medium and large categories. In
addition, small satellites exhibit another significant drop in reliability after three years on
orbit. A second trend that can be seen in the graph is the wearing-out of large satellites. The
constant reliability of small and medium satellites seen after approximately 4 and 6 years,
respectively, is an artefact of the analysis. Most of these satellites will have reached their
design lifetimes by then, meaning they were removed from the study, and no reliability data
exists for longer durations. However, large satellites are often designed for longer lifetimes
and their increased failure rate after approximately 7 years can, at least partially, be attributed
to mechanical and environmental wear out of components. The study concludes that amongst
the satellites studied, small satellites had the highest infant mortality rate.
The second study, by Guo, Monas and Gill [26], is based on a satellite database of 222
small satellites (< 500 kg) launched between 1990 and 2010. The satellites were divided
into categories based on mass: pico (0-1 kg), nano (1-10 kg), micro (10-100 kg) and mini
(100-500 kg). A Kaplan-Meier estimator was used to generate a reliability plot for each
category, shown together on one plot for comparison purposes in Figure 2.7. The Figure also
includes the reliability plot of the ’average’ satellite, as determined by the Castet and Saleh
study. In contrast to the ’average’ satellite first year failure rate of 3 %, the survey showed
that approximately 35 % of micro and mini-satellites and 70 % of nano and picosatellites
failed within a year.
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Figure 2.8: Mission success rates of a group of 94 nano satellites (< 10 kg) launched between 1957
and 2009. Reproduced from [27].
The same study made two further findings. Firstly, it found that the TTC subsystem and
electrical power subsystem were the least reliable of the investigated subsystems. This
partially supports the results reported by Castet and Saleh. The study also looked at whether
design lifetime had any impact on reliability. The 222 small satellites were divided into three
groups according to their designed lifetime: less than five years, more than five years and
unknown. They found that satellites with longer design lifetimes suffered the least from
infant mortality, while those from the unknown category suffered the most. This can be
explained by the fact that an unknown design lifetime often implies that limited thought has
been given to the subject by the satellite designers.
The third small satellite reliability study is a paper by Bouwmeester and Guo, which inves-
tigates the success rates of nano-satellites launched between 1957 and 30 July 2009 [27].
94 satellites with masses less than 10 kg are used in the study. A pie chart of the mission
outcomes is shown in Figure 2.8. The paper does not define what exactly was counted as
mission success, however, it normally implies completion of the primary mission objectives.
Of the surveyed satellites, 48 % achieved full mission success, 17 % achieved partial success,
19 % failed outright, and the otcomes of the remaining 16 % is unknown. The authors believe
that the majority of the satellites from the unknown category were probably failures, as
mission publicity often rapidly dies down after a failure. Including these satellites, the failure
category grows to 35 %.
Finally, Swartwoudt presents a study based on the first 100 CubeSats [1]. Today, CubeSats
make up the majority of nano-satellite sized missions. By the start of 2014, more than 190
CubeSats had been launched. The first CubeSat was launched in 2003 and the hundredth
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Figure 2.9: Mission success rates of the first 100 CubeSats (a), and the primary causes of failure (b).
Reproduced from [1].
CubeSat was launched in 2012. Among the statistics looked at by Swartwout are mission
success rates and causes of failure. Pie charts reproduced from Swartwout’s paper can be
seen in Figure 2.9a.
According to Figure 2.9a, 31 % of the surveyed CubeSats failed early (excluding launch
failures). Swartwout’s paper considers a mission a failure if the mission operators publicly
declared it as such, or if the satellite lasted less than 60 days in orbit. A figure of 34.4 %
failures (rescaled from 31 % to include only successfully launched CubeSats) is similar to
that found by Bouwmeester and Guo. While missions from industry fared better than those
from universities, missions from both sectors showed high failure rates.
Figure 2.9b shows the fraction of failures caused by each subsystem. The largest group,
labeled no contact, contains those missions which were never heard from after deployment.
Swartwout examined these missions more closely and came to the conclusion that this group
of failures can be classified as failures in functional integration. Swartwout argues that many
of these missions were let down by insufficient functional level testing. Problems that could
have been caught by functional level testing include: unreliable harnessing, insufficient
power generation and unrecoverable processor errors.
After problems in functional integration, the next most common causes of failures are related
to the communication and power subsystems. This agrees with the findings of Guo, Monas
and Gill.
These four studies highlight the large difference in reliability seen to date between traditional
satellites and the new class of small, low-cost satellites. But why does this reliability gap
exist? Based on the literature reviewed, the causes of unreliability can be attributed to several
factors.
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Firstly, intrinsic satellite mass and volume limitations inhibit the implementation of hardware
redundancy. Since hardware redundancy eats into mass and volume budgets without adding
science value to the mission, may small, low-cost satellites are based on single-string designs.
A further problem with single-string designs is that determining the cause of failure is often
difficult or impossible as a single failure can cause the satellite to stop communicating with
the ground. Once the satellite has stopped communicating, operators are left to hypothesise
at the cause of failure. Without a known cause of failure it is challenging to come up with a
recovery plan or to design out the cause in future satellites.
Secondly, small mission budgets necessitate the use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
components instead of radiation hardened, space-rated, and screened components, which can
cost orders of magnitude more. Once in space, electrical components, and especially complex
integrated circuits, are susceptible to a variety of undesirable and damaging radiation and
temperature induced effects. Amongst others, these include single event upsets, latch-ups and
gate ruptures. In addition to their low price, COTS components are attractive to designers as
a large variety of useful ICs have been developed for terrestrial applications. While these ICs
simplify circuit design effort, their complexity makes their behaviour difficult to predict in
unusual environments such as in orbit.
The third cause for unreliability amongst small, low cost satellites is time pressure. While
traditionally satellites have taken several years to design, it is not uncommon for satellites
of this new class to be designed and built in less than a year. The time pressure is caused
by limited mission budgets and the ride-share nature of many of their launches. Ride-share
launches occur when a large primary satellite’s launch vehicle has excess capacity, allowing
small satellites to ’piggy-back’ on the launcher. While ride-share launches offer significant
cost savings, their unpredictable availability and dependence on the primary satellite’s
readiness make planning around them difficult. Time pressure can lead to design mistakes,
skipped reviews, and reduced test campaigns.
Fourth, inexperience, especially amongst university mission teams, leads to design and
integration mistakes. Universities represent one of the leading small, low-cost satellite
developers. They are developing satellites largely as a tool to train engineering students.
However, universities, especially upon embarking on their first satellite missions, are often
ill-equipped and too inexperienced to complete the missions successfully. Facilities, such
as cleanrooms and thermal chambers, are difficult to procure and engineering students are
inexperienced, even in terrestrial application design. Fortunately, many of these projects
have completed their primary goal of giving students hands-on engineering experience, even
before the satellites reaches orbit.
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Finally, related to inexperience, is overconfidence. The CubeSat standard has led to the
availability of a variety of off-the-shelf subsystems, which may give the illusion of plug-and-
playability. Even the subsystems themselves may not seem overly complicated compared
to terrestrial designs. However, it is simple to overlook the issues that are presented by
the launch and orbit environments. Terrestrial designers take for granted maintenance
access, convective heat dissipation, a steady power supply and the ability to hit reset when
the software stalls. Despite growing popularity, building a satellite is still a challenging
undertaking.
2.3.2 CubeSat Survey - Finding a Recipe for Success
A large variety of CubeSat missions have been completed to date, with mission outcomes
ranging from complete success to dead on arrival in orbit. These missions are all an important
source of information in the study of small, low-cost satellites. With a typical mass of less
than five kilograms and a budget measured in tens of thousands of British Pounds (exclud-
ing launch), CubeSats fall towards the lower extreme end of the small, low-cost satellite
spectrum. In addition, since many CubeSats are university research projects, academic
publications make information on their design and performance readily available. This is
in contrast to commercial satellites, where insightful design and reliability information is
rarely made public. Thus, in an attempt to find a ’recipe for success’, a paramaterised survey
of 159 CubeSat missions was conducted. While other studies have focussed on external
factors, such as class (university/commercial/governmental) or mission type (earth obser-
vation/communication/science), this study examines the design of the satellites themselves.
One of the main sources of mission status information for the survey was Swartwout’s online
CubeSat database [28]. However, a large number of additional sources, including mission
websites and academic publications were consulted. The full database, with sources, is given
in Appendix A.
The first step in conducting the survey was to define and determine levels of mission success.
The levels of mission success are given below (note that missions which ended due to launch
failure were not included in the survey):
1. Dead on arrival in orbit.
2. At least one beacon or downlink packet received by any ground station.
3. Successful uplink achieved.
4. On-orbit mission objectives partly completed.
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5. On-orbit mission objectives fully completed.
Next, a number of parameters were identified for comparison against mission success
rates.
First is the level of implemented redundancy. Measured out of a maximum of three, this
parameter specifies how many of the core subsystems are redundant. Core subsystems
include the onboard computer (OBC), electrical power system (EPS) and communication
subsystem. Any form of redundancy is allowed, as long as mission success is still achievable
after primary failure. For example, if another subsystem can take over from a failed OBC,
the OBC is counted as redundant. However, a separate radio beacon does not mean that the
communication (COMM) system is redundant as the beacon cannot take over from a failed
TTC subsystem. It is expected that higher levels of redundancy will result in higher satellite
reliability.
Second is the number of COTS subsystems. Again measured out of three, this parameter
specifies the number of core subsystems which are COTS components. COTS CubeSat
subsystems are readily available from a number of suppliers such as Gomspace, Clyde Space,
Innovative Solutions in Space (ISIS) and CubeSpace. COTS subsystems generally have flight
heritage and their use is expected to increase satellite reliability.
The third parameter is a measure of the attitude determination and control system’s complex-
ity:
1. No ADCS.
2. Passive attitude control (e.g. compassing, gravity gradient).
3. Active magnetic control using magnetorquers.
4. Active magnetic control coupled with a momentum wheel.
5. Full 3-axis pointing control.
It is expected that satellites implementing simpler attitude control schemes will prove to be
more reliable.
The fourth parameter specifies one of three system architecture types:
1. Star architecture. The OBC connects to subsystems via separate, dedicated interfaces.
2. Single-master bus architecture. All subsystems are slaves to the OBC on a shared bus.
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3. Multi-master bus architecture. Subsystems can freely instantiate communication with
one another over a shared bus.
Star architectures commonly employ universal asynchronous receiver-transmitter (UART)
links, single bus architectures are most commonly based on an Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C)
bus, and CAN buses are popular in multi-master architectures.
The fifth and final parameter is development time. It is measured from project start to launch
day. Technically, this is not a correct measure of development time as launch delays are
common. However, teams experiencing launch delays may have added time to work on
software and possibly to perform more testing. CubeSat development time varies significantly
in duration, from less than a year to more than five years. A longer development time may
be an indication that more thought was put into the design process and that more thorough
testing was performed on the satellite before launch. This argument leads to the prediction
that satellites with a longer project duration will show higher levels of mission success.
Each parameter was investigated individually by splitting the set of 159 surveyed satellites
into groups based on their characteristics. For example, when looking at the ADCS complex-
ity parameter, the satellites were split into one of five groups based on the characteristics of
their ADCSs. The mission success rates within each of these groups were then compared to
one another. The results are depicted graphically in Figures 2.10-2.12.
As Figure 2.10a shows, the relationship between level of redundancy and mission success
rates is largely as expected. Mission success rates increase as the number of redundant sub-
systems increase from zero to two. All satellites with two out of three redundant subsystems
achieved at least two way communication. Interestingly, beyond this level of redundancy,
mission success rates are seen to decrease again slightly. This decrease is likely due to the
complexity of implementing a satellite with such high levels of redundancy.
An example CubeSat with fully redundant core subsystems which performed poorly is
TurkSat-3USat [29]. TurkSat-3USat is a 3U CubeSat and the second nanosatellite mission
from Istanbul Technical University. The core subsystems are all functionally redundant, each
consisting of a primary COTS solution and a secondary custom developed solution. The
primary EPS, OBC and COMM subsystem are manufactured by Clyde Space, Pumpkin
and AstroDev, respectively. TurkSat-3USat was launched in April 2013, but operated
for less than a day before falling silent. The development of TurkSat-3USat faced many
problems, including RF system heat dissipation and grounding issues which led to loss of the
engineering model, and I2C bus disconnections and data loss. In addition, despite the full
redundancy of the core subsystems, the power bus lacked redundancy and recovery options.
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Figure 2.10: CubeSat mission success rates versus number of redundant core subsystems (a), and
number of COTS core subsystems (b).
TurkSat-3USat demonstrates that introducing subsystem redundancy is not sufficient without
considering interfaces and inter-subsystem interactions.
Figure 2.10b shows an unexpected relationship between number of COTS subsystems and
mission success rates. While CubeSats with one COTS subsystem (55 % full mission success)
generally fared better than those without any COTS subsystems (35 % full mission success),
the trend does not continue for CubeSats with two or three COTS subsystems. In fact, the
trend reverses, as CubeSats with two COTS subsystems achieved a full mission success
rate of only 20 %, and those with three only 7 %. This inverse relationship is unexpected
and is likely due to problems in satellite integration. Inexperienced teams may be tempted
to buy COTS subsystems due to their apparent plug-and-playability, leading to insufficient
system level testing, as mentioned by Swartwout [1]. Teams that opted to use fewer COTS
subsystems likely have a better understanding of their satellites, or at least had enough
experience to know which subsystems were beyond their ability to design.
An example of a CubeSat mission which employed all COTS core subsystems, but still failed
to perform well on orbit, is HiNCube [30]. HiNCube is a 1U CubeSat built by undergraduate
and masters students of Narvik University College in Norway. Its core subsystems are a
GOMSPACE NanoCOM U480 transceiver, GOMSPACE NanoPower P-Series EPS, and a
Pumpkin MSP430 OBC. HiNCube was launched in November 2013, but was never heard
from in space. Despite the use of all COTS core components, the team experienced several
integration issues, including switched-off subsystems hanging the central I2C bus, severe
electromagnetic interference from the COMM subsystem, and ground support equipment
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Figure 2.11: CubeSat mission success rates versus ADCS complexity (a), and system architecture
type [0-star, 0-single-master bus, 0-multi-master bus] (b).
ground loops causing subsystem damage. HiNCube demonstrates the dangers of assuming
COTS components will simply plug together to form a reliable satellite.
The relationship between ADCS complexity and mission success rates, shown in Figure 2.11a
is also unexpected. Initially ignoring the most complex subsystem category (4), two trends
can be seen. Firstly, the number of very poorly performing CubeSats is seen to decrease
with increasing levels of ADCS complexity. 20 % of the CubeSats with no attitude control
systems were dead on arrival, while not a single CubeSat with a Type 3 ADCS was dead on
arrival. An explanation for this trend is based on team experience. First time satellite builders
are likely to forgo complex ADCSs, but still suffer from poor performance due to other
design and implementation mistakes. In contrast to the first trend, the fraction of CubeSats
achieving full mission success decreases with increasing ADCS complexity. This is easier to
explain, as missions requiring more complex ADCSs usually also have more complicated
missions to perform.
Comparing mission success rates to system architecture types reveals the advantage of a Type
2, multi-master, architecture (Figure 2.11b). In comparison to the CubeSats featuring this type
of architecture, all of which were at least heard from in orbit, 40 % of the Type 1 CubeSats
were dead-on-arrival. While both Type 0 (star) and Type 1 (single-master bus) architectures
rely on the OBC to facilitate data transfers between subsystems, the Type 1 architecture
has the added vulnerability of bus hangups. A failure in following the communications
protocol, or a failed or misbehaving subsystem, can all potentially lead to the bus being
held-up, stalling all subsystem communication. Type 1 architectures based on the I2C
bus have become the most popular choice for CubeSats as a large variety of MCUs have
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Figure 2.12: CubeSat mission success rates versus development time. The last category (6) includes
missions which took longer than six years to develop.
built-in I2C interfaces, and a large range of COTS subsystems are available based on this
interface. Unfortunately, the I2C standard is not very strictly defined, leading to a variety of
slightly different implementations. This has led to a number of reported I2C bus problems on
CubeSats [29][30][31][32].
In contrast, only 11 of the surveyed CubeSats are based on multi-master architectures, which
are most commonly implemented using a CAN bus. In comparison to an I2C bus, a CAN bus
consumes more power and far fewer MCUs support it natively. This is likely why, despite its
empirical reliability advantages, Type 3 architectures have not been common to date.
Finally, Figure 2.12 shows a comparison between development time and mission success
rates. The overall trend of longer development times leading to reduced mission success rates
is unexpected. 65 % of the surveyed CubeSats that were deveoped in under a year achieved
full mission success. In comparison, less than 20 % of the CubeSats which took six or more
years to develop could match this performance. CubeSats with 6+ year development times
that performed poorly in orbit in clude the University of Montpellier’s ROBUSTA, which only
briefly emitted weak signals [33][34], and the Thomas Jefferson High School for Science
and Technology’s TJ3Sat, which was never heard from in space [35]. Long development
timelines often indicate inexperienced development teams and can lead to problems with
knowledge transfer as people join and leave the project during its development. For example,
TJ3Sat was worked on by more than 50 students during its 7 year development.
Short development timelines are possible for experienced teams that can build on heritage
designs. For example, CalPoly has developed eight CubeSats, with launches occurring
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on average every 18 months since 2006 [36]. However, in lieu of experience and heritage
designs, short development timelines can be tackled by having a stable core team of designers,
simplifying mission aims, and making sensible use of COTS subsystems.
The results of this survey can be summarised as follows:
1. Including redundant subsystems has a positive effect on reliability.
2. Mistakes in integration are common and cannot be prevented by buying commercial
subsystems.
3. Missions requiring more complex ADCSs are less likely to succeed.
4. Non-redundant, single-master bus architectures should be avoided.
5. Longer development time does not necessarily equate to more reliability.
Thus, while this survey uncovered interesting trends, it largely highlights the fact that mission
success is the result of a complex interaction between many factors, several of which, such as
team experience, development infrastructure, and mission complexity, are difficult to measure.
Additionally, it shows that simple reliability assumptions, such as COTS subsystems are more
reliable, or more redundancy is always better, are not always true, especially when considered
in isolation. Thus, the survey does not provide a simple “recipe for success”.
2.4 Summary
This chapter began with an introduction to the new class of small, low cost satellites. It
highlighted their growing capabilities and popularity, and described several exciting future
mission concepts. However, through a review of empirical reliability surveys, it then went on
to highlight their poor on-orbit reliability seen to date.
A discussion of traditional techniques for improving reliability followed. These techniques
follow one of two philosophies, namely: fault avoidance, or fault tolerance. Fault avoidance
attempts to prevent faults from occuring in the first place, and includes techniques such
as component screening and extensive test campaigns. Fault tolerance attempts to cope
with failures as they occur, and contains most traditional forms of redundancy. However,
the large overheads imposed by these traditional techniques, in terms of mass, volume and
budget was highlighted, making them poorly suited for implementation on small, low-cost
satellites.
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2.4 Summary
In an attempt to gain further insight into the causes of unreliability amongst small, low-cost
satellites, a parametric reliability survey of 159 CubeSats was conducted. The results showed
many counter-intuitive trends, including CubeSats with longer development times displaying
reduced reliability. While some advice for future CubeSat developers could be drawn from
the results, they largely show that there is no simple recipe for success.
To improve the reliability of small, low-cost satellites, new techniques, which minimise
overheads, are required.
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Chapter 3
Sources of Inspiration
The first part of this chapter introduces the remarkable robustness of biological life. It
describes the techniques used by unicellular and multicellular life to achieve this robustness,
and proposes that certain characteristics of multicellular life, if successfully replicated in a
man-made system architecture, could provide increased satellite reliability while minimising
overheads. These features are combined into the outline for novel, distributed system
architecture.
Further inspiration is drawn from a variety of research fields, including bio-inspired proces-
sors, agent platforms, and modular spacecraft concepts. A literature review of important
works from these fields is presented, and the expected novelties of this work, with regards to
each field, is highlighted.
3.1 Bio-Inspiration
In many ways, a satellite can be compared to a biological organism. Both have the ability to
survive independently in their environments, with ways of harvesting energy, hardware which
continues to function without external maintenance and the ability to make life-preserving
decisions. In the biological case, organisms must face environmental and biological hazards,
such as UV radiation and viruses. Similarly, a satellite must endure hazardous temperature
swings and constant attack from charged particles and micrometeorites. Since biological life
has achieved an impressive level of robustness, flourishing even in the most inhospitable parts
of the planet, alternative techniques for increasing reliability are often found by studying
characteristics of biological life.
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3.1.1 Unicellular Life
A cell is the smallest independently replicating unit of life. The earliest cells appeared at
least 3.8 billion years ago [37]. Since then, cells have become the building blocks of all life
on Earth.
All living organisms are composed of one or more cells. The earliest forms of life were single
celled organisms based on simple cells called prokaryotes. Single celled organisms include
most bacteria, unicellular fungi and unicellular algae. While single celled organisms perform
all the functions necessary to maintain life, including moving, feeding, producing waste
and reproducing, the majority never grow beyond microscopic size and remain relatively
simple.
Cells have evolved to include various mechanisms to increase robustness. These include:
genetic redundancy, DNA repairing mechanisms, special adaptions to extreme environ-
ments and the ability to transfer genes. However, as shall be explained, these techniques
are essentially analogous to the well-known techniques of functional hardware and soft-
ware redundancy, EDAC algorithms, special radiation hardened components and on-orbit
reprogramability.
Genetic redundancy allows certain genes in an organism to become damaged without causing
any noticeable effects. In fact, several studies with bacteria, worms and mice have shown
that only a fraction of their genes are essential [38]. The set of non-essential genes contain
non-functional genes and redundant genes. Redundant genes can compensate for damaged
genes, and have been shown to exist in many organisms [39]. For example, a biochemical
reaction within a cell may be redundantly catalysed by two distinct proteins generated from
different genes. Functional redundancy may also exist at higher functional levels within a
cell. For example, a study showed that 28-38 % of the chemical reactions involved in the
metabolism of the microbe E.coli can be inhibited without lethal results [40]. These forms of
redundancy can be compared to hardware/software functional redundancy in a man-made
system.
Cells have the ability to repair their own DNA if it gets damaged through a form a information
redundancy. DNA damage is caused by both normal cellular activities and environmental
factors. Human cells experience up to a million molecular lesions per day, each of which
threaten the integrity of the DNA [41]. The information redundancy manifests itself as in
the double helix structure of the DNA. Each DNA molecule is composed of two identical
strands. If damage occurs to only one strand, the other strand can be used as a template to
repair the damage [42]. If damage occurs to both strands, cells use more complex and error
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Figure 3.1: The bright colours of Yellowstone National Park’s geysers are caused by extremophiles
thriving in the 74 degree Celsius water (a) [43]. Giant single-celled extremeophiles have been found
living in the harsh conditions at the bottom of the Mariana Trench, 11km below the surface (b) [44].
prone techniques to attempt repair [41]. These techniques are comparable to error detection
and correction (EDAC) schemes used by man-made systems.
The most inhospitable locations on Earth are characterised by extreme temperatures or
pressures, high levels of radiation or poisons, low levels of moisture, or other hazardous
conditions. To survive in under such conditions, organisms known as extremophiles have
evolved special adaptions. For example, to function in the extremely hot environment near
a hydrothermal vent, thermophile cells utilize special heat tolerant proteins in place of
ordinary proteins in cellular activities [45]. Similarly, electronic components have been
designed especially for the hazardous environment of outer space. Such components are
typically designed to operate over wide temperature ranges (-40 to +85 degrees Celsius) and
can be made resistant to the effects of radiation. However, space-rated, radiation-hardened
components usually cost orders of magnitude more than their commercial counterparts.
Horizontal gene transfer, which occurs within the same generation, is an alternative to gene
transfer through reproduction. Usually an organism’s genes remain constant throughout its
lifetime. However, certain organisms, chiefly bacteria, have shown the ability to to transfer
genes between themselves. Such cells can benefit by taking up foreign genetic material and
altering their own genes. Horizontal gene transfer is thought to be a significant cause of
developed drug resistance. This occurs when one bacterial cell develops a drug resistance
through a random mutation, and passes the mutated gene to neighbouring cells. The ability to
reprogram a satellite on orbit is the man-made analog to horizontal gene transfer. A satellite
that can be reprogrammed on orbit could, within reason, be modified to cope with unexpected
environmental changes or design mistakes.
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Single celled organisms are still abundant on Earth, despite having existed for billions of
years. The reliability-increasing techniques seen in use by these organisms have well-known
analogues amongst man-made systems. Unfortunately, as discussed in Chapter 2, these
techniques typically incur large overheads, making subsystem-level implementations imprac-
tical and unaffordable for small-low-cost satellites. Nevertheless, as will be described in the
following sections, when implemented at a cellular level within a multicellular architecture,
these techniques play a crucial role in giving a system multiple levels of redundancy.
An important note to add here is that unicellular organisms have another survival strategy.
Their large numbers allow many individual organisms to die without compromising the
species as a whole. Thanks to small, low-cost satellites, the ’build many and accept a few
losses’ strategy is becoming feasible to satellite mission designers, too. For example, Planet
Labs has a constellation of more than 100 CubeSats which are used for Earth observation
[11], while SpaceX is planning a constellation of several thousand small satellites for internet
distribution [46]. Other projects have suggested making satellites as small as a single PCB
[47], or a single IC [48], to enable large swarms to be deployed. In either case, the loss of a
few satellites will have minimal impact on the overall mission outcomes. While this strategy
is interesting to study in itself, it shall not be the focus of this work.
3.1.2 Multicellular Life
At some point in the Earth’s past multi-cellular organisms began to appear. There are
currently three major theories as to how this occurred [49]. The symbiotic theory states that
multi-cellularity arose from a symbiotic relationship amongst a group of different unicellular
organisms. As the organisms became more and more dependent on each other for survival,
gene transfer eventually merged the organisms into a single multicellular organism. A second
theory, called Cellularisation, states that the origin of multi-cellularity may have been cells
with multiple nuclei. Such cells still exist, supporting the theory. The final theory, Colonial
Theory, states that multi-cellularity may have arisen from the symbiotic behaviour of a
group of cells of the same species. While there is still a lot of debate about how the first
multicellular organisms evolved, biologists agree that it has happened independently several
times in different branches of the tree of life [50]. This suggests that there are definite
evolutionary advantages to multicellular life. Today, all large, complex organisms, including
animals and plants, are multicellular.
Multicellular life has a fundamentally different architecture to unicellular life, and demon-
strates alternative ways of achieving robustness. As various aspects of multicellular life are
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Table 3.1: Number of specialised cell types versus total cell count in several organisms
Organism Number of Cell Types Typical Total Cells
Placozoa 4 few thousand
Hydra 15 50-70 thousand
Jellyfish 22 millions
Human 411 3.72x1013
detailed in the sections that follow, the alternative reliability-increasing techniques, and their
potential for being ported to man-made systems, are discussed.
3.1.2.1 Cells versus Subsystems
Multicellular life is based on cooperating cells. This arrangement allows individual cells to
specialise and take on specific tasks through a process known as differentiation. Typically,
a multicellular organism starts life as a single cell called a Zygote. A Zygote is totipotent,
meaning it can differentiate into any other form of cell. As the number of cells within the
organism starts to increase due to cellular division, cells begin to differentiate based on
location within the organism and many other factors. Humans contain approximately 411
differentiated cell types, including nerve cells, fat cells and red blood cells [51].
It may be tempting to describe a traditional, subsystem-based satellite as having a multicellu-
lar architecture with each subsystem representing a differentiated cell. However, this analogy
has three flaws. Firstly, the basic building blocks of a satellite are typically unique, discrete
subsystems, while the basic building blocks of a multicellular organism are, in a simplified
sense, a set of initially identical cells. While a satellite’s subsystems are generally designed
from the ground up to perform a specific set of functions, each cell initially has the potential
to perform any function. It is only through the process of differentiation that the cells take on
specific function sets.
Secondly, in biological organisms the number of differentiated cell types and extent of
differentiation typically scales with the total number of cells, as shown in Table 3.1 [51][52].
An organism with four cells representing four different subsystems is not a good analogy to
what is seen in nature. Such an organism would be less robust than a single celled variant
as the death of any one of its cells would lead to the death of the whole organism. Instead,
the cells in a simple organism composed of only a few cells would all have fairly similar
functionality.
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Finally, as is described in detail in the following section, the forms of redundancy seen in
multicellular organisms, while familiar, vary significantly from their traditional, man-made
counterparts.
3.1.3 Natural Redundancy
Through cell cooperation and the process of differentiation, multicellular organisms benefit
from three forms of redundancy.
Firstly, the lifetime of a multicellular organism is not dictated by individual cell lifetimes.
Cells are constantly dying and being replaced without any significant effect on the organism.
This is a form of cold redundancy. Because cells have the ability to self-replicate, a multi-
cellular organism has a large supply of spare parts. Unfortunately, man-made systems do
not yet have the ability to self replicate from raw materials obtained from the environment.
Thus, practical versions of cold redundancy require maintenance access, or sufficient excess
margins for all spare parts to be housed within the system from the very start. This is not an
attractive option for small, low-cost satellites.
In addition to cold redundancy, multicellular organisms display modular redundancy. Table
3.1 showed a comparison between the total number of cells and the number of unique cell
types in various multicellular organisms. There are typically orders of magnitude more
cells than there are cell types, implying that every task is being performed with significant
redundancy. If a few cells are misbehaving, their effects are essentially overpowered by
the correctly behaving majority. This is comparable to a massive voting circuit, where
the majority wins. Modular redundancy, such as TMR arrangements, are common in high
reliability systems. However, due to size, man-made systems cannot practically match the
sheer numbers involved in the biological version. In addition, unlike in the biological case
where the voting process is essentially analogue and not reliant on an arbiter, in digital
systems there is always the problem of how to make the voting circuitry, itself, reliable.
Finally, as the process of differentiation is not necessarily final, multicellular organisms can
display functional redundancy. Some biological cells retain the ability to de-differentiate
and re-differentiate throughout their lifetimes. Such additional phases of differentiation
are typically triggered by damage to the organism and occur in the area surrounding the
damage. For example, a zebra fish can regenerate after losing up to 20 % of its heart. Fully
differentiated cells in its heart de-differentiate before re-differentiating and proliferating to
restore the missing tissue [55]. Similarly, damage to the cells in the lens of a newt’s eye will
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Figure 3.2: Zebrafish (a) and Newts (b), can recover from cell damage through cell re-differentiation.
This is a form of redundancy only possible in multicellular organisms. Image credit [53][54]
cause nearby cells to de-differentiate and re-differentiate to replace the damaged lens cells
[55]. If the potential for cell division and multiplication is disregarded, the process of cell
re-differentiation can be viewed as a form of graceful degradation. Cells performing less
essential tasks have the ability to take over from damaged cells which were performing critical
tasks. Intrinsic, system-wide functional redundancy is rarely, if ever, seen in man-made
systems. Therefore, it is worth exploring this concept in more detail.
3.1.3.1 A Closer Look at Differentiation
Understanding the process of differentiation and how cells with the same DNA can specialise
into performing wildly different tasks, begins with an understanding of the importance of
proteins. Proteins are complex molecules which can aid in and perform a variety of chemical
and physical processes. Many cellular functions are performed by proteins, so it is important
for a cell to be able to produce its own set of proteins. The instructions for this are stored in
the cell’s DNA and are known as genes. The process of using a gene to produce proteins is
called gene expression.
The process of going from DNA to proteins is split into two steps, named transcription and
translation. Transcription is performed by a large molecule known as RNA polymerase. RNA
polymerase creates copies of particular sections of DNA. These copies are single stranded,
unlike DNA, and are called messenger RNA strands. The second step of gene expression,
translation, is performed by a large molecule called a ribosome. The ribosome synthesises
a particular protein according to information in the messenger RNA (mRNA), from raw
materials absorbed from the environment. The details of transcription and translation are not
important here. However, it is important to note that these two processes can be modulated
to vary which proteins are ultimately present in the cell, dictating its behaviour.
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Transcription normally begins when RNA polymerase binds to a promoter sequence on the
DNA. A promoter sequence is, in simplified terms, a start marker for a particular section
of genetic code. RNA polymerase will move along the DNA strand making mRNA until
it encounters an end marker. Which pieces of DNA are being transcribed at any moment
is controlled by regulator proteins. These proteins bind to regulatory sites on the DNA
near promoter sequences, effectively turning them on or off. For example, the unicellular
E.Coli bacteria prefer to feed on glucose, but can also feed on lactose if necessary [56].
Different sets of proteins are required for metabolising each of these food sources. Glucose
and lactose will bind to different regulatory proteins which, in turn, will activate or deactivate
the promoter sequences for manufacturing the appropriate metabolising proteins. Similarly,
cells can respond directly to a variety of changes to their environment through the activation
and deactivation of certain genes. Generally, the set of proteins present in a cell at any one
time dictate its specialisation.
The process of building proteins to perform functions is akin to building automated tools
before executing a task. Thus, since biological cells can build a large variety of tools, they
can differentiate to perform a large variety of tasks.
3.1.3.2 Decentralised Architecture
Now that the various forms of redundancy that are made possible through cellular cooperation
are understood, it is important to examine how that cooperation is achieved.
Complex multicellular organisms have brains which act as central task managers to coordinate
system-wide behaviour. However, simple multicellular organisms, like sea sponges, do not
have the equivalent of a brain [57]. In these organisms, all coordination and arbitration of
tasks is handled through cellular peer-to-peer communication. Even in complex organisms
with fully developed brains, a large amount of coordination is handled through inter-cellular
communication. At the most primitive level, a group of cells may coordinate their movements
to ensure the effective mobility of the group. Multicellular organisms utilise several methods
of inter-cellular communication to coordinate activity [41].
All inter-cellular communication techniques make use of signalling molecules [58]. A cell
wishing to send a message to another cell initially synthesises signalling molecules. These
molecules are then transported to the recipient cell. The recipient cell has various receptors
for different signalling molecules, depending on its current state of differentiation. The
successful reception of a signalling molecule can trigger changes in its gene expression.
Different cells may interpret the same signal molecules in different ways, depending on their
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own receptors. Inter-cellular communication methods are classified according to the means
and distance over which the signal molecules are transported between cells. Methods include:
Endocrine signalling, which works over long distances, Paracrine signalling, which operates
between cells in close proximity, Juxtacrine signalling, which operates between touching
cells and Neuronal signalling, which is very fast and point-to-point.
Endocrine signalling operates over long distances and is akin to a public broadcast. To utilise
endocrine signalling, cells release their signalling molecules into the organism’s bloodstream
(or equivalent e.g. sap, in plants). This allows the signal molecules to spread throughout the
organism. Signal molecules used for endocrine signalling are called hormones. A cell sending
an endocrine message is not targeting a particular recipient. Instead, the interpretation of
the message is dependent on each individual cell’s receptors. For example, the hormone
adrenalin is interpreted by almost all human cells. It causes the cells in the heart to increase
contraction rate, blood vessels to constrict and smooth muscles cells to relax [59].
Unlike endocrine signalling, paracrine signalling molecules only diffuse over relatively short
distances. Cells sending paracrine messages can only affect cells in their close vicinity.
Paracrine signalling molecules are released directly by cells into the space between cells,
known as the extracellular environment. The signalling molecules are short lived and diffuse
slowly, causing cells closer to the sender to experience higher concentrations of the signal
molecule. An example of paracrine messaging occurs during wound healing [58]. Molecules
called cytokines are released into the wound area causing skin cells to express more adhesion
molecules. These, in turn, help the skin to rebind.
Autocrine signaling is a special case of paracrine signalling where a cell is stimulated by
its own messenger molecules. The messenger molecules are released into the extracellular
environment, only to be re-detected by the same cell. In conjunction with paracrine signalling,
this behaviour can be utilised by groups of cells to judge their own population densities
[60].
Juxtacrine signalling requires direct contact between communicating cells. Instead of releas-
ing messenger molecules into the extracellular environment, a cell may attach the messenger
molecules to the external surface of its cell membrane. Neighbouring cells can only receive
these chemical messages if they are in direct contact with the sender. Alternatively, two cells
in direct contact may form a gap junction, which is a tunnel through the cell membranes of
the two cells. In this way, the cells can exchange messenger molecules without releasing
them into the extracellular environment. Juxtacrine signalling occurs amongst heart cells to
ensure that their contractions are synchronised.
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A final form of inter-cellular communication is neuronal signalling. Like gap junctions,
neuronal communication is point-to-point. The difference is that neuronal communication
can occur over long distances thanks to special cells called neurons. Neurons have a long
fiber, called an axon, which can span the distance between two distant cells. Chemical signals
are converted to and from electric signals within the neuron. Neuronal communication is
very fast because it uses electrical signals, instead of molecules, to transfer information. A
neuronal message can be blocked if there is damage to the neuron.
Neurons form the core of an organism’s nervous system. Nervous systems vary greatly in
complexity between different organisms [57]. The simplest multicellular organisms, like sea
sponges, have no nervous systems. In intermediately complex organisms, such as jellyfish,
the neurons form a diffuse network of isolated cells called a nerve net. Finally, complex
organisms have their neurons concentrated in a brain and spinal cord, with bundles of axons
(called nerves), radiating to all parts of the body. In this configuration, coordination of
bodily functions is largely centralised. Nervous systems allow faster and more directed
communication between cells, allowing better coordination.
The vast majority of satellites have a system of coordination between subsystems analogous
to a complex nervous system. A central OBC (brain) coordinates all functionality by
sending messages to targeted subsystems along specialised connections (nerves). Typically,
all communication between subsystems must pass through the central OBC. Similarly, in
humans, the process of removing a hand from a hot surface requires a message to be sent
from sensors in the hand to the brain (or at least the spinal cord) and back to the appropriate
muscles. While a complex nervous system allows for better coordination amongst cells, it
also presents serious vulnerabilities. In an organism, damage to the brain or certain critical
nerves may prove fatal. These are potential single points of failure. Similarly, a satellite
is likely to fail if it sustains damage to the OBC or critical links between the OBC and
subsystems. Thus, in a system where reliability is more important than high performance, a
structure and communication scheme similar to that found in simple multicellular orgasm
would be effective. That is, a decentralised, distributed architecture with a peer-to-peer
communication scheme akin to the endocrine system.
3.1.3.3 Programmed Cell Death
An important consideration when dealing with a group of coordinating cells is how to deal
with uncooperative cells.
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In biology, cells can die in one of two ways, necrosis or apoptosis. If a cell sustains major
injury from an external force, or is cut off from the blood supply, it undergoes necrosis.
Necrosis is unintentional death, and the process can cause inflammation and damage to
neighbouring cells. In contrast, apoptosis is cell suicide. Apoptosis is a controlled, natural
and necessary process in multicellular organisms [61]. A cell may voluntarily commit suicide
if it detects that it has been infected by a virus or has suffered genetic damage. Alternatively,
the reception (or lack of reception) of certain intercellular messages may also trigger aptosis,
if received in sufficient quantities.
Inappropriate apoptosis may lead to a variety of diseases. For example, cancer is characterised
by uncontrolled cell population growth and Alzheimer’s is thought to be caused by ex-cessive
apoptosis [61]. Similarly, cells with genetic mutations that fail to undergo apoptosis and
continue to divide can damage the health of the organism.
The importance of aptosis in multicellular organisms suggests that it should exist in some
form in an artificial multicellular system, too. At a minimum, this requires an artificial cell to
be able to detect anomalies in its own behaviour, and to have an isolated state which it can
voluntarily enter.
3.1.4 A Multicellular Satellite
Based on the lessons learned regarding how biological life achieves its robustness, the
following outline of an artificial multicellular satellite is proposed:
Instead of the avionics being based on a set of unique, discrete subsystems, a multicellular
satellite’s avionics are based on a set of artificial cells. Every cell is electrically and me-
chanically identical when it comes off the assembly line. Every cell contains an identical
set of ’DNA’, in the form of non-volatile instructions, which specify how to perform every
potential task of its host system. Once a set of cells have been assembled into a complete
system, the artificial cells communicate with one another over a peer-to-peer network and
coordinate their ’differentiation’. Through some mechanism which reads the DNA, every cell
reconfigures to take on a specific task within the system. Once the system is configured and
running, the cells constantly monitor their own and their peers’ health. In the event of a cell
failure, the cell can be isolated and the remaining healthy cells coordinate to take over from
the failed cell. Through this process, the satellite may degrade in capabilities or performance,
but the process ensures that the most critical tasks remain executed.
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Such an approach to low-cost satellite development will only be advantageous if the following
conditions can be met:
1. The resources required to develop a generic cell must be lower than the resources
required to develop the set of unique subsystems that are to be replaced by cells.
2. Cells must be sufficiently capable in their reconfiguration process so as not to impose
significantly more overheads than the dedicated subsystems they are replacing. In
other words, if a cell is to replace a subsystem, minimal additional external circuitry
must be required.
3. The process of differentiation must not invalidate electrical or environmental testing
that has been performed on a cell.
By fulfilling these conditions, a multicellular architecture could demonstrate the following
benefits:
1. Graceful degradation could replace ’instant death’ on missions with minimal resources
for backup redundancy.
2. Cell mass production could lead to reduced manufacturing costs.
3. Uniform, automated test procedures could save time and more accurately identify
manufacturing faults.
4. Simplified integration, thanks to identical electrical and mechanical interfaces, could
lead to fewer integration mistakes and reduced development time.
Despite the promise of such an architecture, there are potential disadvantages, too. The recon-
figurability of the cells will likely lead to overheads in mass, volume and power consumption.
In addition, the firmware development will likely be complex and the distributed nature of
the architecture has the potential for instability. The only accurate way to determine the cost-
benefit ratio of the proposed, conceptual system is through the design and implementation of
a prototype multicellular system.
To this end, the remainder of this thesis describes the development of the Satellite Stem Cell
Architecture, and the investigation of its practical feasibility through analytical reliability
analysis, simulation, and the development and benchmarking of hardware prototypes.
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3.2 Bridging Research Fields
While the architecture of multicellular life serves as the main inspiration behind this work,
several other research fields provide contributions, too. These include bio-inspired processors,
agent computing and modular spacecraft concepts. In the remainder of this chapter, important
works from each of these fields are discussed, and the expected contributions of the Satellite
Stem Cell Architecture are highlighted.
3.2.1 Bio-Inspired Processors
Like the work described in this thesis, many other projects have been inspired by the archi-
tecture of biological life. Bio-inspired processors are man-made computing systems which
mimic, or take inspiration from, various biological processes. Bio-inspired processors found
in literature vary significantly in capability, with some projects aiming for increased fault
tolerance, while others seek to accurately model biological processes. Many are implemented
within a single FPGA, where structures are more easily duplicated and reconfigured than in
discrete hardware. In this section, three prominent examples of bio-inspired processors are
described, including Embryonics, POEtic, and eDNA.
3.2.1.1 Embryonics
The Embryonics project is considered a classic amongst researchers of bio-inspired proces-
sors. Its stated objective is: ’the conception of very large scale integrated circuits endowed
with properties usually associated with the living world: self-repair (cicatrisation) and self-
replication’ [62]. The Embryonics design is based on a two-dimensional grid of cells, each
of which has a three-layered hierarchical structure (Figure 3.3).
The bottom layer of each cell contains a basic computational element called a MUXTREE.
It is composed of a 2-to-1 multiplexer and a D-type flipflop, together with interconnection
switches allowing the inputs and outputs of the MUX and flip-flop to be connected to
neighbouring cells. Each MUXTREE is configured using a 20-bit word, or gene. Each bit in
the gene acts on a control line of the MUX, flip-flop, or bus switches. Complex logic functions,
described using ordered binary decision diagrams, can be built up by interconnecting a set of
MUXTREEs. The authors of Embryonics describe cells configured with different genes as
being in different states of differentiation.
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Figure 3.3: The three-level hierarchy of the Embryonics architecture. The top two layers are only
active during the initial differentiation of cells, while the bottom layer is always active [62].
The second layer of an Embryonics cell is composed of random access memory, which stores
the cell’s ’genome’. The genome contains all the individual genes required to build the
desired complex logic function. Despite every cell containing the entire genome, each cell’s
MUXTREE will only be configured using a single gene of the genome.
The process of selecting which gene to load into the MUXTREE is handled by the top layer
of the artificial cell. The authors compare this process to that performed by ribosomes in
biological cells. In an Embryonics cell, a binary decision machine, or interpreter, executes
a microprogram to determine with which gene to configure the MUXTREE, based on the
cell’s X and Y coordinates within the grid. The genome memory and interpreter layers are
only active during the initial configuration of the cell. Thereafter, only the MUXTREE level
of the cell is active.
In addition to configuring its cell MUXTREE, the microprogram also copies itself and the
genome to empty neighbouring cells, effecting a form of self-replication. Thus, only a single
cell within the grid initially needs to be manually programmed with the genome in order for
the complete genome to eventually be expressed by a whole set of cells across the grid.
The Embryonics authors also describe a form of self-repair, where faulty cells are isolated
before the self-replication process produces new cells to take over from the faulty ones. How-
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ever, the original research paper describes it as a process which relies on human intervention
to identify and signal the presence of a faulty cell.
Two partial implementations of the Embryonics architecture were developed to demonstrate
the feasibility of MUXTREE-based logic functions. One implementation contains 240 cells
based on Actel 1020A programmable circuits, while the other is based on a custom developed
ASIC of 64 cells. However, each of these cells contained only the MUXTREE level.
Follow on research includes a reliability analysis of the Embryonics architecture [63] and
work on combining Embryonics with the research field of Immunotronics [64].
3.2.1.2 POEtic
The POEtic project highlights the heterogeneous nature of bio-inspired hardware to date,
noting that the lack of a universal development platform has prevented the emergence of
a methodology in the design of bio-inspired computing systems. To this end, the aim of
the POEtic project is the: ’...development of a flexible computational substrate inspired
by the evolutionary, developmental and learning phases in biological systems’ [65]. The
POEtic project does not aim to implement a specific bio-inspired architecture. Instead, it
aims to provide a flexible platform, composed of a grid of hardware ’molecules’, which can
be configured into cellular structures to study the potential hardware implementations of
bio-inspired algorithms and systems.
According to the members of the POEtic project, bio-inspired systems principally find their
inspiration in three biological models: phylogenesis, ontogenesis and epigenesis. Phylogen-
esis is concerned with the evolution of a species over time, and has inspired work such as
genetic algorithms, evolutionary programming, and genetic programming. The ontogenetic
model describes the development of an individual based on its genetic code. Cellular divi-
sion and differentiation are key processes in the ontogenetic model. Due to the difficulties
involved in developing self-replicating machines, study in this area was limited until the
invention of FPGAs. Now, projects such as Embryonics are attempting to mimic ontogenetic
processes to imbue integrated circuitry with features such as self-replication and self-repair.
Finally, the epigenic model describes how interactions with the environment can shape the
development of an organism. Research into epigenetic mechanisms has led to the research
fields of artificial intelligence and artificial neural networks.
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Figure 3.4: The organic subsystem of the POEtic architecture. It is composed of a grid of reconfig-
urable ’molecules’ and a grid of communication switchboxes. The molecules can be combined into a
variety of experimental artificial cells [65].
In order to facilitate research based on these three models, the POEtic development platform
is composed of three parts: the organic subsystem, environmental subsystem, and system
interface.
The organic subsystem, shown in Figure 3.4, is composed of a grid of elementary units
called molecules. Each molecule is composed of a four-input lookup table, a register and
a switchbox. A molecule can be configured to perform a variety of simple logic functions,
including being a shift register or multiplexer. These functions have been selected as useful
building blocks for implementing artificial cells. For example, a shift register can be used
to store a simple binary-encoded genome. By combining molecules and configuring their
interconnections through the switchboxes, different implementations of digital cells can be
realised. In addition to the grid of molecules, the organic subsystem also contains a grid
of routing units which can be used to implement dynamic routing mechanisms between
constructed cells.
The purpose of the environment subsystem is to allow interactions between between the
environment and the organic subsystem. Such interactions can come from physical sensors
and actuators interfaced to the environment subsystem, or from simulated environments for
studying, for example, evolutionary algorithms. Epigenetic processes will thus largely be
implemented in the environmental subsystem. The environmental subsystem is composed of a
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custom microprocessor and various peripherals connected by an Advanced High-Performance
Bus (AHB). One of the peripherals is a random number generator, which has specifically
been included to aid in implementing the randomness of evolutionary processes.
Finally, the system interface performs an integration function by mapping the configuration
bits of each molecule in the organic subsystem to the memory space of the environment
subsystem. Thus, researchers are able to implement processes which dynamically reconfigure
the molecular fabric. In addition, the system interface facilitates scaling of the development
environment by providing a communication link to other system interfaces. The system
interfaces can transparently map several organic subsystems together into a single larger
one.
The POEtic system has been implemented as a custom ASIC [66]. It contains twelve
molecules, together with the environmental subsystem and system interface. In addition,
various development tools have been created to facilitate the use of the chip, including a
graphical simulation tool.
3.2.1.3 eDNA
The eDNA project aims to create a fault tolerant, self-healing processor IC [67]. Its archi-
tecture, shown in Figure 3.5, is based on an array of homogeneous processing units, called
eCells, which communicate with one another over a two-dimensional mesh network. To-
gether, the eCells work to execute an eDNA program, a copy of which is stored in each eCell.
Each eCell executes only a specific part of the eDNA program, mimicking the biological
process of gene expression.
Each eCell is composed of a small, 8-bit MicroBlaze MCU, a 32-bit arithmetic logic unit
(ALU), and a block of memory for storing the eDNA program. eDNA programs are written
in a bespoke programming language which allows the program to be compiled into a set of
discrete ALU operations, or genes. The complete eDNA program is loaded into each eCell,
and each of its genes are executed in a distributed fashion by the ALU’s of the eCells. The
MCU is responsible for executing a program known as the ribosomal DNA, which performs
the self-organising and self-healing functions of the eDNA architecture. Based on its eCell’s
coordinates within the grid, the MCU locates a specific gene of the eDNA program and uses
it to configure the ALU. Additionally, the MCU configures the appropriate interconnections
to the ALUs of other eCells using the mesh network.
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Figure 3.5: The eDNA architecture is composed of a grid of eCells and a mesh communication
network facilitated by Network Adapters (NA). Each eCell contains an MCU, ALU and DNA memory
[67].
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The eDNA system is capable of recovering from eCell failures through a self-repair mecha-
nism, provided spare eCells are present. Once a failure is detected, a spare eCell is invoked
to begin executing the gene of the lost eCell. Since every eCell already contains the complete
eDNA program, no reprogramming is required. However, as part of the fault repair mecha-
nism, the MCU will attempt to transfer run-time state variables across to the replacement
eCell.
A 3 x 3 eCell architecture has been implemented in a Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGA [68]. As
part of a practical demonstration, the eCell system was integrated into an experimental
science instrument called a Fourier Transform Spectrometer. The small scale of the 9-eCell
implementation limited the demonstration to two simple eDNA programs. One generated
a voltage ramp, while the other performed the averaging of voltage readings from the
instrument. The results showed that the eDNA implementation is 6 - 90 times slower and
uses approximately 5 times more FPGA resources than a traditional HDL implementations.
However, it also demonstrated that the self-healing time is a fraction of the execution time
of an application. In addition, the eCell architecture’s intended migration to an ASIC
implementation is expected to increase its performance and decrease overheads.
3.2.2 Multi-Agent Systems
The concept of agent computing emerged in the 1990s as a new, high-level programming
philosophy [69]. Software agents are programs which can make autonomous decisions
within their environment to meet design objectives. Similar to the cells in a multicellular
organism, agents have life cycles, pursue goals and may have a level of mobility. Thus, agent
technology has the potential to provide a natural solution for facilitating communication and
cooperation between the artificial cells of a multicellular system.
As the name suggests, a multi-agent system consists of platform on which multiple agents
can coexist and cooperate. Agent platforms can be categorised according to their target
hardware platforms, their real-time capabilities, and their compliance to a standard. Target
hardware platforms range from desktop computers with gigabytes of RAM and multi-
gigahertz processors, to physically-tiny, embedded platforms based on MCUs clocked at
a few megahertz and with only a few kilobytes of RAM. An agent platform’s real-time
capabilities are determined by its agent execution environment (AEE), which may be based
on an interpreter, virtual machine, or native hardware. Finally, an agent platform aiming
to form part of a larger heterogeneous agent environment may choose to adhere to one of
several agent standards. For example, the Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language
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(KQML) [70] and the Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) [71] can be
implemented as standards for inter-agent communication. Amongst agent standards, those
of the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA), covering many aspects of agent
communication, behaviour and management, are the most modern and have proven to be the
most popular [72].
3.2.2.1 Traditional Agent Platforms
The most common agent platforms are those designed for standard personal computer
hardware. Typical applications for such a platform include multi-agent-based simulations
applied to a variety of research fields, including economics, social sciences, biology and urban
planning. As these applications do not have real-time requirements, agents are commonly
coded in Java and execute within Java Virtual Machines (JVMs). A good survey of 24
such platforms, including the popular, FIPA-compliant examples JADE [73] and FIPA-
OS [74], can be found in [72]. While these platforms are powerful, multifunctional, and
allow code mobility, their agent execution timing is non-deterministic due to the underlying
JVMs garbage collection routines, class initialisation, and just-in-time compilation [75].
Additionally, their large memory footprints make them undesirable for use in the resource-
restricted, embedded environment of a satellite.
3.2.2.2 Embedded Agent Platforms
Several agent platforms with reduced memory footprints have been developed for deploy-
ment on smartphones. Examples include JADE-LEAP [76], u-FIPA [77] and AgentLight[78].
These platforms typically make use of the JAVA ME Embedded or Android runtime environ-
ments as the basis for their agent execution environments. The Java ME Embedded runtime
environment is available for many platforms, including ARM Cortex M3 MCUs and requires
as little as 128 kB of RAM and 1 MB of ROM [79]. Experiments with AgentLight have
demonstrated the creation of ten agents using only 83 kB of memory.
The FIPA-compatible Mobile-C agent platform was specifically developed to have a small
memory footprint, and differs from the majority of agent platforms by using an embedded
C/C++ interpreter as its AEE [69]. The embedded interpreter claims to be smaller than
the Java ME Embedded runtime environment and allows agents to be written in the C
programming language. Writing agents in C simplifies the process of interfacing to low-level
hardware, which is a common requirement in embedded applications.
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Even smaller agent platforms have been developed by the distributed sensor node community.
Agilla, for example, requires only 57 kB of ROM and 3.3 kB of RAM when deployed on an
ATmega128L MCU [80]. Agilla is not FIPA compatible and its agents are programmed in a
custom language and execute in a bespoke virtual machine.
While agent platforms based on the Java ME Embedded runtime environment, Mobile-C, or
Agilla would fit within the processing power and memory constraints of a satellite embedded
system, the non-deterministic nature of their AEEs make them poorly suited for real-time
tasks such as attitude determination and control.
A solution to this problem is to replace the JVM with a hardware Java processor. Bridges et.
al. attempted to get the JADE-LEAP mobile agent platform operating on such a processor,
with the aim of developing a real-time agent platform for satellites [81]. The Java Optimised
Processor (JOP) was chosen and implemented in a Xilinx Spartan-3 FPGA. While the
feasibility of the concept was proven, a usable platform could not be developed.
The Secure Hardware Agent Platform (SHAP) is an alternative Java hardware processor
which was designed by Zabel et. al. specifically to enable the creation of a real-time agent
platform [82]. It has been demonstrated running the Connected Limited Device Configuration
(CLDC) API, which is a subset of the Java ME runtime environment. However, it appears
that no agent environment based on this processor has been developed yet.
3.2.2.3 Agents in Space
Despite the challenges of getting an agent platform executing on the constrained hardware
of a satellite, at least one agent has seen in-orbit operation. In 1999, NASA briefly handed
control of its Deep Space 1 probe to an experimental on-board agent [83]. The agent
successfully developed and executed plans for dealing with a variety of simulated events.
However, it was designed as high-level software and did not perform real-time tasks. More
recently, the ObjectAgent environment was developed by Princeton Satellite Systems for
its Techsat 21 mission [84]. However, this agent platform is designed to run on a powerful
PowerPC 750 processor, is not FIPA compliant, and was never completed as TechSat-21 was
cancelled.
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Figure 3.6: The Space Plug-and Play architecture envisions satellite subsystems and peripherals
interfacing as seamlessly as the peripherals of modern desktop computers [85].
3.2.3 Modular Satellite Concepts
Not many attempts have been made at designing a generic satellite building block. While
many COTs subsystems are available, they are usually built for purpose and are designed to
be reused across missions, not within the same satellite. Additionally, while some electrical
interfaces have become standardised, such as SpaceWire, mechanical, electrical supply, and
TTC interfaces are rarely standardised or compatible between manufacturers.
The two most interesting and relevant modular satellite concepts are the Space Plug-and-Play
architecture, and DARPA’s Phoenix Project.
3.2.3.1 Space Plug-and-Play
The Space Plug-and-Play Avionics (SPA) architecture [86] is inspired by consumer computer
plug-and-play interfaces, like USB, which have become very successful (Figure 3.6). It has
been under development by the US Air Force for more than a decade. Its goals include:
• Build systems dramatically faster (satellite in a week).
• Promote hardware and software reuse.
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Figure 3.7: The SPA network architecture [85].
• Aim for an ’open architecture’ by avoiding obscure and proprietary data handling
protocols.
• Make the addition of redundancy simple and flexible
The SPA architecture is composed of both hardware and software elements. The hardware
elements include a set of defined, electro-mechanical, point-to-point interfaces, a set of
routers, and an Application Sensor Interface Module (ASIM), which allows legacy devices to
interoperate with the rest of the system. Together, they allow a set of SPA compatible nodes
and peripherals to be networked into a complete system. The software elements consist of
an electronic datasheet embedded in each node (or ASIM), and a set of middleware which
manages the SPA network. The electronic datasheet is called the eXtensible Transducer
Electronic Datasheet (xTEDS) and allows a node plugged into the SPA network to identify
itself and its capabilities. As shown in Figure 3.7, the middleware is called the SPA Service
Manager (SSM), which runs on top of Linux and facilitates the discovery, registration, and
transfer of data between nodes.
The SPA architecture is not designed to be completely distributed. Instead, the SSM middle-
ware is hosted on a central node. Nodes performing different functions can be electrically and
mechanically different, as long as they abide by the interfacing standards. In collaboration
with the Swedish company AAC Microtech, a number of different SPA nodes have been
developed. The smallest node, called the nanoRTU (RTU - remote transceiver unit), is based
on an FPGA with a softcore PIC 16F84 processor. The nanoRTU is essentially an ASIM,
designed to allow legacy devices to access the SPA network. It is an intrinsically digital
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device and cannot interface directly to analogue sensors and actuators. However, a generic
analogue interface add-on has been created for it. Two larger devices, the Micro-RTU, which
consumes 1.5 W, and full RTU, which is still in development, are designed for interfacing to
more complex payloads. They are also capable of hosting the SSM middleware.
Work on the SPA architecture over the last decade has resulted in at least ten standards
documents being approved by the AIAA [85]. Furthermore, the TechEdSat 1U CubeSat,
based on the SPA architecture, was launched in 2012 and proved to be very successful. It
contained a Micro-RTU as its central OBC, which hosted the SSM middleware, and a number
of nano-RTUs which served as interfaces to other subsystems and payloads [87].
3.2.3.2 DARPA Phoenix Project
The DARPA Phoenix program highlights the fact that the construction and make-up, or
morphology, of satellites has barely changed over the past fifty years. Satellites are typically
constructed out of subsystems which are sized to achieve certain performance requirements.
In many cases, the process of sizing a subsystem is based on certain rules of thumb, which
have remained relatively unchanged due to the inherent risk-adversity of the space industry.
For example, both geosynchronous satellites weighing several tonnes and CubeSats, weighing
less than 3 kg, use essentially the same reaction wheel mechanism for attitude control. The
wheels only vary in size. Thus, an almost linear cost-mass-performance function has emerged.
Lately, focus has been placed on lowering the mass of satellites to reduce cost. However, these
efforts have largely been met with an equivalent reduction in performance, as is commonly
seen amongst CubeSats. To this end, the DARPA Phoenix program aims to: “re-define
the cost-mass-performance function, by challenging the existing satellite morphology and
demonstrate the concept of ‘cellularity’” [88].
In this case, the concept of ‘cellularity’ was also loosely inspired by multicellular life. The
Phoenix ‘cells’ are proposed as CubeSat-scale ‘satlets’ which will be assembled in space into
larger satellites. Assembly is envisioned to be performed by a larger constructor satellite,
and not autonomously by the satlets themselves.
As part of the Phoenix project, a study was undertaken to determine the optimum number
of unique satlet types, largely based on economic factors. This optimum was determined to
be four, namely: central, actuator, structural and payload satlets [89]. The central satlet is
essentially a complete nanosatellite, featuring data processing, attitude sensing, and ground
communication capabilities. The other satlets are less intelligent and are unable to function
independently. All satlets feature mounting points and power and communication ports,
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Figure 3.8: Comparison between traditional satellites of varying sizes, and their ’satletised’ counter-
parts [90].
allowing them to be aggregated into a single larger entity. As shown in Figure 3.8, it is
proposed that satellites of all sizes, from nano (< 10 kg) to large geosyncronous satellites
could be assembled out of a combination of these four satlet types. Different mission
requirements will be served by different combinations of satlets. For example, a highly agile
mission will include more actuator satlets, while a telecommunication satlet might contain a
large number of structural satlets in the structure of its dish antennas.
The Phoenix program aims to disrupt the cost-mass-performance function in two ways.
Firstly, by building all satellites out of the same four satlet types, the Phoenix program
hopes to make use of mass production techniques. They estimate, based on current satellite
demand, that there could be a market for 1000 to 16000 satlets per year, which is two orders
of magnitude higher in production quantity than any currently produced satellite subsystem
[89]. Secondly, the Phoenix program aims to reuse satlets which are still functional at the
end of their mission lifetimes. For example, large dish antennas, which are difficult and
expensive to launch, are specifically targeted as items which, if constructed out of satlets,
could be transferred from one satellite to another at the end of one mission’s lifetime.
The Phoenix project also notes that its satlet-based architecture allows designers to easily
trade reliability against other system traits during development. For example, changes in
the mission lifetime requirement which come during the satellite design phase could be
accommodated by removing an actuator satlet and replacing it with a spare central satelet. In
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Figure 3.9: Different scales of system cellularisation based on cells of increasing functional scope.
this way, the satellite will lose some manoeuvrability performance, but will gain important
redundancy. This process is simpler than the traditional process which would involve, for
example, reducing the mass of the reaction wheels to free up some mass budget for the
addition of critical system redundancy.
An implementation of the satlet concept exists in the form of NovaWurks HiSat platform.
Each highly integrated satellite (HiSat) is a complete satellite measuring 20 x20 x 10 cm
[91]. Their structures feature locking mechanisms and electrical ports, allowing them to be
assembled into larger structures. The eXCITe mission, scheduled to launch in late 2017,
will carry a pre-assembled satellite composed of several satlets into orbit [90]. Its primary
aims will be to test the mechanical design’s ability to survive launch, and to demonstrate the
satlets’ ability to function independently and together.
3.2.4 Discussion and Expected Novelties
The proposed Satellite Stem Cell Architecture, bio-inspired processors, and modular satel-
lite concepts discussed in this chapter demonstrate ’cellularisation’ at different scales and
functional scopes. This is depicted in Figure 3.9.
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At the lower end of the scale, bio-inspired processors, such as Embryonics, POEtic and
eDNA, demonstrate how aspects of biological cells can be applied at the logic gate level of
FPGAs and ASICs to enable features such as self-healing and functional reconfiguration.
Such features would be especially useful when trying to replace expensive space-rated FPGAs
with COTs ones. The ’cells’ in these projects are composed of simple logic elements or
elementary processors. Their greatest advantage in terms of reliability is their individual
simplicity. Further advantages of cellularisation in this form include rapid prototyping (if
built in a hardware description language), and large cell populations (extensive internal
redundancy).
However, when aiming for a practical system with fault tolerance at system-scale, current-
generation, logic-scale implementations have several disadvantages. Firstly, current gen-
eration implementations are based on digital circuits (which include the vast majority of
FPGAs), which mean they are limited to processing applications. Additional circuitry is
required to interface these bio-inspired processors into practical sensor-actuator systems,
and it is impossible for them to provide fault tolerance for other aspects of the system (e.g.
batteries, structure). Secondly, their limited functional scope is compounded by the fact
that projects such as Embryonics, POEtic and eDNA aim for accurate bio-mimicry at the
expense of performance. They require programs written in bespoke languages, bespoke
compilers, and are not designed with real-time applications in mind. Therefore, they are
currently limited to relatively simple lab demonstrations.
At the other end of the scale, cellularisation is applied at system scale. An example is the
DARPA Phoenix Project, which proposes building a larger satellite out of multiple, smaller
satelets. Theoretically, each satlet is an almost fully functional system itself. The main
advantage of applying cellularisation at this level is that every aspect of the system can be
made redundant. This includes processing capacity, avionics, actuators and structure. In
other words, each ’cell’ has a large functional scope.
However, there are several disadvantages that go along with a large functional scope. Firstly,
each satlet is a complex system in itself, and therefore less reliable (especially when compared
to the simplicity of a cell composed of a few logic gates). Further, as the scale of the cells
increase, so the total number of cells in the system is likely to decrease. This is simply due
to logistical and budgetary limitations. Finally, the complexity of the mechanism required
to replace a failed cell with a redundant one increases as the functional scope of the cells
increases. For example, replacing a logic-based cell within an FPGA with a spare simply
involves activating a few switches to reroute signals. However, physically moving a satlet
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to repair structural damage to another area of a multicellular satellite would require a very
complex (and in the case of the Phoenix Project, external) mechanism.
Thus, the Satellite Stem Cell Architecture, proposed in this thesis, aims for a novel middle-
ground in terms of scale and functional scope.
Compared to bio-inspired processors, the Satellite Stem Cell Architecture aims to distinguish
itself by extending beyond pure computational tasks. Through the use of generic I/O
circuitry, it aims to allow each cell to interface directly to a variety of peripherals, allowing
the implementation of complex sensor-actuator systems with minimal additional hardware.
Furthermore, while most bio-inspired processors to date have been lab experiments, the
Satellite Stem Cell Architecture places importance on the practical feasibility of the design.
In addition to providing sufficient processing capacity to perform complex tasks such as
attitude control, the Satellite Stem Cell hardware must be physically small and consume
minimal power.
The repair mechanism of the Satellite Stem Cell Architecture will be facilitated by a novel set
of middleware based on the concept of Agent Computing. Due to the resource-constrained
and real-time nature of a small, low-cost satellite platform, the developed agent platform is
envisioned to differ from traditional agent platforms in three areas. Firstly, the developed
agent platform will require a very small memory footprint - on the order of tens of kilobytes.
Secondly, real-time task execution is required, which excludes the use of interpreters and
virtual machines. Finally, in addition to the usual services provided by an agent platform, the
developed platform will be required to execute a distributed task allocation strategy.
Compared to the DARPA Phoenix project, the proposed artificial cells have a much smaller
functional scope. They aim to cellularise only a system’s processing elements and portion
of the analogue electronics. However, unlike the Phoenix Project and Space Plug-and-
Play modular spacecraft concepts, the Satellite Stem Cell architecture envisions a fully
decentralised architecture, where every cell has the potential to perform the same tasks and
reconfiguration is handled without external, or centrally coordinated, help.
3.3 Summary
This chapter presented an in-depth investigation of the techniques employed by unicellular
and multicellular life to achieve robustness. Unicellular life was found to employ techniques
which are well known to system developers. These include the use of specially adapted
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proteins (radiation-hardened parts), genetic redundancy (functional redundancy), and gene
repair (error detection and correction schemes). Multicellular life, on the other hand, displays
techniques which are not commonly employed by man-made systems. They are based on the
biological processes of differentiation and inter-cellular communication.
With the aim of adapting these techniques for use in man-made systems, an outline for a
novel, artificial, multicellular architecture was presented. It is based on initially-identical,
reconfigurable, hardware blocks, instead of unique, discrete subsystems. The proposed
architecture has the potential for enabling graceful degradation, mass production, streamlined
testing, and simplified integration.
The second part of this chapter presented important works from several other research fields,
including bio-inspired processors, agent computing, and modular spacecraft concepts, from
which key ideas and inspiration were taken.
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Chapter 4
Artificial Stem Cells
In Chapter 3, the unique characteristics that make multicellular life robust were discussed
and the outline of an artificial multicellular architecture was proposed. In this chapter, the
concept is further developed through the design of a new artificial stem cell. These cells are
designed to replace the avionics of traditional satellite architectures and to interface directly
to a variety of sensors and actuators. Since the proposed architecture has these cells at its
core, it has been named the Satellite Stem Cell Architecture.
Ideally, Satellite Stem Cells should replace all the avionics of a satellite. This concept is
more feasible than it seems at first. Through the advancement of integrated circuit technology
and software development environments, an increasing amount of discrete circuitry is being
replaced by microcontrollers and field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). This shifts
functionality from hardware to software, which can more easily be updated. Furthermore,
functionality which cannot be performed in software is typically implemented using a small
set of commonly used circuit blocks, such as high-power switches and analogue to digital
converters (ADCs). Thus, a generic hardware block, or cell, containing a microcontroller
and some of these common circuit blocks already contains the core of most traditional
subsystems.
However, subsystems which still contain a large portion of analogue electronics, such as
radio transceivers and battery charge regulators, are not being targeted for replacement by
the current generation of cells. Neither are the the peripherals, such as motors, temperature
sensors, and batteries. Nevertheless, as will be shown throughout the rest of this thesis,
the fraction of avionics which can be replaced by the cells described in this chapter, is
significant.
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Figure 4.1: A simplified depiction of the differentiation process in a biological cell, and the proposed
artificial implementation.
4.1 Artificial vs Biological Cells
Figure 4.1 shows a simplified representation of the inner workings of a biological cell,
focussing specifically on the process of gene expression. As explained in detail in Chapter 3,
it is the process of gene expression which allows a single biological cell to differentiate into
any of the specialised cells required within an organism. It is this quality, of subsystems being
able to reconfigure to perform a variety of roles, which lies at the heart of ASC Architecture.
Thus, as shown in Figure 4.1, an artificial cell capable of undergoing a process similar to
gene expression is proposed.
In a biological cell the majority of cellular tasks are performed by proteins. Proteins are
complex molecules and each one exists to perform a specific function. Proteins can interact
with one another directly, or with the outside world. The interface to the outside world
is provided by the cell membrane, which also acts to protect the cell’s internals from the
environment. At any one time, a cell will contain a set of different proteins, and it is this set
which determines the cell’s functionality.
In the proposed artificial cell the role of the proteins is performed by a set of discrete
processing elements. It is envisioned that these will either be MCUs or FPGAs. The discrete
nature of the processing elements is important to aid reliability, as the failure of a single
protein should not interfere with other proteins. Before being configured by having its
firmware or bitstream programmed, a processing element can be seen as a blank protein
slot, or a protein skeleton. A processing element is capable of pure computational tasks, or,
through the use of generic I/O circuitry, tasks which require external interfaces to sensors or
actuators. The generic I/O circuitry, which is explained in detail in Section 4.2, is analogous
to the cell membrane.
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In a biological cell proteins are created through the processes of transcription and translation
by a set of components known as the macromolecular machinery. These processes are
described in detail in Chapter 3, but in essence involve synthesising proteins from blueprints
stored in the DNA. Every cell in an organism contains the same DNA, which encodes instruc-
tions for synthesising every possible protein needed by the organism. The macromolecular
machinery is sensitive to conditions internal (e.g. protein concentrations and energy levels)
and external (e.g. messenger molecule concentrations) to the cell and varies which proteins
are being synthesised at any one time in response. In this way, a cell can react to changing
environmental conditions by changing its set of proteins, and therefore its capabilities.
The artificial cell’s version of protein synthesis involves programming a blank protein
processing element with a specific firmware image or bitstream, which is stored, with others,
in non-volatile memory. Every artificial cell in a system contains the same set of programming
files on board. While this may seem wasteful of memory, non-volatile memory technologies,
such as flash, have progressed sufficiently that the physical and budgetary costs of memory
capacity are not of large concern in this application. The macromolecular machinery’s role
is performed by a dedicated MCU on each cell. This MCU reacts to internal and external
conditions by loading specific programming files onto its proteins. The primary monitored
internal condition is the health and status of individual proteins. A likely response of the
macromolecular machinery to a failed protein is to reprogram a blank protein with the lost
task. Examples of actioned external conditions include changing available power levels and
increased radiation levels.
As each biological protein is essentially custom-built for a specific task, so, too, each artificial
protein program should be designed to execute a single system task. Thus, the system
designer is forced to break down the overall system functionality into tasks small enough
to be performed by individual proteins. The granularity of these tasks is dependent on the
processing power of the protein processing elements. Here, a trade-off exists. Smaller tasks
aid robustness, as the failure of an individual protein will have a less noticeable effect on
the system, whether or not that task is later taken up by another protein. However, as tasks
are made simpler and their number increases, the inter-protein communication bandwidth is
likely to increase. Additionally, some system tasks may be difficult or inefficient to break
down further. Thus, the choice of protein processing elements should ideally only be made
after careful consideration of the intended system tasks.
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Table 4.1: The interfaces of typical satellite sensors and actuators.
Peripheral Number on Sat Interface per Device I/O Channels
Reaction Wheel 0-3
3 digital inputs
3 half-bridge outputs
1 digital power
7
Magetorquer 3 2 half-bridge outputs 2
Burn Wire 0-3 1 half-bridge output 1
Magnetometer 1
1 digital power output
1 half-bridge output
6 analogue inputs
8
Temperature Sensor 3-10
1 digital power output
1 analogue input 1
MEMs Gyro 1-3
1 digital power output
2 digital I/Os 3
Coarse Sun Sensor 6 1 analogue input 1
4.2 Artificial Cell Membranes and Peripheral Interfacing
Having the ability to interface directly to external peripherals is a vital characteristic of the
Satellite Stem Cell Architecture’s cells. This feature sets the architecture apart from other
modular, distributed processing architectures, and allows cells to directly replace sections of
traditional satellite avionics.
There are two major challenges in designing the generic I/O circuitry of the artificial cell’s
membrane. Firstly, there is the problem of making the I/O circuitry compatible with the wide
variety of interfaces commonly seen in spacecraft avionics. As seen in Table 4.1, which lists
some common sensors and actuators, the required interfaces include high power outputs,
analogue inputs, and communication buses. Secondly, there is the problem of how to make
interfaces to peripherals robust and redundant.
To solve the first problem, a variation of the I/O circuitry commonly found in MCUs is
proposed. This is shown in simplified form in Figure 4.2. An input stage, output stage and
protection circuitry are combined to form a single I/O channel. As is the case in most MCUs,
the output stage is based on a MOSFET half-bridge. However, unlike most MCU outputs
which are only capable of sourcing tens of milliamps, the proposed half-bridge is capable of
supplying amps of current to directly drive actuators such as torquers and motors. In addition,
while the outputs of most MCUs are limited to operation at the 3V / 5V supply rails of the
MCU itself, the proposed half-bridge will accept alternative drive voltages.
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Figure 4.2: Block diagram of the generic I/O circuitry which allows proteins to interface directly to a
variety of external peripherals.
The proposed input stage is based on an analogue to digital converter and schmitt trigger,
similar to typical MCU input stages. However, in addition, the input stage features adjustable
gain and the ability to switch between measuring an input voltage and measuring the current
being delivered by the output stage.
Finally, the protection circuitry is responsible for preventing unexpected voltages on the I/O
channel from damaging the rest of the circuitry. There will be limits to the protection offered,
but it must at least protect against electrostatic discharge during handling.
To solve the problem of making peripheral interfaces robust and redundant, three options
were considered. The first option, depicted in Figure 4.3, involves having a bank of I/O
channels which can be controlled by multiple proteins through a set of digital multiplexers
(muxes). This configuration could theoretically allow any protein MCU on a cell to interact
with any peripheral connected to that cell’s I/O channels. However, this solution has several
disadvantages. Firstly, the I/O channels connecting to a particular peripheral are not redundant.
Therefore, if the I/O circuitry (or the associated mux) fails the attached peripheral can no
longer be accessed. Secondly, while multiple proteins on a single cell can access the same
peripherals, no cross-strapping between cells is possible. Finally, there is the problem of who
controls the muxes. No single protein may be the sole controller of a mux, and multiplexing
control of the muxes is likely to become infeasibly complex.
69
Artificial Stem Cells
ProteinGPIO
Peripheral
A
Peripheral
B
GPIO Protein
Figure 4.3: The first peripheral interfacing scheme gives each cell a set of communal I/O channels,
which can be accessed by multiple proteins on the same cell through multiplexers.
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Figure 4.4: The second peripheral interfacing scheme gives each protein its own I/O channels, which
can be switched onto different peripherals using multiplexers.
Figure 4.5: The third peripheral interfacing scheme removes multiplexers altogether. Instead, I/O
signal conflicts are avoided through a high-impedance mode I/O mode and through inter-protein
cooperation (in software).
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The second option, depicted in Figure 4.4, replaces the digital muxes with analogue ones and
moves them to the other side of the I/O channels. In this configuration, every protein has
its own set of I/O channels and every peripheral is assigned a mux. Through switching of
the mux, a peripheral can be controlled by various proteins. The primary advantage of this
solution is the redundancy of the I/O circuitry in each peripherals interface. However, there
are also multiple disadvantages. As before, the control of the muxes remains an unresolved
issue, and due to the need for physically housing the mux on a cell, cross-strapping between
cells is still impossible. In addition, the location of the muxes in this configuration requires
them to potentially pass large amounts of current, as would be the case if the attached
peripheral is a high-powered actuator. While analogue mux ICs capable of transmitting
a few milliamps are common, a high-current version would likely have to be built out of
discrete components. Such a mux would be unfavourably large and complex. Finally, while
every peripheral may be controllable by several proteins, each individual protein is likely to
have access to only a single, or few, peripherals. This is because every additional peripheral
a protein is given access to requires additional I/O channels from the protein. Every I/O
channel comes with overheads, so their number should be limited.
The third option, depicted in Figure 4.5, removes muxes altogether. As in the second option,
in this configuration each protein has its own set of I/O channels. However, instead of
going via a mux, the I/O circuitry is connected directly to a peripheral. By equipping the
I/O circuitry with a special high-impedance mode, multiple proteins’ I/O channels can be
directly connected to the same peripheral. All the proteins not currently interacting with their
attached peripherals put their output channels into high-impedance mode, which effectively
disconnects them from the peripherals. As before, every peripheral can be interfaced to
multiple proteins, but in this case each protein has access to only a single peripheral. This
mux-less configuration offers two main advantages. Firstly, peripherals can be arbitrarily
cross-strapped between proteins of different cells (not just between proteins on the same
cell). Secondly, the I/O circuitry is fully redundant in each peripheral interface.
However, while the problem of who controls the muxes is removed, the issue of peripheral
access control still exists. With no mux guaranteeing sole access, multiple sets of GPIO
circuitry can interact in undesireable ways. For example, two sets can compete, with one set
attempting to drive a line high, while another drives it low. Alternatively, one set of GPIO
circuitry may fail in such a way that it holds the line high or low.
The first situation must be dealt with in software. The cells must be capable of communicating
with one another to ensure that each peripheral is only being driven by a single protein at
once. This communication is described in Chapter 4. Arbitration between proteins attempting
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to access the same peripheral could be further aided by the fact that every I/O channel can
serve as both an input and an output, potentially allowing a protein to detect if another protein
is currently driving it’s attached peripheral.
The second situation, involving failed GPIO channels disabling each other, must be prevented
through good hardware design. A GPIO channel will not interfere with another if it is in a
high-impedance state. Therefore, the GPIO circuitry must be designed with well-understood
failure modes, which, as far as possible, result in high-independence states. Using fault tree
analysis and mostly discrete components, such a design is developed in Section 7.2.1).
The reliability of an interfacing scheme is based on a combination of its reconfigurability and
circuitry reliability. Of the three interfacing schemes considered, option three represents the
best compromise between these two characteristics. The fact that each protein can only be
interfaced to a single peripheral limits the reconfiguarability of multicellular systems based
on this scheme. However, this disadvantage is offset by being the only option which allows
inter-cell cross-strapping, and does not require muxes (which are difficult to find off the
shelf with the correct specifications and require ’centralised’ control). Thus, the cells of the
Artificial Stem Cell Architecture implement interfacing scheme three.
Having chosen the mux-less peripheral interfacing option, an important design question is
remains: How many I/O channels does each set of GPIO circuitry provide? As seen in Table
4.1, for the sensors and actuators commonly found on a satellite, one to eight I/O channels are
required. Two channels are sufficient for driving a simple actuator such as a magnetorquer
or for reading a simple analogue sensor. In contrast, seven I/O channels are required for
controlling a brushless-DC motor and eight are required for interfacing to a mixed-signal
magnetometer (ground return is not included in these counts as it can bypass the I/O channel
and go directly to satellite ground). While the number of I/O channels dictates the type
of peripherals that can be interfaced to, it does not limit the number of proteins the same
peripheral could be cross-strapped to.
The maximum level of cross-strapping will be dependent on the I/O circuitry implementation
and specific peripheral electrical requirements. For example, communication buses such as
I2C specify a maximum bus capacitance, which will increase with each additional interfaced
I/O channel. Peripherals can also be cross-strapped between cells.
Deciding on the number of I/O channels per protein is left as a design parameter for the
developer, together with the number of proteins per cell and cells per system. To aid in making
these decisions, Chapter 6 examines the effect of these parameters on system reliability and
makes recommendations based on a number of observed trends in system behaviour.
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Figure 4.6: The detailed design of two artificial cells within a multicellular system. Any protein on
a cell can take on the role of macro-molecular machinery. Peripherals can be cross-strapped to an
arbitrary number of proteins, as determined by the peripheral’s criticality. In addition, peripherals can
be cross-strapped between cells.
4.3 A Multicellular System
At this point the design of the proposed artificial cell and its functioning within a system of
cells can be further defined. While Figure 4.1 served to illustrate the comparison between
the proposed artificial cell and a biological cell, a more detailed design is required. This is
given in Figure 4.6, which shows the internal structure of two artificial cells from within a
multicellular architecture.
The first thing to notice about the cell’s design is is symmetrical nature. Every protein has
its own I/O channels and is interfaced to other proteins using three communications buses.
There is no dedicated macromolecular machinery MCU. Instead, any of the proteins have
the ability to take on the role of macromolecular machinery. This design is not far removed
from its biological counterpart, as the macromolecular machinery found inside biological
cells is itself largely composed of proteins. The protein acting as MM does not utilise its I/O
channels, so it does not interfere with peripherals cross-strapped to it.
73
Artificial Stem Cells
4.3.1 Inter-Protein and Inter-Cell Communication
In Figure 4.6, the proteins are shown as being linked with three communication buses,
namely, an internal inter-protein bus, an internal programming bus, and a bus for inter-cell
communication. Any protein on a cell can send and receive messages on the inter-protein bus,
which is analogous to the medium within biological cells through which messenger molecules
are able to move freely. In contrast, only the protein currently acting as macromolecular
machinery is allowed access to the inter-cellular bus. Any protein needing to send messages
to other cells must send them via the macromolecular machinery protein, which acts as a
router. Thus, in the artificial cell, the MM protein takes on the role of message access control
which is performed by the cell membrane in biological cells. Compared to putting all proteins
from all cells on the same bus, this design offers two key advantages. Firstly, on average,
the traffic on both the internal and inter-cellular buses is reduced. Messages which originate
and terminate on the same cell do not appear on the inter-cellular bus. Secondly, this design
allows a misbehaving protein to be isolated from the rest of the system. The MM protein can
look out for ’babbling-idiot’ failure modes and block such messages from corrupting the rest
of the system.
The programming bus and DNA memory are also controlled solely by the MM protein.
By reading programming files from the memory and reprogramming proteins over the
programming bus, the MM protein is able to emulate the process of gene expression. The
MM protein is constantly monitoring the health of the other proteins on its cell through
polling. If it detects a failure, it is able to reprogram a blank protein to take up the lost task,
or it can reprogram an active, but lower priority protein.
4.3.2 Artificial Mitosis
An important failure mode is the failure of the MM protein. In this case, one of the other
proteins on the cell must take over the role of MM. In order for this to be possible, every
protein must have electrical access to all three of the buses and the DNA memory, even if
only the currently active MM protein is allowed access to them. It is undesirable to have
every protein on a cell preprogrammed with the ability to be the MM, as it complicates the
process of writing ’user software’. Ideally, developers writing user code, which is designed to
perform system functions and intended to be executed on proteins, should not have to concern
themselves with the system reconfiguration process. It should happen transparently. Thus,
upon failure of a cell’s MM protein, one of the remaining proteins needs to be reprogrammed
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into the new MM. This is achieved by having the MM of another cell in the system reprogram
a protein on the stricken cell. This process can superficially be compared to cell mitosis.
In a simplified sense, during mitosis, a biological cell splits in two, resulting in two fully
functional cells. In the case of the proposed artificial cells, once the MM fails the cell could
be described as being dead. At this point, a watchdog timer times out and activates a bridge
which connects the dead cell’s programming and inter-protein buses to the corresponding
buses on its neighbouring cell. From the point of view of the neighbouring cell’s MM, it is
still a single cell but now with more proteins under its control. This is the point at which
artificial mitosis starts. The MM chooses one of its new proteins (which is physically on the
dead cell) and reprograms it with the MM code. Once the new MM boots, it disconnects its
cell’s buses from its neighbouring cell and proceeds to operate as usual.
4.3.3 Cell Death
If an artificial cell is misbehaving and negatively affecting other cells in the system, it
may need to be isolated. In the majority of cases, the cell’s ill behaviour will be due to a
misbehaving protein. This can be dealt with by the MM, which can turn off specific proteins.
How a misbehaving protein is detected is not specifically defined, but the MM may be able
to monitor its power consumption, responses to specific queries, and reset/stall rates.
If the MM protein itself is misbehaving, the only way in which it will be detected is if the
watchdog timer times out and a neighbouring cell intervenes, as described in Section 4.3.2.
Ideally, other cells in the system should be able to ’vote out’ a misbehaving cell, causing it to
isolate itself. However, provided the MM protein is misbehaving, the current generation cell
design does not include such a mechanism.
4.4 Summary
This chapter described the detailed design of an artificial cell, which serves as the building
block of systems based on the Satellite Stem Cell architecture.
Following the conceptual, multicellular system outline developed in Chapter 3, the artificial
cell must be mass-manufacturable, but also capable of performing a wide variety of tasks.
To this end, the artificial cell mimics the biological processes of protein synthesis and
differentiation. Discrete processing elements take the place of proteins and perform user
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defined tasks, while an additional processor performs the role of macromolecular machinery
by reprogramming the processors with firmware stored in non-volatile ’DNA’ memory.
By observing that the macromolecular machinery itself is largely composed of proteins, the
artificial cell could be simplified to include only one type of processing element. Thus, at any
one time, one processor on every cell is devoted to the macrocolecular machinery task, while
the rest are free to execute user-defined tasks. Both the protein tasks, and the macromolecular
machinery task, can be moved in the event of partial hardware failures.
To progress beyond pure computational systems and enable complex sensor-actuator systems
to be developed without additional hardware, a set of novel, generic I/O circuitry was
developed and included in each cell. Each generic I/O channel can serve as a digital or
analogue input, as well as a high-power output. Furthermore, each I/O channel has a high-
impedance mode, which allows peripherals to be cross-strapped between several channels.
This solution avoids the complexity of multiplexers, while ensuring that the drive electronics
are redundant.
Ideally, the artificial cells described in this chapter will be mass produced, as each cell is
electrically identical. To combine a set of cells into a complete system, the cells are linked
together using a common communication bus, peripherals are interfaced to the generic I/O
channels and cross-strapped to a user-defined level, and each cell’s non-volatile memory
is programmed with a complete list of firmware for executing all system tasks. Additional
redundancy, or processing capacity, can still be added late in the development by simply
adding additional cells.
A physical implementation of an artificial cell, based on the architecture given in this chapter,
is described in Chapter 7, together with measurements of performance and overheads.
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Chapter 5
Hybrid Agent Real-Time Platform
The complex processes which take place within a cell, including gene expression, differen-
tiation and the initial phases of mitosis, require careful orchestration. Furthermore, for a
multicellular organism to be successful, not only must its individual cells operate correctly,
but these cells are also required to interact and cooperate with one another as part of a global
task management scheme.
The artificial cells of the Artificial Stem Cell Architecture, described in Chapter 4, have
the required hardware to perform artificial versions of these important internal and inter-
cellular processes. However, it is desirable to abstract the hardware and the execution of
these processes from the application developer. Ideally, application code should be executed
robustly and transparently on the proteins of a multicellular system, without the application
developer having to be familiar with the process by which the code got to the specific protein
processors. To this end, the Hybrid Agent Real-Time Platform (HARP), a novel software
platform which combines real-time capabilities with the power and intuitiveness of agent
computing, has been developed.
The concept of agent computing emerged in the 1990s as a new, high-level programming
philosophy. A software agent is a program which can make autonomous decisions within
its environment to meet its design objectives. A software agent has aims, a life-cycle and,
in some cases, the ability to migrate between systems. Agents typically execute within a
software framework called an agency, which provides supporting services, such as agent
creation, life cycle management and inter-agency communication routing. The similarities
between the operation of an agent within an agency, and the operation of proteins within a
cell, have guided the development of the HARP middleware. Thus, the HARP middleware
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Figure 5.1: Schematic representation of an agency based on the FIPA Abstract Archtecture (a), and
an agent platform based on the HARP middleware running on an artificial stem cell (b). Note that
the Directory Facilitator is an optional component which is not currently implemented in the HARP
middleware.
turns every artificial cell into an agency, which supports the execution of ’protein’ agents on
the hardware protein processors.
In this chapter, the core components of the HARP middleware will be described, along with
unique, extended features relating to peer-to-peer task allocation, real-time capabilities, and
fault tolerance.
5.1 FIPA Abstract Architecture
The HARP middleware is based on the FIPA Abstract Architecture [92]. The FIPA organisa-
tion was formed to promote the interoperation of agents from different platforms. To this end,
they released the FIPA Abstract Architecture, which defines the fundamental components
required of any compatible agent platform, as well as specifying how agents should interact
with these components and each other. The components of a FIPA-compatible platform
include an Agent Execution Environment (AEE), Agent Management System (AMS) and
Agent Communication Channel (ACC). A schematic representation of the FIPA Abstract
Architecture and the HARP middleware are shown in Figure 5.1, and will be referred to
throughout this chapter.
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5.1.1 Agent Execution Environment
Every agent platform has an Agent Execution Environment at its core. The AEE is responsible
for executing agent code on a host machine and for maintaining a security policy to ensure that
agents cannot interfere with one another or the host machine. To enable agent mobility, AEEs
are often designed to present a uniform execution environment, even across different hardware
platforms. To this end, AEEs are commonly implemented using virtual environments,
interpreters, or virtual machines. Examples include the JADE AEE, which is based on a Java
virtual machine, or the Mobile-C AEE, which is based on a C interpreter.
Due to the real-time requirements and limited processing resources of satellite platforms, the
HARP middleware’s AEE is not based on a virtual machine or interpreter. Instead, protein
agents are executed as native code on discrete processors. As described in Chapter 4, the
artificial cells of the ASC Architecture each contain a number of discrete protein processors.
While one of these is always reserved for macromolecular machinery duty, the rest are free
to execute protein agent code. This is depicted in Figure 5.1b. The use of discrete processors
executing native code has several advantages. These include more efficient code execution
(and therefore lower power consumption) and the intrinsic ability to implement real-time
tasks, which are essential for AOCS operations. Because agent code is pre-compiled before
it is deployed onto the system, agent mobility between platforms based different processors
is not supported. However, just as proteins can migrate between the cells of a biological
organism, the agent proteins can migrate between the artificial cells of a multicellular system.
This process is orchestrated by the Agent Management System.
5.1.2 Agent Management System
The Agent Management System is analogous to a cell’s macromolecular machinery. It is
responsible for managing the lifecycles of protein agents, including their creation, registration,
decommissioning, and migration. Since every artificial cell is treated as an agency, every
cell has its own AMS, which is executed on the macromolecular machinery protein. To
create a new agent the AMS implements an artificial version of gene expression by reading a
set of compiled agent code from DNA memory and programming it onto one of its protein
processors. According to the FIPA Abstract Architecture, every agent is required to register
with its AMS, which it does using a unique, hard-coded, user-defined identifier. The AMS
maintains a list, called the agent directory, of all the protein agents currently executing on its
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cell. The AMS provides a service which allows the agent directory to be queried by proteins
on the same cell, or by proteins on other cells, to look-up communication addresses.
Going beyond the basic requirements of a FIPA AMS, a HARP AMS continuously monitors
the health of all its registered agents. This is done by measuring the current consumption of
their respective protein processors and by checking their responsiveness. If an agent fails
its health check, the AMS will attempt to revive it. This process may involve several steps,
including soft and hard restarts (power cycling the protein processor) or reprogramming. If it
is determined that an the protein processor on which an agent was executing has suffered
an unrecoverable failure, the AMS can attempt to restore the agent on another protein
processor.
The process of agent restoration is the same as agent migration. The ability for agents to
migrate is not a compulsory feature of FIPA-compatible platforms. Nevertheless, many
agent platforms support some form of agent migration. To differentiate migration from
simply creating a new agent of the same type in another location, migration requires the
continuity of some level of runtime information. The strictest implementations transfer the
instruction counter and stack. The HARP implementation only provides the ability to transfer
user defined runtime variables. While executing, an agent may request its AMS to store
given runtime variables in central, volatile memory. This memory is different from the DNA
memory as it is non-volatile. It represents the intra-cellular medium within a biological cell
in which cell state is effectively encoded through the specific concentrations of proteins and
messenger molecules. The AMS’s Agent Directory is stored in the same memory.
To restore an agent, the AMS effectively creates a new agent of the same type on an available
protein processor. Alternatively, the AMS can request another cell’s AMS to create the new
agent. It is then up to the newly created agent to query the AMS for any available runtime
variables.
5.1.3 Agent Communication Channel
To facilitate communication between agents and the AMS, and between agents themselves,
the FIPA Abstract Architecture specifies the need for an Agent Communication Channel and
Agent Communication Language (ACL). The ACC interacts with other agency services, such
as the AMS Agent Directory, to provide a Message Transport Service (MTS). Since effective
inter-agent communication is a key goal of the FIPA organisation, it provides extensive
specifications relating to, amongst others, transport protocols, message encoding and agent
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Figure 5.3: The HARP middleware communication stack, supporting both ACL and real-time
messaging. Layers shown in grey implement FIPA protocols.
interaction protocols. However, FIPA does not concern itself with the lower levels of the
Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) network stack [93]. The FIPA communications model is is
a service oriented model and is described using its own protocol stack which resides within
the application layer of the OSI network stack [94]. This relationship is shown in Figure
5.2.
The HARP ACC’s message transfer service does not implement a FIPA-defined message
transfer protocol and is therefore not fully FIPA compliant. However, it does implement
the higher levels of the FIPA communications stack, including the encoding, messaging,
communicative acts and interaction protocols. This design, shown in Figure 5.3, allows both
FIPA ACL messages and real-time packets to be sent between agents.
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5.1.3.1 Physical and Data Link Layers
The physical and data link layers of the HARP communications stack are based on CAN
2.0A. CAN is a multi-master bus which is used extensively in real-time, multi-master
environments, such as vehicles and automated production lines. The choice of CAN for
the HARP communication stack was made in collaboration with the artificial cell hardware
development. The Artificial Stem Cell Architecture calls for peer-to-peer networking between
its proteins and cells, necessitating a multi-master bus. CAN was chosen for its flight heritage,
real-time messaging capabilities, and low implementation cost in terms of processing power,
power consumption, and volume.
Flight heritage comes from SSTL, amongst others, who have successfully used CAN as their
main spacecraft bus [95]. CAN’s real-time capabilities derive from its deterministic message
arbitration scheme [96]. A CAN frame is composed of several fields, including a message
identifier (ID), payload data, a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) code and various other flow
control bits. Arbitration between messages from different masters is performed based on the
message ID, with lower numerical IDs receiving priority. Thus, a node attempting to send a
low priority message, which gets suppressed by a higher priority message, will attempt to
retransmit.
In a CAN network, the arbitration, message framing, acknowledgement and error detection
are orchestrated in hardware by discrete CAN controller and transceiver ICs. These make
implementation simple and free up valuable processor time. In fact, an increasing number of
MCUs are becoming available with the CAN controller, and even the transceiver, embedded
as a peripherals.
A CAN frame does not necessarily contain any information about its origin or destination.
All it has is a message ID, for which receivers can selectively filter. Thus, a CAN network
can be set up to use the message IDs as destination addresses, or IDs can be used to indicate
message contents. As an example, the ID could be used to indicate whether a message’s
contents were temperature, battery voltage, or attitude telemetry. However, because message
IDs are used for arbitration, it is important that each node on a CAN bus uses a unique set of
IDs.
5.1.3.2 Network and Transport Layers
In the HARP communication stack, the CAN message IDs are used as destination addresses.
Every active protein in the system has a unique address which is composed of a 4-bit cell
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address and 7-bit protein address. Together, these form the standard 11-bit CAN message
ID field. A protein is given its address, which is based on its physical location within the
system, when it registers with its AMS. In addition, certain IDs are reserved for special
functions. Examples include protein ID 127, which is reserved for AMSs and cell ID 0,
which is reserved for real-time traffic.
Every cell has an internal, inter-protein bus and is connected to the global, inter-cellular
bus. CAN frames are routed between these two buses by a router service, which is executed
on the MM protein. The router service uses the message IDs to determine whether CAN
frames need to be routed into, or out of, the cell. On the internal bus the router service
filters for messages with cell addresses which do not match the local cell address. Such
frames are repeated onto the inter-cellular bus. Similarly, on the inter-cellular bus the router
service filters for messages with a cell address which matches the local cell address. Such
frames are repeated onto the internal bus. Thus, the router service does not need to have any
understanding of the higher level FIPA protocols. It could, however, be instructed not to
route certain message IDs to isolate misbehaving proteins from the rest of the system.
Standard CAN frames have a maximum payload capability of 8 bytes. This is insufficient for
implementing higher-level FIPA protocols. Thus, an additional protocol is required which
can package longer messages into a set of standard CAN frames. A suitable protocol is ISO
15765-2, or ISO-TP, which is commonly used for transporting diagnostic messages across a
vehicles CAN network. ISO-TP sacrifices one or more of the payload bytes in each standard
CAN frame to encode information, called the protocol control information (PCI), which
allow multiple frames to be recombined. ISO-TP defines four different frame types, each of
which is identified using the PCI. These types are called single, first, consecutive and flow
control frames.
Messages which are shorter than eight bytes are sent as a single frame. The transfer of a
longer message begins with the transmission of a first frame, which contains the first six bytes
of message data and PCI describing the frame type and total message length. Thereafter, the
sender waits for a flow control frame from the recipient, which specifies parameters for the
transmission of further frames. These parameters include the number of frames which can be
sent before waiting for another flow control frame, and the rate of transmission of frames.
Upon reception of a flow control frame, the sender completes the transaction by sending a
series of consecutive frames, each of which contains seven bytes of message data.
ISO-TP enables the transfer of messages which are longer than eight bytes, which is essential
for implementing higher-level FIPA protocols. However, in its standard form, it is not a
capable ACL transport service as its packets do not contain sender information. Thus, the
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Conversation ID = 0x1234
CONTENTS
(raw bytes)
0x00 0x01 0x02 0x03 0x04 
0x05 0x06 0x07 0x08 0x09 
0x0A 
Initiator Participant
query-if
refuse
agree
failure
inform-result
[agreed]
a) b)
Figure 5.4: An example HARP ACL message (a), and a schematic representation of the Query FIPA
interaction protocol.
ISO-TP protocol was modified slightly to include the sender address in the PCI of first frames.
This reduces the number of message payload bytes in first frames from six to four, but does
not impact consecutive frames.
5.1.3.3 FIPA Higher-Level Protocols
The ISO-TP protocol is used to transport FIPA ACL messages. FIPA ACL messages are
designed to be universally understood by FIPA-compatible agents, and as such contain
information about the message format, its origin, and destination in a header. The specifi-
cations for FIPA ACL messages describe what fields must be present in the header, as well
as specifying several optional fields. An example ACL message, as used by the agents of
the HARP middleware, is shown in Figure 5.4a. The Agent Identifier, Intended Recipient,
and Message Length header fields are self-explanatory. The purposes of the Message Type,
Protocol, and Conversation ID fields will become clear once the various layers of the FIPA
protocol stack have been described.
In addition to specifying the structure of ACL messages, FIPA also has specifications for how
these messages should be encoded for transport. Several encoding schemes are specified,
including XML, String, and Bit-Efficient. The XML and String encodings have the advantage
of being human-readable. However, they are primarily useful for agent platforms operating
on reasonably powerful hardware and within fast networks, due to their large overheads. The
bit-efficient encoding scheme is specifically designed to be simple for machines to parse and
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requires low communication bandwidth, and was thus chosen for the HARP middleware.
The specifications for the FIPA Bit-Efficient encoding can be found in [97].
Next, FIPA defines how ACL messages should be used in interactions. FIPA defines a
number of different message types, called Communicative Acts, which are used in interaction
sequences known as Interaction Protocols. The only mandatory Communicative Act is called
the not-understood message, which should be an agent’s response to any message it receives
but cannot understand. As long as an agent is capable of replying with a not-understood
message to any message it receives, it is considered FIPA-compatible. However, to be useful,
an agent should be able to understand and reply to a wider variety of message types.
An example of a useful interaction sequence, known as the query-if interaction protocol, is
shown in Figure 5.4b. The sequence begins when an agent sends a query-if message type
to another agent. This message type is used to make a request for information, the details
of which are stored in the message body. The header of the message will contain query-if
in its message type field, and will contain a unique conversation ID, which is generated by
the initiating agent. Conversation IDs are used to keep track of which message belongs to
which interaction, as an agent may be carrying out several interactions at once. Provided the
recipient understands the message, it will reply with either an agree or refuse message type.
The refuse response indicates that the recipient is not willing to proceed with the interaction,
perhaps because it is currently busy, or it does not support the initiated interaction protocol.
An agree response indicates that the recipient is willing to proceed with the interaction, and
in this case will attempt to service the request. Once the recipient has had time to service the
request, it will reply with the requested information in the body of an inform-result message,
or it will reply with a failure message. Failure could be due to the requested information
being private, or non-existent, amongst others.
As shown in Figure 5.3, HARP agents understand all the message types required to participate
in Query and Request interaction protocols. Examples of Query interactions include querying
an agent with access to temperature sensor peripherals for sensor readings, or querying the
AMS for a registered agent’s address. Examples of Request interactions include requesting
an agent with access to a reaction wheel to provide a torque, or requesting an agent to
start producing a real-time telemetry stream. While FIPA defines several other interaction
protocols, these two provide a solid base from which a lot of functionality can be achieved.
Further interaction protocols can be added in the future.
As mentioned, the details of a query or request are given in the message body or contents
(as opposed to header). FIPA suggests implementing a content language with a well-defined
syntax and semantics to aid the interaction of heterogeneous agents. Examples of such
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languages include the FIPA Semantic Language (SL), Knowledge Interchange Format (KIF)
and Constraint Choice Language (CCL). However, due to the added processing power
required to parse these languages and the relatively simple interactions envisioned for HARP
agents, no formal content language is employed. Instead, the message contents is simply
a byte array with interaction parameters stored in known indices. Implementing a formal
content language is feasible in the future.
5.2 Extended Features
In addition to the core FIPA Abstract Architecture components, the HARP middleware
includes several features which tailor it specifically to the Artificial Stem Cell Architecture.
These include its support for real-time messaging, autonomous task allocation, agent redun-
dancy, and its ability to recover from agency failures. These features are described in the
subsections that follow.
5.2.1 Real-Time Messaging
ACL messages are used by agents to exchange information in a process known as an
interaction protocol. However, since ACL messages are transported using the ISO-TP
protocol, which involves reassembling messages from a number of frames, they are not well
suited to real-time communication. Therefore, the ACL communication stack also makes
provision for real-time CAN traffic. Messages with a cell ID of zero, which translates to
CAN message IDs 0-126, are reserved for real-time frames. Since these message IDs are
numerically lower than any ACL messages, which have cell IDs starting from one, they
will receive priority on the CAN bus. Real-time messages are automatically forwarded by
all routers, in both directions, simulating a single bus system. It is envisioned that ACL
interactions will be used to set up producer/consumer relationships between protein agents,
whereafter these raw, real-time message frames will be used to transfer time-sensitive data.
For example, a protein agent running an attitude estimator may use FIPA ACL messages to
request that another protein, interfaced to a gyroscope sensor, start to produce a stream of
periodic, real-time sensor readings.
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5.2.2 Task Allocation Entity
A system can be defined by the list of tasks it is required to be executing at any one time.
Just like in a biological organism, in a system based on the Artificial Stem Cell Architecture,
it is up to the individual cells to cooperate to ensure that this list of tasks is performed. This
process involves sensing information about the system state and manipulating the life cycles
of proteins.
In biological multicellular systems, individual cells can gather information about the system
state by measuring the concentrations of messenger molecules in the inter-cellular space.
These messenger molecules are the product of protein activity and the presence or absence of
a particular molecule can signify that a particular task is, or is not, currently being performed.
These concentrations of messenger molecules affect the macromolecular machinery inside a
cell and influence which proteins get synthesised. For example, the absence of a particular
messenger molecule in inter-cellular space may invoke the macromolecular machinery to
start synthesising the particular protein responsible for the missing messenger molecule.
Through this feedback loop, cells are able to distribute tasks amongst themselves.
A simplified version of this process underlies the P2P task allocation strategy of the artificial
cells running the HARP middleware. Within each cell, which is its own agency, a Task
Allocation Entity (TAE) is responsible for interacting with other TAEs to coordinate its local
allocation of tasks. This process is depicted in the flowchart of Figure 5.5.
At a user defined interval, every cell’s TAE queries its local AMS for its agent directory
and broadcasts a list of all locally registered agents. This process is akin to the secretion of
messenger molecules in relation to active protein tasks. By listening out for these broadcasts,
every TAE can build and maintain a list of all the agents, and therefore tasks, currently being
executed by the system. In addition, every artificial cell contains, alongside its DNA of
protein firmwares, a prioritised list of system tasks. This list is identical in every cell and
is written by the system developers. The TAE routinely compares this list to the current
system state and will instruct its AMS to create a new agent if a particular task is found
to be missing. Because the TAE process is happening concurrently on every cell within
a multicellular system, several cells may detect a missing task almost simultaneously. To
minimise the instantiation of duplicate agents, each cell is given a unique priority within
the system. The TAE will immediately request its AMS to retire an agent if it is detected to
already be executing on a higher priority cell. In a biological cell, the role of the prioritised
task list is encoded in the transcription factors and DNA in the form of enhancer and promoter
sequences.
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Figure 5.5: Flowchart depicting the task allocation strategy executed concurrently and asyncronously
by every cell’s Task Allocation Entity.
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If a cell’s TAE discovers that a high priority task is not currently executing, but has no free
proteins on which to deploy the relevant agent, it will request its AMS to replace a lower
priority agent with the high priority one. However, this will only occur after a defined waiting
period, during which other cells, with potentially free proteins, also have a chance to detect
and act on the missing task. This process is not globally optimum, as the protein that is
replaced may not be the lowest priority globally. Instead, it will be the lowest priority on its
particular cell. However, the replacement will trigger a series of replacements throughout
the system, ending with globally highest set of tasks being executed. While not optimally
efficient, this process is robust as no negotiation is required between cells. In addition, protein
replacements are expected to occur infrequently and only in response to failures or significant
environmental changes.
5.2.3 Redundancy
To hasten system recovery after a failure, redundant agents may be introduced. Both cold
and hot redundancy is supported. Cold redundant agents are proteins which have been
programmed with the relevent agent firmware, but are physically switched off. Activation of
a cold redundant agent proceeds through boot-up, AMS registration and runtime variable
update processes, before taking over from the failed agent. On the other hand, hot redundant
agents are powered on and pre-registered, but are in a paused state. Runtime variable updates
may still occur to keep the hot redundant agent in sync with its active counterpart. The
activation of either form of redundancy takes less time than it takes to program a new
protein.
If redundancy is enabled, the TAE entity will attempt to fill unused proteins with redundant
agents, again starting from the highest priority. Redundant agents are always replaced before
any active agent in the event of a task reshuffle.
5.2.4 Agency Services Failure
In a typical agent platform, the agency presents a potential single point of failure. As ex-
plained, the agency is responsible for providing a number of services. These include both
mandatory services, such as directory lookups, message routing and agent lifecycle manage-
ment, and HARP specific services, such as task distribution and runtime variable management.
Without these services, the multicellular system would fail. Thus, in order to remove this
potential single point of failure, the HARP agencies are, themselves, mobile.
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As explained in Section 4.3.2, failure of the acting macromolecular machinery protein (and
therefore the agency) results in a recovery procedure akin to artificial mitosis. This process is
orchestrated by the HARP middleware.
Upon failure of the MM protein, the protein health-check service ceases. This is detected
by a hardware watchdog timer on the cell which activates a hardware bridge between the
programming and inter-protein buses of the stricken cell with those of its neighbouring cell.
At this point the neighbouring cell’s agency will detect the additional proteins which have
now been added under its control. In effect, the neighbouring agency’s AEE has expanded.
Following the same process as reprogramming one of its proteins with a new agent, the
agency will reprogram one of the new proteins (which are physically located on the stricken
cell) with the agency firmware. Once that protein boots, it becomes the active agency of
the previously stricken cell. The programming buses are disconnected and the two cells
operate independently once again. The new agency will attempt to revive the old, stricken
MM protein for reuse as a standard agent protein.
Through this process agencies are kept functional above all else, despite increasing hardware
failures.
5.3 Summary
This chapter described the Hybrid Agent Real-Time Platform, which is a set of middleware
designed to facilitate communication and cooperation between the artificial cells of Chapter
3. Through the implementation of a decentralised task management strategy, the HARP
middleware allows a multicellular system to gracefully degrade in response to hardware
failures.
The HARP middleware turns each artificial cell into an agent platform based on the Foun-
dation for Intelligent Physical Systems Abstract Architecture. Each agency implements the
compulsory FIPA components, including an Agent Management System, Agent Communica-
tion Channel, and Agent Execution Environment. Furthermore, the HARP communication
stack implements the FIPA specifications for Agent Communication Language, encoding,
communicative actions, and interaction protocols.
Unlike the majority of agent platforms, designed for desktop computers, the HARP middle-
ware is expected to run on the resource constrained, embedded environment of a low-cost
satellite. This necessitates a small memory footprint, fault tolerance, and support for real-time
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operations. To fulfil these requirements, the HARP middleware distinguishes itself from
typical agent platforms in several areas.
Firstly, the HARP middleware does not make use of virtual machines or interpreters and
instead uses discrete processors as its agent execution environment. This has the advantage
of reducing the agency memory footprint and enabling protein agents to perform real-time
tasks.
Secondly, in place of resource-intensive protocols such as HTTP and IIOP, the HARP
communication stack makes use of ISO-TP over CAN 2.0A. This design saves memory and
processing time, as well as allowing real-time CAN traffic to share the network and be given
priority over ACL communication.
Third, the HARP middleware embeds a peer-to-peer task manager in each agency, allowing
systems composed of Satellite Stem Cells to autonomously reconfigure in the event of failures.
The task manager supports the allocation of redundant protein agents, to reduce recovery time,
and preserves user-defined runtime variables using a form of ’soft’ agent mobility.
Finally, while most agent platforms can recover from the failure of an agent, the HARP
middleware can additionally recover from a complete agency failure. This is possible because
agents and agencies execute on the same discrete processors within an artificial cell. Thus,
through a process akin to cell mitosis, the agency can be moved from a failed processor to a
functional one, possibly displacing an agent protein in the process. This capability prevents
agencies from becoming a potential single point of failure.
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Chapter 6
Reliability Analysis and Simulation
In this chapter, the theoretical reliability of multicellular systems is investigated. First, the
derivation of an analytical solution for predicting the lifetimes of simple multicellular systems
is presented. Using this solution, the reliability of multicellular systems is compared against
systems featuring traditional forms of redundancy. Thereafter, the design of a MATLAB-
based, multicellular system simulator is presented. The simulator is used to verify the
analytical reliability predictions. Additionally, it is used to study more complex multicellular
systems, including those with peripherals. The results of the analytical and simulation-
based analyses are formulated into a set of guidelines for the configuration of multicellular
systems.
Because the Satellite Stem Cell Architecture is primarily concerned with extending the
overall system lifetime, it allows a level of system performance degradation over time. Thus,
throughout this chapter, only permanent failures are considered, and transient failures, such
as radiation induced single event transients, and parametric failures, such as a device drawing
more current than expected, are not modelled. The failure rates used throughout this chapter
are for demonstration and comparison purposes only, and are not necessarily representative
of any particular real-life system.
Section 6.1: Introduction To Reliability Analysis, and Section 6.2.1: Common System
Architectures, are based on well-known reliability equations described in [19]. All further
derivations, where not specifically referenced, are original.
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6.1 Introduction to Analytical Reliability Analysis
Every device, without external maintenance, will eventually fail. The time to failure is the
duration of time the device was functioning properly before failure occurred. Time to failure
is a value of the random variable T and is a real number in the interval [0,∞). Since T is
a random variable, it can be described by a cumulative distribution function, as given by
Equation 6.1.
F(t) = P(T 6 t), t > 0 (6.1)
F(t) represents the probability that the system will fail by time t, and is usually known as
the unreliability function. Similarly, the reliability function R(t) is defined by Equation
6.2.
R(t) = P(T > t) = 1−FT (t) (6.2)
Thus, reliability is the probability of no failures occurring in the time period [0, t].
Often, the random variable T will be described by its probability density function, f (t). The
reliability function, R(t), can then be calculated as given by Equation 6.3. If the failure
probability density function of a system is known, the probability of the system being
functional at a certain point in time can be calculated by substituting for t.
R(t) = 1−
∫ t
0
f (x)dx (6.3)
Related to the reliability function is the failure rate function. It gives the expected number
of failures per unit time at a given instance in time. The failure rate function h(t) can be
calculated using Equation 6.4
h(t) =
f (t)
R(t)
(6.4)
The simplest failure rate function is a constant failure rate, which implies that failure is a
random event and is equally likely to occur at any moment in time. A constant failure rate is
a common simplifying assumption for systems whose failure probability density function is
not well understood. The probability density function of a system with a constant failure rate
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Figure 6.1: Failure rate, probability density and reliability plots of a system known to suffer from
continuous random failures.
is given by Equation 6.5. It involves only a single parameter, λ , which is known as the ’Mean
Time to Failure’ (MTTF). The MTTF of a system with a constant failure rate represents the
expected time after which 63.2% of such systems are expected to have failed.
The failure rate, probability density and reliability functions of a system with a constant
failure rate are shown in Figure 6.1.
fconst(t) = λe−λ t (6.5)
Usually, failure rates are not constant. Without maintenance, most systems suffer from
an increasing failure rate over time, as components begin to wear out. In contrast, newly
designed systems can suffer from infant mortality, which is characterised by a high initial
failure rate which decreases over time. These behaviours can be modelled with a Weibull
Distribution, which is commonly used in reliability analysis. It has two parameters, called
the shape parameter β and the scale parameter θ . With an appropriate choice of the shape
parameter the Weibull distribution can model increasing failure rates (wear-out), decreasing
failure rates (infant mortality) and constant failure rates. The Weibull probability density
function is given in Equation 6.6, and a Weibull distributed reliability function has the form
given in Equation 6.7.
f (t) =
β
θ
(
t
θ
)β−1e−(
t
θ )
t
t > 0 (6.6)
R(t) = e−(
t
θ )
β
, θ > 0,β > 0, t > 0 (6.7)
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Figure 6.2: The effect of the Weibull Distribution scale parameter on failure rate, probability density
and reliability plots
Figure 6.3: The commonly-seen bathtub reliability curve [98].
The shape parameter β is dimensionless and the scale parameter θ is expressed in units
of time. The effect of different scale parameters can be seen in Figure 6.2. A decreasing
failure rate is modelled with 0 < β < 1, a constant failure rate is modelled with β = 1 and
an increasing failure rate is modelled with β > 1.
The ’bathtub curve’ is a commonly-seen failure rate function which combines the three
forms of Weibull functions into one [98]. It denotes a system which initially suffers from
infant mortality (decreasing failure rates), followed by a period characterised by a relatively
constant failure rate, before suffering from an increasing failure rate due to wear-out. A
bathtub curve failure rate function is shown in Figure 6.3.
The MTTF of a system with a non-constant failure rate can be calculated as the expected
value of the system’s reliability function. This is shown in Equation 6.8.
MT T F =
∫ ∞
0
R(t)dt (6.8)
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However, when the only reliability information on a system is specified as an MTTF, a
constant failure rate must be assumed if any reliability analysis is to be performed.
6.2 Reliability Equation Derivation
An analytical reliability function for a system based on the Satellite Stem Cell Architecture is
needed for two reasons. Firstly, an analytical solution gives insight into the behaviour of the
system and will aid designers in determining the optimal ratios of proteins per cell and cells
per system, based on high-level reliability requirements. Secondly, provided the analytical
solution is not too computationally intensive, there is potential for a multicellular system to
continuously predict its own reliability and react through autonomous reconfiguration. For
example, a multicellular satellite, upon receiving indication of an upcoming solar flare, may
reconfigure from a high performance to high reliability state. It could do so by repurposing
low priority proteins into spares for high priority proteins. Monte Carlo simulations (which
can also be used to approximate a system’s reliability function) can be used to verify design
decisions using the multicellular system simulator, but are too inefficient to be run on
resource-constrained embedded systems.
The following analyses assume that all components begin to age at the same time and continue
to age whether they are power-on or not. This assumption is consistent with several on-orbit
failure modes, including failure from total ionising dose, thermal cycling stress, and charge
build up. In addition, the analyses assume perfect failure coverage. The analysis begins with
a purely computational system, meaning that there are no attached peripherals and every
protein has the potential to run any task. Thereafter, in Section 6.5, the effect of attached
peripherals is investigated.
6.2.1 Common System Architectures
As a starting point in the derivation of a reliability equation for multicellular systems, it is
worth briefly going over some common system architectures. Comparisons between the
reliabilities of different system architectures will be given once the multicellular system
reliability equation has been derived (Section 6.3). The simplest system architecture is a pure
series system, which is also known as a single-string system. This architecture is depicted in
Figure 6.4. In the simplest case, such a system could be modelled using only the individual
reliabilities of the subsystems themselves. However, in practical systems the subsystems
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are typically supported by common infrastructure such as power and communication buses.
Therefore, two additional failure models related to shared infrastructure are included. The
common component model encapsulates all the failure modes which are independent of the
number of subsystems. For example, failure of the power supply. On the other hand, the
support component model encapsulates failure modes which are dependent on the number of
subsystems. For example, a lock-up of the communications bus becomes more likely the
more subsystems are added. These additional failure models will become more important
once multicellular architectures are examined.
The reliability function for a single string system as depicted in Figure 6.4 is given by
Equation 6.9. Rc, Rs, Rp are the reliabilities of the common, support, and subsystem models
respectively, at a particular moment in time, as given by each model’s reliability function. In
other words, R should be written as R(t), but has been abbreviated in the following sections
for clarity. The number of subsystems is denoted by n. In a single string system, all the
subsystems are required to be functional in order for the system to be functional.
Rstring = Rc(Rs)n
n
∏
i=1
(Rpi) (6.9)
The simplest form of redundancy involves duplicating the single-string system into what can
be called a multi-string system. This includes the duplication of the supporting infrastructure,
as shown in Figure 6.5. The reliability for such an architecture is given by Equation 6.10.
Rstring is the reliability of a single string at any moment in time, as calculated using Equation
6.9. The number of strings in the system is denoted by m.
Rmstring = 1− (1−Rstring)m (6.10)
An improvement to the multi-string architecture involves ’cross-strapping’ components, as
shown in Figure 6.6. Cross-strapping involves interconnecting components of different
strings so that a functional system is possible even if unique failures have occurred in
each string. In practice, cross-strapping is difficult to implement and can lead to excessive
amounts of harnessing and mass. In addition, the strain on the support components, such as
communication buses, is multiplied by the number of strings in the system, as each support
component must now be able to service components in any string. Given Fc = 1−Rc,Fs =
1−Rmns and Fp = 1−Rp, the reliability of a cross-strapped, multi-string system is given by
Equation 6.11.
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Figure 6.4: Schematic representation of a single-string system architecture.
Common Support^n
Subsystem
1
Subsystem
n
Common Support^n
Subsystem
1
Subsystem
n
Figure 6.5: Schematic representation of a multi-string system architecture.
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Figure 6.6: Schematic representation of a cross-strapped, multi-string system architecture.
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Figure 6.7: Schematic representation of an n-choose-k system architecture.
99
Reliability Analysis and Simulation
Rcstrap = (1−Fmc )(1−Fms )
n
∏
i=1
(1−Fmpi ) (6.11)
The final architecture to cover before moving onto multicellular systems is the k-out-of-n
architecture. In this architecture, every subsystem is generic and has the ability to perform
the role of any other subsystem in the group. Thus, as long as a sufficient number of these
generic subsystems are functional, all the required systems tasks can be performed. The
set of subsystems is typically called a pool, and the ratio of number of subsystems in the
pool to minimum number of required subsystems defines the system’s redundancy. In an
ideal k-out-of-n system, all components of the system would reside in the pool. However,
in practice, as with the other system architectures, the generic subsystems typically require
additional supporting infrastructure. Thus, a k-out-of-n architecture can be modelled as
shown in Figure 6.7. It should be apparent that the supporting infrastructure presents a
potential weak point in an otherwise very reliable architecture. The reliability equation for
such a system is given by Equation 6.12, where n is the total number of generic subsystems
in the pool, and k is the minimum number required for the system to be functional.
Rpool = RcRns
n
∑
i=k
(
n
i
)
Rip(1−Rp)n−i (6.12)
At this point the similarity between a k-out-of-n architecture and the proposed multicellular
architecture may have become apparent. Thus, the k-out-of-n architecture will serve as a start-
ing point for the next section, in which the reliability equation of the proposed multicellular
architecture will be derived.
6.2.2 Multicellular Architectures
In a multicellular architecture, each cell can be treated as its own k-out-of-n system. In this
case, the generic subsystems are the proteins. The proteins rely on common components, such
as central voltage regulators and non-volatile memory, and supporting components, including
the inter-protein communication and power buses. Since a multicellular system is composed
of more than one cell, there is an additional layer of supporting infrastructure between
the cells of a system. This supporting infrastructure includes power and communication
buses, which are assumed to decrease in reliability as more cells are added to the system.
Inter-cell, common-mode failures are akin to common-mode failures between units of
traditional redundancy schemes. Therefore, for comparison purposes, such failures are not
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Figure 6.8: Schematic representation of a simple multicellular system composed of two cells of two
proteins each.
considered. However, a common way to mitigate against common mode failures is to have
two separate unit designs in the system. This could equally be applied to a multicellular
system by including at least two different cell designs, based on the same specifications, in
the system.
A simple multicellular system composed of two cells of two proteins each is depicted in
Figure 6.8. In this case, the system is functional if sufficient proteins, across all cells, are
functional. Determining the reliability of such a system is complex as the same system
state can be achieved through multiple configurations. For example, referring to Figure
6.8, a system state consisting of two functional proteins can be achieved by having a single
functional cell with two functional proteins, or by two functional cells each containing only a
single functional protein. In either case the system has two functional proteins, but the state
consisting of only a single cell is more reliable as fewer common and supporting components
are required. Therefore, all possible configurations resulting in a particular state must be
considered when calculating reliability.
Since the state of a multicellular system as a whole is a function of its individual cell states,
in makes sense to consider each cell on its own first. While it is common to assume only
two states in reliability calculations, namely functional and non-functional, in this case a cell
is said to be in one of multiple states [99]. The state represents the number of functional
cells proteins that the cell can contribute to the system. At any point in time a cells state can
be described using a discrete probability density function (PDF). Initially ignoring the need
for a macromolecular machinery protein, the probability of being in a specific state is equal
to the probability of the common and supporting components being functional, and of that
specific number of proteins being functional. State zero occurs when either all of the proteins
on the cell have failed, or the common or supporting components have failed.
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Figure 6.9: An example of a cell’s discrete state probability density function, which reflects the
probability of a specific number of proteins being functional at a given time.
For a cell containing p proteins, the probability of exactly k being functional, and therefore of
the cell being in state k, is given by Equation 6.13. This is the same equation which underlies
the n-choose-k system reliability function. In that case, the probabilities of exactly k, or more
than k, were added together to determine the system reliability. Equation 6.13 is only valid
for states k > 0. The probability of being in state zero is given by Equation 6.14.
C(k)|k=1:p = (RcRps )
(
p
k
)
Rkp(1−Rp)p−k (6.13)
C(0) = (1−RcRps )+(RcRps )
(
p
0
)
R0p(1−Rp)p−0 (6.14)
Using Equations 6.13 and 6.13, a cell’s discrete state PDF, C(k), can be constructed as shown
in Figure 6.9.
Now, given a system of c cells, the system’s state pdf can be calculated through the convolu-
tion of the individual cell pdfs Ci(k). This process is expressed in Equation 6.15.
Sproteins(k) =C1(k)∗C2(k)∗C3(k)...∗Cc(k) (6.15)
Once again the system state, k, represents the number of functional proteins. More specifically,
it represents the total number of functional proteins across all cells. States with a sufficient
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number of proteins will result in a functional system, while those states with too few translate
to a non-functional system. Thus, system reliability can be calculated by summing the
probabilities of all functional states. This is shown in Equation 6.16. The additional term, Rcs ,
models the reliability of the supporting infrastructure between cells, which is also required to
be functional in order for the system to be functional.
Rmulticell = Rcs
cp
∑
k=n
S(k) (6.16)
Up until now, the need for macromolecular machinery (MM) proteins has been ignored.
However, to more accurately predict the reliability of a multicellular system, the overheads
of the MM proteins need to be taken into account.
One each cell, the first functional protein is reserved for the MM. Therefore, cells need
to have at least two functional proteins in order to contribute to the system state. This is
modelled by essentially reducing the cell state by one. In addition, the probability for a cell to
be in state zero is increased, as state zero now occurs when the cells supporting infrastructure
has failed, or the cell has zero or one functional proteins. Equations 6.13 and 6.14 are updated
to reflect these changes, resulting in the updated Equations 6.17 and 6.18. These can be used
as before with Equations 6.15 and 6.16 to calculate a multicellular system’s reliability.
C(k)|k=1:p = (RcRps )
(
p
k+1
)
Rk+1p (1−Rp)p−(k+1) (6.17)
C(0) = (1−RcRps )+(RcRps )
1
∑
i=0
(
p
i
)
Rip(1−Rp)p−i (6.18)
Figure 6.10 presents a first look at the reliability functions, as calculated using Equation
6.16, of several example multicellular systems. Each system is composed of 120 proteins,
but distributed amongst a differing number of cells. Each system is said to have 24 critical
tasks, and therefore requires at least 24 of its 120 proteins to be functional. Constant failure
rates are assumed for proteins (MTTF of 5 years), common components (MTTF of 10 years),
and supporting components (MTTF of 1000 years). These values are chosen purely for
demonstration purposes.
From Figure 6.10 it becomes apparent that choosing the most reliable configuration of
proteins is not trivial. Different systems, with different configurations of proteins, present the
highest reliability at different mission phases. Similarly, if the hazard functions are plotted,
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Figure 6.10: Comparison of the reliability functions of different 24-task multicellular system config-
urations.
Figure 6.11: Comparison of the hazard functions of different 24-task multicellular system confgura-
tions.
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as shown in Figure 6.11, undulating failure rates are seen. This appears counter-intuitive,
given that all of the components in the system were given constant failure rates.
To gain a better understanding of the system behaviour predicted by the reliability functions
derived in this section, the system state PDF is examined in more detail.
6.2.3 Understanding the System State PDF
In this section, the relationship of the system state PDF to various parameters is examined.
The parameters include: mission time, number of cells, proteins per cell, and the reliability
of supporting infrastructure.
Using Equation 6.15, the system state PDF can be plotted for various times within the
system’s lifetime. As shown in Figure 6.12, the system state PDF changes over time (Note
that the PDFs are shown as being continuous for clarity, but are actually discrete). As it
progresses, time has the effect of moving the expected value towards zero. This is intuitive,
as the system state represents the number of functional proteins and the proteins are gradually
expected to fail over time.
Figure 6.13 shows the system state PDFs of three different multicellular systems at a particular
moment in time. The three systems are composed of one, two, and three cells respectively
(each cell contains an identical number of proteins, so the three systems have differing
numbers of total proteins). From Figure 6.13, it is apparent that, ignoring the peak at zero,
the number of peaks in the PDF is the same as the number of cells in the system. Intuitively,
the peaks can be explained by remembering that the system state is determined by both the
number of functional cells and the number of functional proteins per cell. Knowing the
number of functional cells in a system at any one time gives a lot of information about the
likely total number of functional proteins in the system at that time. Essentially, each number
of functional cells comes with its own state PDF which shows up as a peak in the full system
state PDF.
Mathematically, the peaks can be explained by revisiting Figure 6.9, which shows an example
discrete protein state distribution of an individual cell. If the distribution is pictured as
being continuous instead of being discrete, a cell’s protein state distribution can have one
or two peaks. One peak occurs at the the most likely number of functional proteins. A
second peak can occur at C(0), which represents the probability of cell failure due to failed
common or supporting components. As explained in Section 6.2.2, the final system state
PDF is calculated through the convolution of the individual cell PDFs. Convoluting two
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Figure 6.12: The system state PDF changes over time. It is shown here as continuous for clarity, but
is actually discrete. Able proteins are those which are functional and not reserved for MM duty.
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Figure 6.13: The effect of number of cells on the system state PDF. Excluding the peak at zero, the
number of peaks is equal to the number of cells in the configuration.
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Figure 6.14: The effect of proteins per cell on the system state PDF. As the number of proteins per
cell increases, the peaks move further apart and become more defined.
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Figure 6.15: The effect of common component reliability on the system state PDF. Common compo-
nent reliability affects the height of the peaks, but not their location. As common component reliability
increases the distribution is shifted to the later peaks.
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single-peaked distributions would result in only one peak, but it is through the convolution
of the multi-modal cell state distributions that the multiple peaks of the system state PDF
appear.
In addition to number of cells, the number of proteins per cell also has a predictable effect
on the system state PDF. As seen in Figure 6.14, the number of proteins per cell affects
the spacing between peaks. More proteins per cell result in more clearly differentiated
peaks, while in systems with relatively few proteins per cell, the peaks become almost
indistinguishable.
Finally, as seen in Figure 6.15, the reliability of a cell’s supporting infrastructure affects the
height distribution of the peaks of the system state PDF. More reliable infrastructure shifts
the height distribution towards the later peaks, while unreliable infrastructure favours the
earlier peaks. The passing of time has a similar effect of shifting the expected value towards
zero, but, unlike the reliability of infrastructure parameter, the passing of time additionally
shifts the locations of the peaks towards the left.
With an understanding of the effects that these parameters have on the system state PDF, the
multicellular system reliability function can be re-examined with more insight.
6.3 System Reliability Sensitivity Analysis
This section presents a sensitivity analysis based on, amongst others, the parameters examined
in Section 6.2.3, and compares the reliability of multicellular architectures to more traditional
multi-string and cross-strapped architectures.
Firstly, sensitivity to total number of tasks is examined. Figure 6.16 shows the reliability
plots of various multicellular systems, a multi-string system, and a cross-strapped system.
Each system is responsible for six tasks, which are performed by proteins in the multicellular
architectures and subsystems in the traditional architectures. Each system also has a level of
redundancy equivalent to a triple-string configuration, meaning the multicellular architectures
have 6x3 = 18 proteins each. However, each multicellular architecture has its proteins
distributed across a differing number of cells. Figures 6.17b and c present similar comparisons
but for systems of 12 and 24 tasks respectively.
As seen in Figure 6.16, the most reliable architecture at any point is a multicellular archi-
tecture. In addition, when comparing to the plots of Figures 6.17b and c, the reliability
advantage of multicellular architectures is seen to increase with the total number of proteins
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Subsystem
Figure 6.16: Comparison of the sensitivity of various system architectures to total number of tasks.
Each system has 6 tasks and a level of redundancy equal to triple-string. In traditional architectures,
tasks are performed by subsystems, while in a multicellular architecture they are performed by proteins.
At any point in time a multicellular architecture is the most reliable, however, which configuration is
optimal changes during the system’s lifetime.
-Subsystem Subsystem
a) b)
Figure 6.17: Similar to Figure 6.16, but for systems featuring 12 (a) and 24 (b) tasks respectively.
The reliability benefit of multicellular architectures is seen to increase with the total number of system
tasks.
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in the system. However, which multicellular configuration is the most reliable varies with
time. During early life, configurations featuring multiple cells have a reliability advantage,
while a single-celled configuration becomes the most reliable later in life.
As seen before in Figure 6.10, the reliability functions of Figures 6.16 and 6.17 display
periods of varying failure rates, despite being modelled with constant-failure-rate components.
These periods can now be explained as being caused by the peaks and valleys of the system
state PDFs. A vertical boundary line can be imaged on the system state PDF which represents
the minimum number of proteins required for the system to remain functional. As mission
time progresses, the peaks and valleys of the distribution gradually change shape whilst
globally moving towards the left. The failure rate is high whilst peaks are moving through
the boundary, whilst valleys produce periods of low failure rates.
Based on this description, a system composed of two cells (and therefore featuring two peaks
in its PDF) would be expected to have two periods of high failure rates, with periods of low
failure rates before, after and in-between. This is exactly what is seen in in the reliability plot
for the two-cell, multicellular configuration of Figure 6.17c. The failure rate is proportional
to the steepness of the plot, which is seen to drop sharply at approximately 500 and 1500
days. The same pattern is difficult to discern in the reliability plots for the other two-cell
configurations because, as explained in Section 6.2.3, these systems feature cells with fewer
proteins per cell, which make the peaks in their PDFs less distinguishable.
The reliability plots of three-cell configurations in Figures 6.16 and 6.17 do not show the
expected three periods of high failure rates, as in each case the first PDF peak is already left
of the boundary line at time zero. This is because, in all three cases, a single cell does not
have enough proteins to run all the tasks required for a functional system.
Figures 6.18-6.19 are similar to Figures 6.16-6.17, but in this case sensitivity to system
loading is examined. System loading is inversely proportional to spare capacity (or redun-
dancy), and refers to the number of proteins in the system which are executing tasks as a
fraction of the total number of proteins in the system. It is evident that cross-strapped and
multicellular systems benefit similarly from a reduction in loading. Amongst the multicellular
configurations, the benefit of reduced loading is seen to increase with number of cells. This
is measured by noting the points at which the reliability functions cross. In Figure 6.19a,
featuring systems with a 33% loading, the triple-cell configuration becomes less reliable than
the single-celled configuration once the system reliability has dropped to 0.8. In comparison,
in Figure 6.19b, featuring systems with a 25% loading, the changeover only occurs at a
system reliability of 0.66.
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Subsystem 50% Loading
Figure 6.18: Comparison of the sensitivity of various system architectures to loading. Loading is
defined as the number of active subsystems or proteins compared to the total number of subsys-
tems/proteins. Each system has 12 tasks to run. At high loading, a single-celled architecture performs
best.
SubsystemSubsystem
a) b)
33% Loading 25% Loading
Figure 6.19: Similar to Figure 6.18, but for systems that are 33% (a) and 25 % (b) loaded. The
lower loading is achieved by adding additional strings or proteins. Cross-strapped and multicellular
architectures respond similarly to changes in loading. Amongst multicellular configurations, lower
loading favours configurations featuring multiple, smaller cells.
111
Reliability Analysis and Simulation
Common component reliability is the next parameter examined. As a reminder, common
component failures are those which cause multiple subsystems to fail at once, but are not
influenced by the number of subsystems in the system. In the case of multicellular architec-
tures, a common component failure will lead to the loss of a complete cell. Figure 6.20 shows
that, in comparison to multi-string and cross-strapped architectures, cellular architectures are
more sensitive to common component reliability. Amongst the multicellular configurations,
those with relatively few cells benefit more from increased common-component reliability
than configurations featuring many cells. This is because configurations featuring many cells
are more capable of surviving the loss of individual cells.
Another visible trend is the diminishing returns on increasing common component reliability.
For example, the systems in Figure 6.20 have a constant protein failure rate with a MTTF
of five years. System reliability is seen to increase appreciably as the common component
reliability is increased up to 25 years MTTF (or five times the protein reliability). Thereafter,
further increases in the common component reliability yield diminishing returns.
As the common component reliability is lowered to that of the proteins (MTTF of five years,
in this case), multicellular architectures lose their reliability advantage over cross-strapped
architectures. This is highlighted in Figures 6.21a and b, which are reliability plots with
common component reliabilities from the extreme ends of Figure 6.20’s scale. In Figure 6.21a,
featuring systems with common component reliabilities equal to their protein reliabilities,
it is evident that multicellular and cross-strapped architectures behave similarly. However,
as seen in Figure 6.21b, featuring systems with high common component reliabilities, the
multicellular architectures display a clear reliability advantage.
Finally, sensitivity to supporting component reliability is investigated. As a reminder, sup-
porting component failures have a similar effect to common component failures. However,
the probability of a supporting component failure is proportional to the number of subsystems
in the system. In a multicellular architecture it is proportional to the number of proteins
per cell and number of cells in the system. Figure 6.22 shows that both cross-strapped and
multicellular architectures show a similarly large initial benefit from increased support com-
ponent reliability. For cross-strapped architectures, the benefits flatten out after increasing
the supporting component reliability up to a MTTF of 110 years (20 times the subsystem,
or protein, reliability). However, multicellular architectures continue to benefit from sup-
porting component reliability increases far beyond this point. Multi-string architectures, in
comparison, are relatively insensitive to supporting component reliability.
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Figure 6.20: Comparison of the sensitivity of various architectures to common component reliability.
Here, system reliability is measured with a single metric, MTTF, instead of a whole reliability plot.
Multicellular architectures, and especially those featuring few cells, are seen to benefit more from
increases in common component reliability than traditional architectures.
a) b)
Figure 6.21: Reliability plots of systems with common component reliabilities from the low (a)
and high (b) ends of Figure 6.20’s scale. At low common component reliabilities (a), multicellular
architectures perform comparably to cross-strapped designs. However, at high common component
reliabilities (b), multicellular architectures have a clear reliability advantage.
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Figure 6.22: Comparison of the sensitivity of various system architectures to support component
reliability. Multicellular architectures and cross-strapped architectures benefit similarly from initial
increases in support component reliability. Thereafter, compared to cross-strapped architectures,
multicellular systems experience more gradual diminishing returns.
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6.4 Verification through Simulation
To verify the analytical reliability equations derived in Section 6.2.2, a graphical, multicellular
system simulator was developed in MATLAB. The simulator allows Monte Carlo lifetime
simulations to be performed on a simulated multicellular system. During each run failures are
induced according to a specified distribution, and the simulated system reacts by reconfiguring.
Once sufficient failures have occurred that the system cannot reconfigure successfully, the
run ends and the simulated mission elapsed time is recorded. Several parameters related
to the configuration of the system and the operating environment can be adjusted. These
include:
• Number of cells in the system
• Number of proteins per cell
• Number of system tasks to be performed by the proteins (multiple system modes
requiring different numbers of tasks can be defined)
• Component failure models (Constant, Exponential, or Weibull)
• Component power requirements and available power
Figure 6.23 shows a screenshot of the main simulation window, which includes a graphical
representation of the current system state and various controls for configuring the system
and environment. Additionally, controls are provided for manually triggering failures, as
well as for stepping through the repair process. Simulations can be set up to run a system
till failure once, or a set number of times, with cell and protein failures occurring according
to adjustable probability distributions. The simulator is also useful for experimenting with
different task allocations strategies. Currently, only the task allocation strategy described
in Section 5.2.2 has been implemented, but it would be simple to replace this strategy with
others optimised for other variables, such as downtime ore power consumption.
Simulations are relatively slow, with 5000 iterations of a 5-Cell, 7-Protein system taking
several minutes on an Intel i5 desktop computer. Simulations involving hundreds of proteins
are impractical using this simulator. Therefore, the comparisons made in this subsection are
restricted to relatively small systems.
To verify the correctness of the analytical reliability solution derived in Section 6.2.2, reliabil-
ity functions for various multicellular systems were analytically generated and compared to
reliability functions generated through Monte-Carlo simulations in the MATLAB simulator.
The failure models used in the simulations are based on Weibull distributions for protein,
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Figure 6.23: The main window of the MATLAB multicellular system simulator. At the top of the
window are controls for setting various parameters of the simulated system, as well as controls for
stepping through failures and system reconfiguration. The bottom of the window shows a graphical
representation of the current system state. In this case, a system composed of four cells of four
proteins each is being simulated.
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Table 6.1: Simulated System Failure Models
Component Failure Model Shape Parameter Scale Parameter
Protein Weibull 0.4464 2226.2
Common Weibull 0.4464 220 million
Support Weibull 0.4464 22 million
Table 6.2: Comparison between Analytical and Simulated Reliability Functions
System Configuration
Cells; Proteins/Cell; Tasks Number of Simulations Reliability Error
4-4-8 1000 0.0055
10000 0.0017
5-7-10 1000 0.0111
10000 0.0024
6-5-11 1000 0.0127
10000 0.0019
common and support failures. Their parameters are given in Table 6.1. The shape parameter
was taken from an empirical study of nano-satellite failures [26]. The scale parameters are
roughly proportional to estimated component complexities and were chosen to give lifetimes
similar to those seen in the same study. SEE failures were not simulated as their effect is
considered negligible on total system lifetime.
The results of comparisons performed with three different multicellular systems are given in
Table 6.2. Each system is described using three numbers (e.g. 5-7-10), which represent the
number of cells, proteins per cell, and total system tasks respectively. The error is given as
the standard deviation of the error between the analytical and simulated reliability functions,
calculated at a resolution of one day. Using 1000 simulations, the errors are on the order of
0.01, while using 10000 simulations reduces this to 0.001. The low standard deviation and
trend of decreasing error with number of simulation iterations, indicates a good correlation
between the analytical and simulated reliability functions.
6.5 Effect of Peripherals
While purely computational systems are interesting in their own right, the Satellite Stem Cell
hardware has been specifically designed to replace more than just the processing elements
of a spacecraft. Every protein has a set of generic I/O circuitry, allowing it to be interfaced
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directly to a variety of peripherals. In this way, complex sensor-actuator systems can be
implemented with no additional interfacing hardware.
However, adding peripherals to a system imposes new challenges to the system designer. In
a purely computational system, every protein can theoretically run any system task. With the
addition of peripherals to the system, this may no longer be true, as the distribution of tasks
becomes restricted by which protein has access to which peripheral. In an ideal scenario, a
designer may choose to interface every peripheral to every protein. In this case, the system
behaves like a purely computational one, and, excluding peripheral failures, can be modelled
using the reliability equations of Section 6.2.2.
Unfortunately, cross-strapping every peripheral to every protein is infeasible in all but the
smallest systems. The harnessing would be extremely complex and error prone, heavy,
and would take up significant amounts of space. Alternatively, some form of multiplexing
(MUX) hardware could be designed, but such a solution would present its own challenges
regarding who controls the MUX switches and in ensuring the reliability of the potential
single-point-of-failure MUX itself.
Thus, as described in Section 4.2, the Satellite Stem Cell architecture does not make use of
I/O multiplexers and does not require every peripheral to be cross-strapped to every protein.
Instead, the chosen peripheral interfacing solution trades some reliability for implementation
simplicity. Every protein can only be interfaced to a single peripheral. However, the GPIO
circuitry does allow the same peripheral to be interfaced to several proteins at once. This is
possible because all the proteins which have physical interfaces to a particular peripheral,
but which are not currently accessing that peripheral, place their GPIO circuitry into a high
impedance mode. This prevents interference to the protein which is currently accessing the
peripheral. In addition, the GPIO circuitry has been carefully designed to ensure that the
majority of its failure modes result in the high impedance state. Thus, a designer can cross-
strap peripherals across as many proteins as they see fit. The simplest solution is simply to
divide the total number of proteins in the system by the total number of peripherals, and cross
strap each peripheral that amount of times. Alternatively, the designer may choose to favour
more critical peripherals with more cross-strapping, while reducing the cross-strapping of
less critical peripherals.
While this solution favours simplicity, it reduces reliability by restricting which proteins
can perform which tasks. To determine the impact of this peripheral interfacing scheme
on system reliability, the MATLAB multicellular system simulator was expanded to allow
the simulation of peripheral interfaces. In addition to the standard system configuration
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Figure 6.24: The effect of increasing peripheral ratios on three different multicellular systems,
composed of 12 (a), 24 (b), and 36 (c) proteins respectively. From all three plots it is clear that
increasing peripheral ratios has a detrimental effect on system reliability. However, systems with
peripheral ratios below 1/6 can be reasonably approximated by an ideal system.
parameters, the simulator now also allows the number of peripherals and their corresponding
level of cross-strapping to be specified.
Three example systems consisting of 12, 24, and 36 proteins, respectively, were simulated .
In each case, the system was first simulated without any peripherals to determine a baseline
reliability, followed by simulations including an increasing number of peripherals. Other
variables, including system configuration and failure models, were kept constant. Each
Monte Carlo simulation consisted of 500 iterations. The resultant reliability plots are shown
in Figure 6.24a-c.
From all three plots it is clear that system reliability suffers with the addition of peripherals.
As more peripherals are added, the reliability function deviates further and further from
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the ideal, purely computation system. In addition, it can be seen that larger systems suffer
a greater reduction in reliability from a proportionality equal increase in peripherals than
smaller systems. This deviation in reliability from the ideal, purely computational configura-
tion means the reliability predicting equations of Section 6.2.2 can not be accurately used
on systems with a high peripheral to protein ratio. Even ratios as low as 1/4 (one peripheral
for every four proteins) are seen to cause deviations in reliability of up to 10%. However,
for ratios below 1/6, which are shown to be practical in the case studies of Section 7.3, the
system may still be approximated by an ideal one. This was shown to hold true regardless of
the system loading.
6.6 Summary
This chapter focussed on deriving and validating analytical equations for predicting the
reliability of multicellular systems. The presented solution is based on an extension of
k-out-of-n system theory. Instead of evaluating the system as a whole with binary component
functionalities, each cell is evaluated as an independent, multi-state, k-out-of-n system. The
full system reliability is then calculated through the convolution of the individual cell results.
Determining the optimal configuration of cells per system and proteins per cell proved to be
complex, as different configurations were shown to be optimal at different points during a
system’s lifetime. However, a variety of trends in system behaviour were discovered, which
may be useful to multicellular system designers.
Firstly, the reliability benefits of a multicellular architecture over more traditional architec-
tures, such as multi-string and cross-strapped designs, increases with the total number of
proteins in the system. In small systems which can implemented using only a few ( 4) proteins,
a multicellular architecture gives little benefit, in terms of reliability, over a cross-strapped
one.
Secondly, system loading has a strong effect on the optimal multicellular configuration.
Heavily loaded systems (> 50 % load) should minimise the total number of cells in the
system by opting for large cells containing many proteins. On the other hand, systems which
are designed to be lightly loaded will benefit from a configuration which features many,
smaller cells.
Investigating system sensitivity to support and common component failures showed that
multicellular architectures benefit more from increases in the reliabilities of these shared
components than traditional multi-string and cross-strapped architectures. If the common
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components have low enough reliability (approximately equal to the reliability of a protein),
multicellular architectures perform no better than cross-strapped designs. Thus, it is coun-
terproductive to implement a multicellular system using unreliable communication buses or
fragile common circuitry.
The derived multicellular reliability equations were verified using a multicellular system
simulator developed using MATLAB. The simulator has a graphical user interface and allows
Monte Carlo simulations (composed of thousands of runs) to be performed with a number of
configurable parameters. Comparisons between the reliability functions calculated using the
analytical equations and those produced by the simulator showed a good correlation.
Using the same simulator, the effect of peripherals on the reliability of multicellular systems
was investigated. The ability to interface directly to a variety of peripherals is one of the
most important features of the Satellite Stem Cell architecture. However, adding peripherals
to a system causes a negative deviation from the analytically predicted reliability, as the
peripheral interfaces limit reconfigurability. Nevertheless, it was shown that the derived
reliability equations are still useful for predicting the reliability of multicellular systems with
peripheral ratios below 1/6.
Given a multicellular architecture is chosen, there are many additional aspects to consider
when determining the configuration of cells per system and proteins per cell. These include
physical constraints such as available volume, bandwidth constraints on internal communi-
cation buses, and implementation constraints (e.g. limited I2C addresses). However, it is
believed that the results obtained in this chapter will allow systems developers to make some
early decisions, such as whether a multicellular architecture is appropriate, and will aid in
determining an optimal configuration.
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Chapter 7
Multicellular System Implementations
In previous chapters, the hardware and software aspects of the Artificial Stem Cell Architec-
ture were described in detail, together with an analytical and simulation-based investigation
of its theoretical reliability. In this chapter, two practical implementations of the ASC
Architecture will be described.
The first implementation can more accurately be described as version 0.1 of the ASC
Architecture. It was developed as a solution for interfacing to a large number of sensor
and actuator payloads on the SMESAT CubeSat, which was being developed by the Surrey
Space Centre. While this implementation lacks many features of the full ASC Architecture,
including the HARP middleware and generic I/O circuitry, it nevertheless demonstrated
many of the benefits of a multicellular approach. This chapter includes a brief overview of
the SMESAT CubeSat and the design and development of its cellularised payload interface
computer.
The second implementation of the ASC Architecture takes the form of a two-cell, benchtop
multicellular system demonstrator. It fully implements all aspects of the proposed artificial
cells and agent-based middleware. Together with implementation details, this chapter de-
scribes a set of experiments which aimed to test the functionality and performance of the
benchtop multicellular system.
Finally, based on practical measurements of the benchtop system and the results of the
reliability analysis of Chapter 6, two case studies of cellularising portions of real spacecraft
are given.
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Figure 7.1: A computer model of the SMESAT CubeSat being developed by the Surrey Space Centre.
SMESAT’s primary goal is to space-rate payloads from various small and medium enterprises across
europe and Canada.
7.1 SMESAT
SMESAT, shown in Figure 7.1, is a CubeSat developed by the Surrey Space Centre as part
of a European Commission FP7 project. The satellite measures approximately 10 x 10 x
30 cm and carries a number of payloads from Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) project
partners. The primary aim of the SMESAT mission is to test the performance of the payloads
on orbit so that they may be sold as commercial products in the future. Traditionally, ’space-
rating’ a component is a complex and expensive procedure which may involve a variety
of environmental and radiation test campaigns, as well as trial flights. SMESAT aims to
demonstrate that space-rating a component by flying it on a CubeSat may provide a faster
and more cost effective route to market.
The SMESAT payloads are diverse and come from a variety of European and Canadian
SMEs. They include:
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• STIM300 three-axis, high-accuracy, MEMs inertial measurement unit (IMU) by Sen-
sonor in Norway.
• High-accuracy MEMs accelerometers by Theon Sensors in Greece.
• Minitature, science-grade fluxgate magnetometer by Laboratory of Electromechanical
Innovation (LEMI) in Ukraine.
• CubeSat star tracker by Innovative Solutions in Space in the Netherlands.
• Smart Thermal Radiator Tiles by MBP Communications Inc in Canada.
• Nano Control Moment Gyroscope (CMG) Array by Surrey Space Centre in England.
• CubeSat EPS by SystematIC in the Netherlands
7.1.1 Initial System Design
Like many amateur satellites, SMESAT is employs the single-string system architecture and
is composed of a mixture of COTS and custom-designed subsystems. The spacecraft bus is
composed of a COTS communications subsystem and antennas from ISIS (shown in blue
in Figure 7.1), a COTS combined OBC and attitude control subsystem from CubeSpace
(green), and the experimental SystematIC EPS (red). In addition, due to the large number
and diversity of payloads, the system contains a custom payload interface computer (PIC).
The PIC is responsible for operating the payloads on orbit and for collecting experiment data
for later transmission to the ground.
The initial design of the PIC called for a single 10 x 10 cm PC/104 PCB which could interface
to and operate the STIM300, LEMI magnetometer, Theon accelerometers and Smart Thermal
Radiator Tiles temperature sensors. In addition, since SSC was also providing its own
payload, the nano CMG array, it was expected that the PIC would provide the drive and
control for this payload, too. These interfaces are summarised in Table 7.1.
It was quickly realised that designing the hardware and firmware of the PIC would be complex
and likely take longer than the schedule allowed. In addition, the PIC was seen as a worrying
potential single point of failure, as it is the sole interface to a large fraction of the payloads
and is itself a new development. Thus, based on the Satellite Stem Cell work presented in
this thesis, an alternative design for the PIC was proposed and implemented.
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Table 7.1: SMESAT Payload Interface Computer required interfaces
Payload Interface
STIM300 RS422
LEMI Magnetometer 3.3V RS232
Theon Accelerometers I2C
Smart Thermal Radiator Tiles 4 x 3.3V analogue inputs
Nano CMG Array
4 x BLDC Motor
4 x Stepper Motor
4 x Absolute Encoder
3 x high-current outputs
3 x digital hall-effect sensor inputs
4 x high-current outputs
1 x 3.3V analogue inputs
7.1.2 Cellularised Design
The new PIC design is based on the artificial cell concept. It is composed of a single cell
of four proteins. Each protein is electrically identical and interfaces to a single CMG and a
single additional payload. This design is shown in Figure 7.2.
Each protein is based on a simple ARM Cortex M0 MCU clocked at 48 MHz, and an external
1MBit of EEPROM memory. The memory is used for experiment data and alternative
firmware images. The proteins are linked by a single CAN bus, which also serves as the
interface to the CubeSat OBC. Every protein can be in one of several modes, depending on
whether it is running experiments related to its external payload, or controlling its CMG. The
four proteins were designed as daughter boards which plug into a PC/104-sized carrier board.
The carrier board distributes power to the proteins and routes protein I/O signals to physical
connectors. The PCB assembly is mounted to the bottom of the CMG array mechanics, as
shown in Figure 7.3.
To limit the risk and experimental nature of the PIC, the HARP middleware was not im-
plemented. Instead, simple, bespoke firmware was written for each protein based on its
attached peripheral, with a large percentage of the code being common to all proteins. Every
protein has the same code for controlling its attached CMG, and every protein has the ability
to be master of the CMG array. As master, the protein is responsible for coordinating the
behaviour of the CMG array as a whole, and for logging resultant data. While proteins are
capable of communicating directly with one another and even reprogramming each other, it
is envisioned that the proteins will be commanded and, if necessary, reprogrammed, directly
from the CubeSat OBC. Thus, the cell lacks the proposed macromolecular machinery of
Chapter 5.
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Figure 7.2: Schematic of the cellularised payload interface computer concept.
Figure 7.3: Flight version of the cellularised PIC, mounted on top of the nano-CMG array. Note the
four identical protein PCBs.
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Furthermore, the proteins of the PIC do not contain generic I/O circuitry. Instead, discrete
motor driver and bus transceiver ICs provide the interfaces to the CMG actuators and payloads.
Initially, cross-strapping payloads between proteins was considered, but, as discussed in
Chapter 4, without generic I/O circuitry this would require complicated multiplexing and
harnessing. Since the loss of a single payload due to the failure of a protein or interface
should not affect other payloads, the one-payload-per-protein configuration was deemed
acceptable.
Despite all these simplifications and limitations compared to a full artificial cell implementa-
tion, the cellular PIC design demonstrated the following advantages:
1. Simplified hardware design - duplicated, simple design, based on low-pin-count MCU,
instead of complex design based on large MCU.
2. Simplified and paralleled firmware development - no multitasking concerns and code
for each payload could be developed and tested in parallel.
3. Graceful degeneracy in experimental output - failure of a protein causes loss of only a
single payload and CMG.
4. Flexible power consumption - each active protein consumes only 66 mW, while idle
proteins can be turned off to conserve power.
The PIC was developed in parallel to the other work presented in this thesis over the course
of a year, while the firmware was written with the help of an additional programmer over a
few months. The SMESAT CubeSat is currently largely complete and in the soft-stack stage,
as seen in Figure 7.4, and awaiting environmental testing and a launch opportunity.
7.2 CubeSat-Scale Multicellular System Testbed
After the development of the SMESAT cellularised Payload Interface Computer, work
progressed onto a more comprehensive CubeSat-scale multicellular testbed. It was developed
to demonstrate the full functionality of the ASC hardware and HARP middleware, and
to determine its real-world performance and implementation overheads. The testbed was
purposefully designed at CubeSat scale so comparisons could be made to heritage CubeSat
subsystem hardware, which is available in the SSC. The following subsections describe
hardware and middleware implementation details, as well as a set of experiments which were
performed on the testbed to characterise its performance.
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Figure 7.4: Clockwise from top left: All of the components of the PIC and CMG array, soft-stacked
SMESAT, assembly montage.
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Figure 7.5: Prototype generic I/O circuitry.
7.2.1 GPIO Circuitry Prototyping
The generic I/O circuitry, which is the artificial counterpart of a biological cell’s membrane,
is one of the most novel features of the Satellite Stem Cell hardware. Its design is crucial for
ensuring that an artificial cell can adapt to interface to a wide variety of peripherals, and its
physical size has a large impact on the overall cell size. Therefore, a prototype of the generic
I/O circuitry, consisting of two I/O channels, was implemented first. This prototype can be
seen in Figure 7.5, with an MCU board controlling its behaviour.
In line with the desire to have the testbed be comparable with CubeSat avionics, each channel
of prototype generic I/O circuitry was designed with the following specifications:
• Supports output voltages between 3.3V and 9V
• Provides drive and sink capability of at least 1A
• Provides current measurements when sourcing or sinking
• Supports digital I/O bit rates of at least 100 kb/s
• Supports digital and analogue input voltages between 3.3V and 9V
• Supports a high-impedance state
In addition, the following two specifications were aimed for, but only partly achieved:
• Minimal physical changes required for different operating modes
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• No single component failure should prevent entry into the high-impedance state
The I/O bit rate specification is to ensure compatibility with I2C buses, which are commonly
used in CubeSats. The supported voltages specification is to ensure compatibility with 3.3V
and 5V interfaces, as well as to support switching peripherals directly from the battery
voltage, which on CubeSats is commonly around 7.2V. One Amp of current sourcing and
sinking capability is required to drive magnetorquers and the motors of reaction wheels,
while the high impedance state is required for analogue input voltage sensing, and when
acting as a backup for a cross-strapped peripheral.
A key aim of the Satellite Stem Cell Architecture is reduced manufacturing costs and
simplified testing through cell mass production. Thus, ideally, each cell should be electrically
identical. This implies that the generic I/O circuitry should support all the modes of operation
described above without requiring any physical rework. Such multifunctional I/O circuitry
would be possible with the use of digitally controlled analogue switches and multiplexers.
However, since the operational mode of each channel of I/O circuitry is fixed as determined
by its attached peripheral, there is no need to be able to change mode once operational. In
fact, once the system is operational, the analogue switches and muxes become a risk. Thus,
the design of the I/O circuitry must represent a compromise. In this implementation of the
I/O circuitry, analogue switches and muxes are avoided in favour of small physical changes,
such as installing jumpers or choosing a minimal set of resistors.
The generic I/O circuitry implementation closely follows the block diagram of Figure 4.2 in
Chapter 4. A section of the schematics (excluding the drive logic, ADC and schmitt trigger
ICs) is given in Figure 7.6. The design was tested through simulation in LTSpice before
moving on to the physical implementation.
I/O protection is provided by two transient voltage suppression (TVS) diodes (D2 and D3),
which guard against over-voltage transients and electro-static discharges from handling. In
addition, a schottkey diode prevents backpowering in the event that external voltages on the
I/O line exceed the local rails. To protect the schmitt trigger and analogue stages, the 0-9V
full-scale I/O range is scaled to 0-3.3V by a set of voltage dividers.
Output drive and sink capability is provided by a pair of p-channel and n-channel MOSFETS
in a half-bridge configuration. A set of discrete logic gates provide the drive logic and prevent
the possibility of shoot-through. Brushed-DC motor control was demonstrated using both
prototype generic I/O channels to form a full H-bridge. All the standard H-bridge drive
modes, including forwards, reverse, brake and coast, were successfully demonstrated, as
shown in Figure 7.7.
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Figure 7.6: A section of the generic I/O circuitry, showing the half-bridge output stage and instru-
mentation amplifier input stage.
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Figure 7.7: Demonstration of a pair of prototype generic I/O channels driving a brushed-DC motor
in full h-bridge configuration.
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Figure 7.8: Demonstration of a pair of prototype generic I/O channels completing a 100 kb/s I2C
transaction.
A challenge was finding small-package MOSFETs capable of switching at high speed
(hundreds of kHz) and handling large currents. A sufficiently fast n-channel MOSFET
was found, but the p-channel MOSFET is too slow for 100 kHz switching. Fortunately,
interfacing to an I2C bus only requires pull-down capability as the bus is normally held high
by pull-up resistors. Thus, the prototype generic I/O circuitry was capable of successfully
performing I2C transactions at 100 kb/s. An example transaction with an I2C temperature
sensor, captured with an oscilloscope, is shown in Figure 7.8.
An instrumentation amplifier, (U1 in Figure 7.6), lies at the heart of the analogue input stage.
It has two modes of operation. Firstly, it can be used to measure the current flowing through
the output stage. In this configuration, the voltage drop over a pair of sense resistors (R1,
R4) is measured and a large gain is required. The gain is set using a single resistor (R10),
which on the prototype I/O circuitry is replaced by a potentiometer to allow the gain to be
adjusted easily. In its second mode of operation, the instrumentation amplifier is used to
directly measure input voltages. To configure the channel for this mode, the bottom sense
resistor must be removed. Then, by turning on the bottom MOSFET in the output stage, the
negative input of the amplifier is referenced to ground. Any external voltage applied to the
I/O channel will then be amplified by the the amplifier and presented to the ADC. In this
mode, a variety of gains may be required, depending on the analogue voltage source.
The ability to cross-strap peripherals relies on the I/O channel high-impedance state. An
I/O channel which fails in such a way that it is permanently high or permanently shorted to
ground will block all access to the peripheral, regardless of cross-strapping. Thus, it is critical
that the I/O circuitry’s failure modes are designed to avoid this eventuality. The design goal
is that no single component failure should result in this undesired state.
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To study the I/O circuitry failure modes, a fault tree analysis was undertaken. The resultant
fault tree is shown in Figure 7.9. At the top of the tree is the undesired I/O channel state,
which represents being stuck in any state other than high-impedance. The second level of the
tree breaks this down into two states: stuck high or stuck shorted to ground. The lower levels
of the tree contain all the combinations of component failures which could lead to one of
these two states. In almost every case, a combination of at least two component failures is
required to end up in an undesirable output state. However, a careful look at the tree will
reveal that the TVS diodes fail the design goal. A shorted failure of the lower TVS diode
will short the I/O channel to ground. The simple nature of the diode as a component makes
its failure very unlikely and this slight departure from the design goal is therefore accepted.
However, if deemed necessary, another diode in series would remove this weak point.
In addition to demonstrating functionality and testing performance, one of the main aims of
the prototype I/O circuitry implementation was to judge how compact, in terms of PCB area,
the circuitry could be made. A practical artificial cell requires each of its proteins to have at
least 8 I/O channels (based on Table 4.1 in Chapter 4). Thus, in a CubeSat-scale cell (10 x 10
cm), the PCB area available per I/O channel is very limited. Once laid out, each prototype
I/O channel fit into an area of approximately 13 x 30 mm, which was deemed sufficiently
compact. Thus, all functional and physical requirements were met to proceed to full cell
design.
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Figure 7.9: Fault tree analysis of the generic I/O circuitry. Only the TVS diode presents a potential single point of failure, provided a peripheral is
cross-strapped.
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7.2.2 Artificial Cell Implementation
Figure 7.10 depicts the design of the multicellular testbed artificial cell. It can be compared
to the reference Satellite Stem Cell design in Figure 4.6 of Chapter 4.
Each testbed cell contains four proteins. This number was reached based on the calculated
maximum number of proteins which could fit within the CubeSat standard PCB dimensions
of 10 x 10 cm. In addition, each cell contains a central, non-volatile ’DNA’ memory IC, a
discrete watchdog IC and a CAN bus bridge.
Each protein is composed of five elements: a microcontroller with embedded bootloader and
CAN hardware, an external CAN controller and transceiver IC, a set of power switches, an
’I2C I/O expander’ IC, and a set of generic I/O channels.
The MCU is an NXP LPC11C24 ARM Cortex M0 which can be clocked at up to 50 MHz. It
has 32 kB of flash memory for program storage and 8 kB of RAM. This MCU was chosen for
several reasons. Firstly, the MCU needs to be physically small and consume as little power as
possible, while having enough processing power to perform demanding tasks such as attitude
estimation. The ARM Cortex M0 family, which was essentially designed to compete with
8-bit MCUs, is a good fit. The LPC11C24 comes in a small 7 x 7 mm, 48-pin LQFP package
and consumes less than 9 mA, while providing 0.84 DMIPS/MHz of processing power (for
a comparison of processing power, see the case study in Section 7.3). Secondly, the MCU
has an embedded CAN controller and transceiver which saves board space. Furthermore, the
MCU has a set of drivers for the CAN hardware in ROM, and, even better, a CAN-based
bootloader. Using this bootloader, new firmware can be uploaded to the MCU over the CAN
bus. Finally, NXP provides very inexpensive hardware development kits for the LPC11C24,
which come with a licence for their Eclipse-based development environment. A number
of other MCUs, such as the Texas Instruments MSP430, would make suitable alternatives,
provided the CAN transceiver is provided and a bootloader written.
The internal CAN transceiver is used to communicate over the inter-protein bus. This bus,
which is also shown in Figure 7.10, is the first of three buses interconnecting the proteins on
a cell. Any protein on a cell can send messages on this bus to other proteins on the same cell,
including the MM. Thanks to the LPC11C24’s CAN bootloader, the same bus is used by the
MM to reprogram proteins. The second bus present on every cell is the inter-cellular bus.
It is also based on the CAN standard but, under normal operations, is only read from and
written to by the MM protein. However, since every protein has the ability to become the
MM, all proteins must at least be electrically interfaced to the bus. This is achieved through
an external CAN controller and transceiver IC, the MCP25625. This solution allows the
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Figure 7.10: Implemented cell architecture based on four proteins interconnected by three buses.
power to the MCP25625 to be removed on non-MM proteins (putting the MCP25625 in a
supported, high-impedance state), mitigating the risk of bus interference.
Removing power to the MCP25625 is achieved with a MOSFET switch controlled via an I2C
I/O expander. The I2C I/O expander is a simple device which provides a number of digital
inputs and outputs which can be controlled via I2C. In addition to providing control over the
MCP25625 power, it also provides individual power control for the MCU and generic I/O
channels, monitors for MCU over-current conditions, and can place the MCU into bootloader
mode via dedicated MCU pins. An I2C bus, therefore, is the third bus which spans the cell.
It is a single-master bus with the MM acting as master. The I2C bus also provides access to
the ’DNA’ non-volatile memory, which in this case is implemented using a pair of 1Mbit
I2C Ferroelectric RAMs (FRAMs). These provide storage space for firmware images and
runtime variables. Thus, the process an MM follows to reprogram one of its proteins follows
these steps:
1. MM pulls the protein MCU’s bootloader pin low via the I2C bus and I/O expander
2. MM cycles power to the protein via the I2C bus and I/O expander
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3. MM checks that the protein is in bootloader mode by pinging it over the inter-protein
CAN bus
4. MM reads new firmware image from the FRAM via I2C bus and transfers it the to
protein over the inter-protein CAN bus
5. Protein’s bootloader writes the new firmware to flash memory
6. MM releases bootloader pin and power cycles protein as before
A final purpose of the I2C bus is to provide the interface to a discrete real-time clock and
watchdog IC. The MM is required to prove it is still alive by periodically ’kicking’ the
watchdog. If the watchdog times out it will trigger two events. Firstly, it will activate a
CAN bridge between the internal and external CAN buses. The CAN bridge is a discrete
IC which, when activated, transparaently forwards all traffic between the two separate CAN
buses, effectively merging them into a single bus. The CAN bridge allows proteins on
the cell to continue interacting with the rest of the system despite the absence of the MM
router task. The bridge also allows the MM on another cell to reprogram proteins on the
stricken cell. In additional to activating the CAN bridge, a watchdog timeout also triggers
a hardware interrupt in all of the cell’s proteins by pulling a dedicated signal line low. As
will be described in more detail in Section 7.2.3, this causes one of the proteins on the cell
to enter bootloader mode, ready to be reprogrammed into the new cell MM. This process
follows these steps:
1. Another cell in the system senses the bootloader-mode protein on the inter-cellular
CAN bus. This signals the loss of an MM on a system cell.
2. The ’saviour’ cell’s MM reads the MM firmware from FRAM and transfers it between
cells (via the inter-cellular bus and CAN bridge) to the bootloader-mode protein.
3. Bootloader writes the new firmware to flash memory
4. Saviour MM resets the bootloader-mode protein using a CAN command
5. Bootloader-mode protein restarts as the formally-stricken cell’s new MM.
6. New MM resets the watchdog, which disables the CAN bridge, and continues as
normal
The final component of each protein is the generic I/O circuitry. Each protein has six generic
I/O channels which are electrically identical to the prototype I/O channels, but have had
their layout optimised. Originally, eight I/O channels per protein were planned to match
the requirements of Table 4.1 in Chapter 4. However, during layout it became apparent that
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Figure 7.11: Implemented artificial cell PCB layout. Notice the repetition of the generic I/O circuitry,
and the symmetry of the four proteins.
Figure 7.12: Completed testbed cell (barring a few I/O channels), with important sections highlighted.
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the number would have to be reduced to fit into the space available. Nevertheless, with
six channels the majority CubeSat peripherals can be interfaced to. The complexity of the
generic I/O layout can be seen in Figure 7.11, which shows the layout of two signal layers of
the four-layer cell PCB. A complete (barring a few I/O channels) testbed cell is shown in
Figure 7.12, with important sections highlighted.
7.2.3 HARP Middleware Implementation
The HARP middleware implementation is composed of two parts, namely, the MM firmware
and an agent template. Both are based on the official FreeRTOS V7.1.0 port for the LPC1114
MCU, which is a close sibling of the LPC11C24 [100]. FreeRTOS is a free, open-source,
real-time operating system for embedded environments. It has been used successfully on
board several low-cost satellites, including the CubeSats STRAND-1 [101], Alsat-1N [102]
and ESTCube-1 [103], and ports are available for many architectures.
The MM firmware implements the AMS, TAE and Router agency services, as well as other
housekeeping tasks, as a set of four FreeRTOS threads (excluding the idle thread). The
threads have hard-coded priorities, with the Router receiving the highest priority and the
TAE receiving the lowest. The full set of threads, their priorities and their required stack
space are given in Table 7.2.
The complete MM firmware, including FreeRTOS port, agency services and relevant hard-
ware drivers, compiles to 28.7 kB in NXP’s LPCXpresso development environment with
compiler size optimisation enabled. This consumes approximately 90% of the LPC11C24’s
flash memory.
A comparison of the memory requirements of the embedded agent platforms JADE-LEAP,
Mobile-C and Agilla, is given in Table 7.3. As these values were generated under different
conditions, they can only be used as a rough, order-of-magnitude comparison. However, it is
evident that HARP’s memory footprint is orders of magnitude smaller than traditional agent
platforms (and comparable to Agilla).
Due to the limited RAM (8 kB) available in LPC11C24 MCUs, some constraints had to be
placed on ACL messages. Firstly, agent names, which are represented as character arrays,
are limited to two bytes in length. Thus, the agency goes by the name ’MM’ while agents
have names such as ’A1’ or ’RW’. Secondly, ACL message contents are limited to 11 bytes
in length. Both of these limitations could easily be lifted if the middleware was ported to a
system based on protein MCUs with more RAM.
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Table 7.2: The priorities, responsibilities and stack sizes of the FreeRTOS threads composing the
HARP agency middleware.
Thread Priority Implements Stack Size (Bytes)
1 lowest Health check 1792
2 medium AMS 1712
3 medium
Kick watchdog
Broadcast agent list 624
4 high Router 544
Table 7.3: Order of magnitude comparison of the memory requirements of agent platforms designed
for embedded applications [81][80].
Agent Platform ROM Requirement(kB)
RAM Requirement
(kB)
JADE-LEAP 17782 600
Mobile-C (emb. Ch Interpreter) ∼3000
HARP 28.7 8
Agilla 57 3.3
The agent template, which forms the second half of the HARP middleware, provides a
FreeRTOS thread for handling ACL communication and a library for utilising the generic I/O
hardware. Additionally, the agent template provides the routines for handling the MM-failure
hardware interrupt. This interrupt occurs when MM failure has caused the cell’s watchdog to
time-out. Upon detecting this condition, the thread will:
1. Broadcast a CAN message, including the priority of its current task, on the inter-protein
bus stating it has received the interrupt.
2. Wait 500 ms and listen for similar messages from other proteins on the cell.
3. If it determines that it has the lowest priority task, enter bootloader mode, otherwise
clear interrupt and continue.
At this point the protein which has entered bootloader mode will be reprogrammed into the
new cell MM by another cell in the system.
The agent template compiles to 24.9 kB, or 78% of an LPC11C24’s flash memory. While the
remaining space for user code is limited, the provided threads and libraries should allow the
developer to focus on high-level functionality. Alternatively, agents need not be based on
the agent template, or even FreeRTOS. As long as an agent is capable of registering with
the AMS and responding to health checks, it can be deployed on the system. However, such
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Figure 7.13: The complete multicellular testbed, composed of two cells. The toggle switches allow
individual proteins to be switched off permanantly or momentarily, simulating failures. Both the
inter-protein and inter-cellular bus traffic can be monitored through a terminal.
agents are not recommended as they are not necessarily capable of detecting and correctly
responding to MM failures, which lowers the overall available redundancy.
7.2.4 Demonstrating Functionality
Figure 7.13 shows the completed multicellular system testbed. It is composed of two cells
and includes a number of toggle switches for simulating permanent or momentary protein
failures. Additionally, the inter-protein and inter-cellular bus traffic can be parsed and
monitored on a terminal. For the majority of experiments, multi-colour LEDs were used as
the peripherals, as they offer a convenient way of identifying an executing agent. Described
in the subsections that follow are a series of demonstrations which were carried out to verify
the full functionality of the multicellular testbed. In addition, further system implementation
details are given to describe various observed and tested-for behaviours.
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7.2.4.1 Task Allocation Demonstration
The first demonstration consisted of three agents being deployed onto the system of two cells.
A separate multicolour LED was attached as the peripheral for each of the eight proteins over
the two cells. Each LED has four connections, namely common ground, red anode, green
anode, and blue anode, which interfaced to four generic I/O channels. Each of the three
agents flashed its LED a different colour when executing, allowing the agent to be easily
identified. In addition, the MM identified itself by flashing its attached LED in white.
The demonstration began with the two cells containing only MMs. As time progressed, the
MMs began deploying the agents onto their proteins. It takes approximately 10 seconds
for an MM to program a protein with new agent firmware. Once all three agents were
executing, as verified by three peripheral LEDs flashing red, green, and blue, respectively,
the MMs continued by deploying cold redundant versions of the agents onto the remaining
proteins.
The task allocation strategy was tested by severing the inter-cellular bus between the two
cells. At this point, each of the three agents began executing on each of the cells, as each
cell wrongly believed that no agents were executing anywhere else in the system. Re-
establishing the inter-cellular link promptly (within 3 seconds) caused the duplicate agents to
stop executing and become cold redundant.
The task allocation strategy was further tested by using the toggle switches to cause protein
failures. Removing the power to an individual protein which was executing an agent causes
the agent to reappear on another protein, which may or may not be on the same cell. This is
only true if spare proteins are available, or the lost agent is of a higher priority than another
agent in the system. In the latter case, the MM will reprogram one of its agents which are
of a lower priority into the lost agent. Such an event has the potential to cause a cascade of
reprogramming events, but the system always settles into a state which includes the highest
priority agents. Additionally, an improved recovery time was noted for agents which could
be recovered from their cold-redundant counterparts, compared to those which had to be
reprogrammed. Cold redundant protein recovery takes less than a second.
Temporary failures were also introduced to test the system. It was demonstrated that the
effect of temporarily disabling a protein is dependent on the duration of the failure. Very
short interruptions, on the order of hundreds of milliseconds, could go undetected by the
health checks and would simply result in the agent successfully re-registering with its AMS.
Longer interruptions would trigger the system to begin redeploying the lost agent onto
another protein. If the failed protein recovered before the new one was operational, the new
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agent’s AMS registration would fail and it would be made cold redundant. On the other hand,
if the failed protein only recovered after the new agent was operational, the original agent’s
attempt to re-register with its AMS would fail, and it would become cold redundant.
Finally, the loss of an MM protein was initiated. As expected, after the cell watchdog
timed out after a few seconds, the CAN bridge was enabled and one of the remaining
functional proteins ceased executing its agent and entered bootloader mode. The remaining
proteins continued execution unaffected. The MM on the second cell successfully noticed
the appearance of a bootloader-state protein on the inter-cellular bus and reprogrammed it
into a new MM. Once the new MM booted, the CAN bridge was disabled and the system
settled back into a steady state containing all three agents.
A commentated video of this demonstration in available online at [104].
7.2.4.2 Continuity of Runtime Variables Demonstration
The second demonstration aimed to test the saving and restoring of agent runtime variables.
Both cells of the multicellular testbed were employed, but only a single agent was deployed
onto the system. This agent flashed its peripheral LED through a predetermined sequence of
colours. The current state of the sequence was stored in a runtime variable, which the agent
requested the MM to store after every transition. Each store sequence followed the FIPA
Request interaction protocol and resulted in the MM storing the runtime variable in the cell’s
non-volatile memory.
To test the continuity of runtime variables, a note was made of the current LED colour
sequence state, before the protein on which the agent was running was deactivated using
the toggle switches. At this point the system successfully redeployed the agent on another
protein, from where it continued its sequence in the correct state. To do this, the agent must
complete two steps upon starting execution. Firstly, it must use a FIPA request to register with
its AMS. Secondly, it must use a FIPA query to ask for any relevant, stored, runtime variables.
If such variables exist, as they did in this case, the MM will respond with the appropriate data.
The agent can then use this data as a state checkpoint from which to continue executing. The
choices of which runtime variables to store, how often to store them, and how to continue
once runtime variables have been recovered, are up to the agent developer.
This sequence of events was tested several times to verify that runtime variables could also be
transferred between cells. As explained in Chapter 5, every MM builds up a list of all agents
currently executing in the system by listening out for agent directory broadcasts. When
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the Task Allocation Entity within an MM notices that an agent has failed (because it has
not recently received notification of that agent’s presence from any of the agent directory
broadcasts), it notes the last cell on which the agent had been executing. As part of the
process of redeploying the failed agent onto one of its own proteins, as part of the global
task allocation strategy, it will query the previous host cell for any relevant runtime variable
data. Thus, once the agent starts executing on the new cell, a copy of its runtime variables
are available locally.
There are two common cases in which the MM will not service valid queries for runtime
variables. The first case occurs when an agent is executed for the first time on the system.
The second case occurs when the requested runtime variables have expired. In addition to
deciding which runtime variables to store and how often to store them, the agent developer
must also assign a longevity to each runtime variable. The longevity determines how long the
data in a runtime variable is relevant for. For example, certain attitude control variables are
updated every second and therefore expire after a second. On the other hand, some variables,
such as temperature, change more slowly and can therefore stay relevant for longer periods.
When the MM receives a query for stored runtime variables, it checks the save time and
expiry time against its real-time clock. Expired variables are not returned, resulting instead
in a query failure response. In either case, a failed query for runtime variables requires the
agent to initialise from a default state.
The expiry of runtime variables was tested in the demonstration, too. This was done by
leaving the agent’s protein running, while deactivating all the rest. In this configuration,
when the agent’s protein was deactivated, too, there were no available proteins onto which
the agent could be redeployed by the system. The system was left in this state until the
LED-colour runtime variable should have expired (10 seconds in this case). At this point
a random protein was reactivated and the agent was seen to restart on it. As expected, the
agent had to start from the beginning of its colour sequence.
A commentated video of this demonstration is available on online at [105].
7.2.4.3 Cross-Strapping Demonstration
The third demonstration aimed to test peripheral cross-strapping. Only a single cell and
a single were used. Instead of a multicolour LED, the peripheral in this case was an I2C
temperature sensor. Interfacing to the sensor requires four generic I/O channels: I2C data,
I2C clock, 3V3 power, and ground. An LED was connected in parallel across the power and
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ground channels to give a quick indication that the sensor was receiving power. The single
I2C temperature sensor was cross-strapped between two proteins.
To test the cross-strapping an agent was written which would periodically read the I2C
sensor and report the temperature over the inter-cellular bus. The two proteins to which
the I2C sensor was cross-strapped were enabled, while the rest were disabled. The system
quickly deployed the agent onto one of the proteins, while the other was automatically
programmed into a cold redundant spare. The active agent successfully read the sensor
and reported the temperature every second. When the active agent’s protein was physically
disabled, simulating a permanent failure, the cold-redundant spare was activated by the
system and successfully read from the same temperature sensor. This implies that the generic
I/O circuitry of the ’failed’ protein correctly entered high-impedance mode.
A commentated video of this demonstration is available online at [106].
A more thorough test of the peripheral interfaces would involve multiple peripherals cross-
strapped in various configurations, including between cells. In this way, the task allocation
strategy would have to take into account the reconfiguration limitations caused by the
peripheral interfaces. This functionality is currently not implemented, but would be simple
to do. Along with each task in the prioritised task list would be information indicating any
required peripherals. Additionally, each cell would require a list in non-volatile memory of
its current peripheral interfaces. With these two pieces of information, the Task Allocation
Entity would be able to deploy agents requiring specific peripherals to proteins with those
interfaces.
7.2.5 Performance and Scalability Benchmarking
In addition to functionality experiments, performance and benchmarking experiments were
performed for determining overheads and scaling potential. In addition to proving practical
feasibility, these characteristics are important for comparison to the conceptual multicellular
satellite requirements derived in Section 3.1.4.
7.2.5.1 Processing Capacity and Power Consumption
The protein MCUs are based on ARM Cortex M0s which can be clocked at up to 48 MHz.
The ARM Cortex M0 core is capable of 0.84 Dhrystone MIPS (DMIPS) per megahertz [107].
The Dhrystone benchmark is a popular test of processor performance and is based on a loop
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Figure 7.14: Power consumption breakdown of a prototype artificial cell from the multicellular
testbed.
containing a number of ’representative’ C statements. The DMIPS unit is calculated by
dividing the total number of iterations of the loop executed by the processor in one second,
by the number achieved by the DEC VAX 11/780 minicomputer of the 1970s. Thus, with all
four proteins clocked at 48 MHz, a cell has a total computational capacity of 161.28 DMIPS.
However, one of the proteins is reserved for the MM, so a total of 120.96 DMIPS is available
to the developer.
At this level of performance, a cell consumes 390 mW. The power consumption breakdown
can be seen in Figure 7.14. 32 % of the power consumption is attributable to the operation
of the two CAN buses. Operating at 5V, they consume significantly more power than the
common CubeSat I2C bus. With only four proteins on the cell, the MM power consumption
overhead, at 16 %, is also substantial. Increasing the number of proteins per cell will reduce
this overhead. However, as will be shown in Section 7.2.5.3, the maximum number of
proteins per cell is limited by the finite processing capacity of the MM.
The power consumption can be lowered by reducing the clock speed of user proteins to
12 MHz, giving a total processing capacity of 30.24 DMIPS. At this performance, power
consumption is reduced by 25.8 % to 310 mW.
A comparison of this performance and power consumption with respect to other satellite
platforms is given in the case studies of Section 7.3.
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Figure 7.15: Inter-protein CAN bus bandwidth utilisation by routine MM health checks and repro-
gramming procedures.
7.2.5.2 Housekeeping Bus Overheads
Housekeeping activities central to the ASC Architecture, such as protein health checks and
protein reprogramming, come with overheads. The health check routine makes use of FIPA
ACL messages and interaction protocols. Despite the bit-efficient encoding of ACL messages,
ACL messaging incurs a large bandwidth overhead. A typical ACL message is 70 bytes
long and can contain a maximum of 11 message payload bytes (a limitation of the HARP
implementation). Furthermore, every ACL message forms part of an interaction protocol,
which involves the exchanges of at least two ACL messages. Thus, transferring 11 bytes of
message data from one agent to another results in at least 140 bytes of transfer layer traffic.
At the ISO-TP layer, this will translate into 22 CAN frames (1 start frame, 1 flow control
frame, and 20 consecutive frames). Finally, 22 CAN frames require 297 bytes (2376 bits) of
physical link traffic. Thus, in this implementation, ACL messaging is only envisioned to be
used for low bandwidth data exchanges and for setting up subscriber-consumer relationships
based on real-time CAN messages. Future enhancements to the HARP middleware should
include a substantial increase to the maximum ACL message content length, to lower these
overheads.
The protein reprogramming procedure does not use ACL messaging and instead uses CAN
frames following the CanOpen protocol, as specified by the LPC11C24’s CAN bootloader.
Thus, the reprogramming procedure has far less overhead, but nevertheless produces a
large amount of data on the CAN bus. Due to the addressing scheme used, this data takes
priority over ACL messages, but not over real-time CAN traffic. It is important for the
programming to complete quickly, as it represents a period of increased risk from radiation
induced faults.
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Figure 7.15 shows the inter-protein CAN bus bandwidth overhead caused by the MM’s health
check routine, and by the protein reprogramming process. During this experiment the CAN
bus was operating at 100 kb/s. Protein failures were induced using the toggle switches at 40
and 110 seconds, leading to the large peaks in bus utilisation as reprogramming occurred.
The failed proteins were revived at 180 and 240 seconds, leading to two more automatic
reprogramming sessions. The reprogramming process can consume up to 65 % of the bus
bandwidth.
The smaller peaks in between programming sessions are caused by the MM’s periodic, ACL-
based, protein health checks. Each health check consists of a single ACL query interaction
per protein, and therefore creates approximately 10 kb (2376 bits x 4 proteins) of CAN traffic.
Therefore, the theoretical maximum health check rate for the prototype cells is 10 Hz over
the 100 kb/s bus. However, in practice, a health check rate at least one order of magnitude
slower should be used to avoid causing excessive bus traffic. In the experiment of Figure
7.15 a rate of 0.1 Hz was implemented. The height of the peaks caused by the health checks
is seen to fluctuate over time, and is caused by the varying numbers of active proteins during
the experiment. However, the health check routine never consumes more than 4 % of the bus
bandwidth.
System recovery time after a protein failure is dependent on several variables, including
the failure type, health check rate, current system redundancy, agent size, and number of
stored runtime variables. However, given knowledge of these variables, the recovery time is
deterministic. The experiment of Figure 7.15 shows that reprogramming takes approximately
10 seconds for a 32 kB agent, while the complete recovery procedure, from fault detection to
new agent execution start, can take up to 30 seconds with a 0.1 Hz health check rate. Thus,
this system is not suitable for applications which require full fail-operational capabilities
(although a certain level of operation will always be available). However, for a satellite in
orbit such recovery times are generally tolerable, especially if it negates the need for a ground
controller to intervene.
7.2.5.3 AMS Performance and Router Bandwidth
Beyond the limits imposed by the housekeeping overheads, several other factors limit the
scaling potential of the system. Firstly, the 11-bit CAN bus addressing scheme limits the
the total number of cells in the system to 15, and allows a maximum of 126 proteins per
cell. This limitation could be overcome by switching to extended addressing mode, which is
supported by most CAN hardware and extends the address field to 29 bits.
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The second scaling limitation is imposed by the AMS transaction bandwidth. Since the AMS
can only service a finite number of transactions per second, a cell with too many proteins
may suffer from an overloaded AMS. As mentioned before, in addition to the health checks,
common AMS interactions include requests to register or store runtime variables, and queries
for protein address lookups. Experiments determined that each AMS of the test bench system
is capable of processing a maximum of 20 AMS transactions per second.
Finally, the Router task, which is responsible for forwarding traffic between the inter-protein
and inter-cellular CAN buses on each cell, also has a limited bandwidth. The Router Task
has the highest priority of all the AMS services to ensure that real-time CAN traffic is always
forwarded. Experiments determined that handling more than 500 CAN frames per second
results in the Router task starving the other tasks of processing time. Since all real-time
CAN traffic is automatically forwarded into every cell (unlike ACL traffic which is filtered),
the entire multicellular system must produce significantly less than 500 frames ( 32 kB) of
real-time CAN data per second. Provided a separate network is implemented for handling
payload data (often in the form of point to point links) and the attitude control bandwidth is
limited to a few hertz, the available bandwidth should be sufficient.
7.2.5.4 GPIO Cross-Strapping Limitations
Ideally, it should be possible to cross-strap the same peripheral to an arbitry number of I/O
channels. However, due to parasitic capacitances and leakage currents, there are limits on
cross-strapping. These limits vary by application. The addition of cross-strapping will have
minimal affect on slow, high power signals, but will degrade the quality of analogue input
and high-speed digital signals.
To understand the cross-strapping potential of the testbed I/O circuitry, an I2C peripheral was
chosen as test case. Using 2.2 kΩ pull-up resistors, an I2C temperature sensor was interfaced
to a single GPIO channel and transactions were successfully completed at 100 kbits/s. The
shape of the I2C clock waveform is shown in Figure 7.16. From this figure, the RC constant
rise time can be remeasured to be approximately 1.5 us. After cross-strapping the same I2C
temperature sensor to a second I/O channel and repeating the test, the time constant increased
to approximately 2.5 microseconds, as shown in Figure 7.17. Thus, we can calculate that
the time constant added by each additional cross-strapped I/O channel is approximately 1
us.
Based on this measurement, and the known 2.2 kΩ resistance, the I/O channel capacitance
is calculated to be approximately 455 pF. Based on the I2C specifications, the maximum
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Figure 7.16: 100 kb/s I2C clock waveform without cross-strapping (a), zoomed-in (b).
Figure 7.17: 100 kb/s I2C clock waveform with cross-strapping between two I/O channels (a),
zoomed-in (b). Note the increased rise time.
allowable I2C bus capacitance is 400 pF [108]. Thus, despite working in practice, even a
single I/O channel violates this requirement.
The majority of this unwanted capacitance comes from the MOSFETs. For example, the
output capacitance of the FDN371N MOSFET, which forms the lower switch in the I/O
half-bridge, is given in the datasheet as 197 pF. The next generation of I/O circuitry will
have to be designed with this parasitic capacitance in mind. However, even a brief survey of
MOSFETs reveals that the current I/O circuitry could be updated with footprint-compatible
MOSFETs with output capacitances below 30 pF (Si2308BDS).
Ultimately, the best performance could be achieved by building the I/O circuitry, either
individually, or as a whole bank, within a single ASIC.
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Figure 7.18: The CubeADCS, an integrated COTS CubeSat attitude determination and control system
available from CubeSpace [109].
7.3 Multicellular Satellite Case Studies
To truly demonstrate the benefits and practical feasibility of the Artificial Stem Cell Archi-
tecture, two case studies are presented. In these case studies, the measured performance
characteristics of the testbed cells are used to theoretically ’cellularise’ two traditional sets
of satellite avionics. Thereafter, the reliability, power consumption, volume and processing
capacity of the cellularised and traditional systems are compared.
The first case study is based on a COTS, CubeSat-scale, ADCS subsystem. Its functionality is
replicated using only 8 proteins. Nevertheless, the system is interesting because of its ability
to operate in several different modes and its large number of interfaces to diverse sensors
and actuators. The second case study represents a larger multicellular system, composed of
approximately 40 proteins, and replicates the combined functionality of several microsatellite
susystems.
7.3.1 CubeSat ADCS
The CubeSpace CubeADCS, shown in Figure 7.18, is an integrated CubeSat attitude estima-
tion and control solution [109]. Attitude is estimated by an ARM Cortex M3 MCU using
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Figure 7.19: The architecture of the full-featured CubeADCS [112].
input from a magnetometer, coarse and fine sun sensors, a horizon sensor, and a gyroscope.
Attitude is controlled by a set of three mangetorquers and one to three reaction wheels. The
CubeADCS can operate in several modes, including detumble, pure magnetic control, and
momentum-biased control. To date, the CubeADCS has flown on a number of SSC CubeSats
and QB50 CubeSats [110] [111].
The most full-featured CubeADCS is composed of three distinct systems, named CubeCom-
puter, CubeControl and CubeSense, existing as three separate 10 x 10 cm PCBs in a stack.
This architecture is shown in Figure 7.19. CubeComputer contains the main ARM Cortex M3
MCU, which handles telemetry and telecommands over an external I2C bus. Additionally, it
executes attitude estimation and control loops and controls the other two systems over an
internal I2C bus. CubeControl provides an interface to the majority of the attitude sensors and
actuators, while CubeSense, fitted with two CMOS cameras with fish-eye lenses, provides
fine sun and nadir attitude vectors. For the purposes of this comparison a simpler version
of the CubeADCS bundle is used. This version does not include CubeSense and contains
only a single momentum wheel. Despite its reduced features, such a system is still capable
of three-axis stabilising a satellite into a nadir-pointing attitude.
To cellularise a system, the discrete tasks it performs must be identified, together with
required peripherals. The number of tasks then roughly determines the minimum number of
proteins required. In this case, six ADCS tasks were identified, requiring two prototype cells
to implement. The tasks are given priorities according to the operational modes in which they
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Figure 7.20: The architecture of a ’cellularised’ CubeADCS, composed of two testbed cells and
cross-strapped peripherals.
are required. The highest priority tasks are required for the most basic mode, which in this
case is detumbling. These tasks include the magnetometer interface, magnetorquers driver,
and main attitude control loop. The next mode, magnetic control, requires the addition of the
coarse sun sensor interface and orbit propagator tasks. Finally, the most complex and capable
mode, momentum-biased mode, requires the addition of the momentum wheel controller
task. An example distribution of these tasks across the cells of a multicellular system is
shown in Figure 7.20.
It is sensible to relate the level of cross-strapping of peripherals to their priorities. In this case,
the magnetometer is triple-strapped (because it is essential for estimating attitude), while the
magnetorquers and Sun sensors are double-strapped. The momentum wheel, because it is
only required in the most complex mode, has only a single interface.
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155
Multicellular System Implementations
7.3.1.1 Reliability Comparison
Now that the cell-based ADCS is fully defined, it is possible to use the reliability analysis of
Chapter 6 to compare its predicted reliability to that of the CubeADCS. In its most capable
mode, momentum-biased mode, the CubeADCS is essentially a series system, as shown
in Figure 7.21a. CubeControl contains two MCUs, one of which controls the momentum
wheel, while the other handles the magnetorquers and magnetometer [112]. The common
and support blocks represent support circuitry and buses on and between the PCBs of the
CubeADCS stack.
In its two reduced-capability modes, detumble and magnetic control, the wheel is not required.
Therefore, the MCU which normally controls the wheel has also been given the ability to
operate the magnetometer and torquers as a form of redundancy. Thus, in these modes the
block diagram appears as in Figure 7.21b, showing a partial parallel structure.
Based on these block diagrams of series and parallel architectures, the predicted reliability
of the CubeADCS was analytically calculated. Failures are assumed to be independent
and are modelled using Weibull distributions. A shape parameter of 0.4464 was derived
from an empirical study of in-orbit satellite reliabilities [26]. The scale parameters for the
MCUs, common and support blocks, of 60e3, 35e8 and 35e7 days, were adjusted to give the
CubeADCS its expected design lifetime of one year, while roughly taking into account their
relative complexities.
In contrast to the series and parallel architectures of the CubeADCS, the cell-based ADCS
is described, as before, as a modified k-out-of-n architecture (Figure 7.21c). It is important
to note that the representation of the system given in Figure 7.21c does not depict the
requirement for an MM on each cell, or the restrictions imposed by peripheral interfaces.
Thus, to more accurately model the system, the custom multicellular system simulator
(described in Chapter 6) was employed. In each simulation the system begins in its most
capable mode and transitions automatically into lower modes as failures build up. As
described before, momentum-biased, magnetic control, and detumbling modes require
a minimum of three, five and six user proteins receptively. To enable comparison, the
same Weibull distributions used to model the CubeADCS were applied to the cell-based
system.
The reliability plots of Figure 7.22a compare the predicted lifetimes of the CubeADCS and
cell-based ADCS in various modes of operation. In detumble mode, the cell-based ADCS
shows a reliability advantage throughout the mission lifetime. In magnetic control mode, the
cell-based ADCS starts out more reliable, but falls below the CubeADCS within the first
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Figure 7.22: Comparison between the predicted reliabilities of the CubeADCS (operating in various
modes) and the 2-cell (a) and 3-cell (b), theoretical, multicellular ADCSs.
157
Multicellular System Implementations
100 days. When operating in their most capable modes, the CubeADCS shows enhanced
reliability.
For a real reliability advantage, an extra cell must be added to the cell-based design. Since
the task allocation strategy is distributed, adding another cell is simple. All it involves is
linking up the inter-cellular bus and further cross-strapping desired peripherals to the new
cell. The three-cell ADCS is predicted to be more reliable than the CubeADCS in all modes,
throughout its mission lifetime, as shown in Figure 7.22b. However, the three-cell ADCS
comes with higher volume, mass and power consumption overheads, as will be described in
Section 7.3.1.2.
The poor performance of the two-cell ADCS in this design is due to the small total number
of proteins, and large number of peripherals, both of which restrict reconfigurability. The
peripheral ratio of the system is 1/2 (0.5), which results in far poorer reliability than a pure
computational or perfectly cross-strapped system. The analysis of Chapter 6 highlighted
the fact that the reliability benefits of a multicellular system increase as the total number of
proteins increase, even if the loading remains equal. Thus, a larger system requiring more
proteins is required in order for a multicellular architecture to show its reliability advantage
over more traditional architectures.
7.3.1.2 Performance and Overheads
As described before, each testbench cell has a processing capacity of 120.96 DMIPS and
consumes approximately 390 mW when operating at maximum capacity. Therefore, the
theoretical cell-based ADCS, composed of two cells, offers 242 DMIPS of processing
capacity at 780 mW of power consumption. In comparison, the CubeADCS has a processing
capacity of only 60.44 DMIPS, but consumes only 350 mW. Its processing capacity is derived
from the CubeComputer’s ARM Cortex M3 MCU, clocked at 48 MHz (1.25 DMIPS/MHz
[113]) and the two CubeControl, 8-bit, PIC18F MCUs, clocked at 11 MHz each (0.02
DMIPS/MHz [114]). Thus, the cell-based ADCS offers four times more performance at a
cost of twice the power consumption.
When placed in ’power-saving’ mode by clocking the proteins down to 12 MHz, the cell-
based ADCS offers almost exactly the same performance as the CubeADCS: 60 DMIPS. In
this mode, the cell-based ADCS’s power consumption is reduced to 620 mW, but this is still
77 % more than the CubeADCS.
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Table 7.4: Summary and comparison of CubeADCS and cell-based ADCS characteristics
CubeADCS 2 x 12 MHz Cells 3 x 12 MHz Cells
1 Year Reliability (%)
Detumble
Magnetic Control
Momentum Bias
85.8
66.8
66.8
95.2 (+11%)
71.4 (+6.9%)
33.4 (-50%)
98.8 (+15%)
97.2 (+46%)
91.9 (+38%)
Performance (DMIPS) 60.44 60.48 90
Power Consumption (W )
Detumble
Magnetic Control
Momentum Bias
0.26
0.35
0.35
0.41 (+58%)
0.55 (+57%)
0.62 (+77%)
0.56 (+115%)
0.70 (+100%)
0.78 (+123%)
PCB Area (cm2) 200 200 300
In terms of volume, both the cell-based ADCS and CubeADCS are composed of two PCBs of
approximately 10 x 10 centimetres each, plus the same accompanying peripherals. Therefore,
the two-cell ADCS comes with no volume overheads, while the three-cell ADCS incurs a 50
% overhead. The small size of the testbed cells makes them CubeSat compatible. However,
their large power consumption overheads, even in ’power-saving’ mode, leads to the same
conclusion as the reliability comparison: a physically larger system, with more room for solar
panels and more use for increased processing capacity, is a better target for cellularisation.
Such a system is investigated in the next case study.
A comparison summary is given in Table 7.4.
7.3.2 MicroSat Avionics
While some commercial entities, such as PlanetLabs, have based their business on the
nanosatellite form factor, which falls towards the bottom end of the small, low-cost satellite
scale, others such as SSTL, argue that slightly larger platforms represent the optimum
compromise between cost and capability [115]. Microsatellites fall in the range of 10-100
kg and compared to nanosatellites, such as CubeSats, have additional volume, mass and
power available. These extra resources can be used to implement a level of redundancy.
For example, SSTL sells a range of microsatellite buses which typically include dual-string,
cross-strapped avionics. One such satellite, AlSat1-B, is shown in Figure 7.23 This case study
focusses on cellularising a set of theoretical, traditional microsatellite-scale avionics.
The system architecture of the traditional microsatellite’s avionics is inspired by that of a
typical SSTL microsatellite. However, because SSTL does not publicly provide MTTF data
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on their subsystems, MTTF values are assumed for comparison purposes. These MTTF
values are not representative of real SSTL hardware.
Table 7.5 lists the representative subsystems which could feasibly be functionally replaced
by the current generation testbed cells. Certain subsystems, such as the electrical power
system and communication subsystems, currently contain too much custom analogue cir-
cuitry to be feasibly replaced. However, future generations of artificial cells, through the
advancement of technologies such as software defined radio, are envisioned to be even more
multifunctional.
The traditional microsatellite has its main subsystems duplicated in cold redundancy, as is
common amongst SSTL satellites. The traditional microsatellite’s OBC is given a repre-
sentative processing capacity of approximately 500 DMIPS, requiring 10 testbed cells (in
power saving mode) to match its performance [117]. The OBC’s workload is assumed to be
composed of several tasks, allowing a natural distribution of the tasks onto the discrete protein
processors of the testbed cells. The other subsystems are primarily peripheral interfaces and
are based on 8-bit MCUs. Therefore, replacing them with cells is simply a matter of ensuring
that sufficient generic I/O channels are provided.
Similary to the CubeADCS, the microsatellite avionics suite is modelled as being able to
operate in three modes of increasing capability. In the simplest mode, detumble, at least
one OBC and one ADCS interface are required. The ADCS interface acts as an interface to
magnetorquers, a magnetometer and a sun sensor. Both the OBC and ADCS interface are
modelled in cross-strapped, cold redundancy. The next mode, three-axis control, requires the
addition of at least three reaction wheels. Typically, four wheels are included, giving some
redundancy. The four wheels are modelled as a k-out-of-n system, requiring at least three to
be active. Finally, full operational mode requires the addition of a propulsion interface and
gyroscope interface, both of which are modelled in cross-strapped cold redundancy.
To determine the number of cells which will make up the cell-based system, the requirements
of each operational mode must be determined. In detumble mode, the OBC is assumed to
be operating at 50 % capacity, requiring at least five proteins, with a further two proteins
required for the magnetorquer and magnetometer interfaces. In three-axis mode, at least 14
proteins are required, with eight going towards the OBC operating at 80 % capacity and the
remaining six devoted to peripheral interfaces. Finally, full operational mode requires the
OBC to be operating at 100 % capacity, requiring 10 proteins, and a further eight are required
for peripheral interfacing. Based on these numbers, and the desire to match the traditional
system’s level of redundancy, a multicellular system of 10 testbed cells (40 proteins total - 30
available to the user) is considered.
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Figure 7.23: SSTL’s 100kg AlSat-1B microsatellite during the assembly phase [116].
Table 7.5: Representative microsatellite subsystems, their processing capacity, associated peripherals,
and equivalent number of proteins
Subsystem Redundant DMIPS Peripherals Eq. Proteins(per sub.)
OBC cold 500 none 10
ADCS Interface cold <10
3 x magnetorquers
1 x magnetometer
1 x fine sun sensor
3
Reaction Wheel 3-out-of-4 <10 1 x BLDC Motor 1
Propulsion Subsystem cold <10
1 x heater
2 x valves 1
Gyroscope Interface cold <10 1 x digital gryoscope 1
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Due to the large number of proteins required to match the performance of the OBC, a
large number of generic I/O channels are available for cross-strapping. Thus, the detumble
peripherals (magnetometer and magnetorquers) are interfaced to six proteins each. The
additional peripherals required for three-axis mode (sun sensor and three reaction wheels) are
interfaced to five proteins each. Finally, the gyroscope and propulsion systems are interfaced
to four proteins each. This gives a total of 40 interfaces, meaning every protein in the system
is interfaced to a peripheral. Failure of the peripherals themselves, for example wear-out of a
bearing in a reaction wheel motor, is not modelled. However, to guard against such failures,
two or three of the same peripherals could be included in the system, splitting the available
interfaces.
7.3.2.1 Reliability Comparison
As in the CubeSat case study, independent Weibull failure distributions are assumed, with a
shape parameter of 0.4464. In this case, the scale parameters of the subsystems, common and
supporting components (48e3, 35e8, 35e7) were adjusted to give the avionics an expected
lifetime (MTTF) of five years. Figure 7.24 shows a screenshot of the MATLAB-based
multicellular system simulator, configured for this case study. The resultant reliability plots,
derived through analytical means for the traditional microsatellite’s avionics and simulation
for the multicellular system, are shown in Figure 7.25. In contrast to the CubeSat-scale
system, the microsatellite-scale multicellular architecture shows a reliability advantage
over the traditional, cross-strapped design, in all modes of operation. Three years into the
simulated lifetime, the cell-based design is predicted to be 5 % more reliable in detumble
mode, and 18 % more reliable in three-axis and full operational modes. Alternatively, this
result implies that some cells could be removed from the multicellular system, lowering
overheads, while matching the traditional microsatellite’s avionics’ reliability.
7.3.2.2 Performance and Overheads
In terms of power consumption, the cell-based design consumes less than 4W, while a
traditional microsatellite OBC, such as the SSTL OBC750, itself consumes 10W [117]. This
power saving is largely due to the use of modern, low power MCUs in the cell-based design.
Furthermore, the cell-based design has the ability to linearly scale its power consumption
with processing capacity by physically shutting off proteins.
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Figure 7.24: A screenshot of the MATLAB-based multicellular system simulator, configured to
simulate a 10-cell system.
Figure 7.25: Comparison between the predicted reliability of a traditional cross-strapped microsatel-
lite avionics suite, and a comparable 10-cell multicellular system.
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To compare volumes, the subsystems of the traditional microsatellite are said to occupy
roughly 300 x 150 x 30 mm each, which is a standard format in which most SSTL subsystems
are available [117]. At least three testbed cells, in their current format, can fit into this volume.
Thus, while the theoretical microsatellite requires eight of these volumes (excluding the
reaction wheels which have integrated electronics), the cell-based system requires only
four. While this seems like a large volume saving, it is important to note that the SSTL
avionics suite looses a lot of volume due to the predefined module boxes. Therefore, the
most important outcome of the volume comparison is the fact that the cell-based solution can
easily fit within the existing avionics volume.
7.3.3 Case Studies Conclusion
The microsatellite avionics could be successfully cellularised because the OBCs translate
into a large number of purely-computational proteins. These proteins have the advantage
of easily trading tasks between themselves, and offer a lot of peripheral cross-strapping
possibilities. In all modes of operation, the cell-based design requires a larger number of
functional ’units’ than the traditional, cross-strapped design. In the traditional microsatellite
avionics, each of the items in Table 7.5 represent one unit, while each protein represents a
unit in the cell-based design. Since each unit was modelled with the same reliability, intuition
would suggest that the system requiring more units should be less reliable. However, once
reliability is introduced (e.g. at least one of the two OBCs must be functional is equivalent
to at least 10 out 20 proteins must be functional), the benefits of the k-out-of-n architecture
begin to outweigh the compounded unreliability of individual units. Thus, given there is
some room for redundancy, as is the case in the microsatellite example, splitting individual,
traditional subsystems into a number of proteins is beneficial.
In comparison to the CubeSat-scale system, the microsatellite system further benefits form a
much lower peripheral ratio. While the multicellular CubeADCS had a peripheral ration of
1/2 (meaning one peripheral for every two proteins), the microsatellite-scale system has a
peripheral ratio of only 1/5. As was shown in Section 6.5 of Chapter 6, a peripheral ratio
of 1/5 is sufficiently low that the system behaves almost like a purely-computational, or
perfectly cross-strapped, system.
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7.4 Summary
This chapter described two successful implementations of systems based on multicellular
concepts. The first implementation, which forms the payload interface computer of the
Surrey Space Centre’s SMESAT CubeSat, is based on a single cell of four proteins. While
it did not feauture generic I/O circuitry or the HARP middleware, it nonetheless allowed
a complex subsystem to be developed by a single engineer, working part-time, in under a
year. In addition, it gives SMESAT graceful degradation in experimental output by removing
potential single points of failure.
The second implementation, based on two artificial cells of four proteins each, forms a
complete Satellite Stem Cell architecture testbed. The testbed cells are approximately 10
x 10 cm each, contain six generic I/O channels per protein, and use ARM Cortex M0
microcontrollers as their protein processors. CAN buses, operating at 100 kb/s, form the
inter-protein and inter-cellular communications links. Operating at maximum capacity, each
cell offers 120.96 DMIPS of user processing capacity, and consumes approximately 390 mW.
Power savings can be made by clocking the protein processors at lower frequencies.
The HARP middleware, implemented for the testbed system, executes on top of the free,
real-time operating system, FreeRTOS. The middleware consists of two parts: a set of agency
services which execute on the macromolecular machinery protein, and an agent template. The
services firmware has a memory footprint of just 28.7 kB and requires less than 8 kB of RAM,
largely due to the offloading of the agent execution environment to dedicated processors. The
agent template, which includes functions for ACL communication and generic I/O control,
occupies just 24.9 kB of memory.
A series of experiments were successfully conducted on the testbed to exercise the full
functionality of the artificial cell hardware and HARP middleware. Additionally, through
a set of benchmarking experiments, the scaling potential of the system was investigated.
These experiments highlighted the large overheads associated with ACL communication,
which limits practical health-check rates to < 1Hz, and AMS transactions to 20 per second.
Nevertheless, with a 0.1 Hz health-check rate, the testbed system was able to recover from
partial hardware failures in under 30 seconds. While not suited for systems requiring fail-
operational capability, a 30 second recovery time is acceptable for satellites in orbit, especially
if it negates the need for ground operator intervention.
In the second part of the chapter, two case studies were presented. These focussed on the
theoretical reliability benefits and practical overheads of ’cellularising’ sets of traditional
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satellite avionics with the testbed cells. The case studies showed that the Satellite Stem Cell
architecture makes better use of available redundancy capacity than traditional architectures.
Cellularised microsatellite avionics are predicted to be up to 18 % more reliable after three
years, while consuming less power and occupying a similar volume. However, the case
studies also showed that the Satellite Stem Cell architecture is poorly suited to very small
systems, such as CubeSats, which have minimal room for redundancy and very limited
power.
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Conclusions
Despite their humble beginnings as educational projects for students and hobbyists, small,
low-cost satellites have graduated on to challenging the roles of large, traditional satellites,
while standing poised to enable exciting new mission concepts. However, the cost cutting
measures which have been experimental in their success, have also led to poor on-orbit
reliability to date. While traditional techniques for improving reliability are well known
to satellite developers, their implementation is hampered by the intrinsic mass, volume,
power, and budgetary limitations of small, low-cost satellites. Thus, this work sought to
develop an alternative system architecture, which minimises overheads while maximising
reliability.
To initially gain a better understanding of the causes of unreliability amongst small, low-cost
satellites, a parametric reliability survey of 159 CubeSats was undertaken. The on-orbit
performance of each CubeSat was compared against parameters of the CubeSat design,
including number of redundant subsystems, number of COTS subsystems, ADCS complexity,
and development time. Certain trends, such as increased redundancy leading to better
reliability, were expected. However, a number of unexpected trends were discovered, too.
These include an inverse relationship between development time and reliability, and a lower
than expected optimal number of COTS subsystems. The study concluded that there was no
clear recipe-for-success, as a large number of additional factors, which were not included in
the survey, impact reliability, too. These include team experience and continuity, mission
scope, available facilities, and budget. Nevertheless, the recently launched QB50 project
will present a good opportunity to redo this study, as the 50 CubeSats it entails were all
developed by different university teams, but with similar mission scopes and under similar
time lines.
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With no clear solution provided by the CubeSat survey, Chapter 3 investigated the techniques
used by biological life to thrive in even the harshest environments on Earth. Unicellular
life was found to employ techniques which are very similar to those used on traditional
satellites. These include the use of specially adapted proteins (radiation-hardened parts),
genetic redundancy (functional redundancy), and gene repair (error detection and correction
schemes). Multicellular life, on the other hand, with its distributed nature, displays the
use of techniques which are not commonly employed by man-made systems. Through the
biological processes of differentiation and inter-cellular communication, biological cells
can start out identically, before taking on specialisations. Furthermore, these specialisations
can change in response to damage or changing environmental conditions. Based on these
multicellular concepts, an outline for a conceptual system architecture, based on initially
identical, reconfigurable hardware blocks, instead of unique, discrete subsystems, was
proposed.
Similar concepts can be found in several other research fields, including bio-inspired proces-
sors, agent computing, and modular spacecraft concepts. Important works from each of these
fields were discussed, and the key novelties of the proposed multicellular architecture were
highlighted.
Expanding on the conceptual system architecture proposed in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 presented
the design of an artificial cell, which is expected to serve as the building block of multicellular
systems. The differentiation process of a biological cell represents a unique solution to
the complex problem of getting a single block of hardware to perform a wide variety
of functions. Therefore, the artificial cell is loosely modelled on the architecture of a
biological cell. In place of proteins and macromolecular machinery, the artificial cell has
discrete processing elements, such as microcontrollers, and in place of a cell membrane,
it has a set of novel, generic I/O circuitry. In a process which mimics differentiation,
the processing element performing the role of macromolecular machinery can respond to
changing internal and external conditions by programming different sets of firmware, stored
in its non-volatile ’DNA’ memory, into the protein processors. As both the macromolecular
machinery and proteins are implemented using the same processing elements (based on the
fact that biological macromolecular machinery is, itself, composed largely of proteins), the
macromolecular machinery can be moved around the cell, preventing it from becoming a
single point of failure.
To facilitate communication and cooperation amongst these artificial cells, a set of middlware
was developed and described in Chapter 5. The middleware, name the Hybrid Agent
Real-Time Platform, is based on the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents Abstract
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Architecture. It turns every artificial cell into an agency by executing a set of services on the
macromolecular machinery processor. Due to the need for a small memory footprint and
real-time capabilities, the HARP middleware distinguishes itself from other agent platforms
in three areas. Firstly, the HARP middleware uses discrete processors, instead of virtual
machines or interpreters, as its agent execution environment. This has the advantage of
reducing the agency memory footprint and enabling agents to perform real-time tasks.
Secondly, the HARP communication stack makes use of ISO-TP over CAN 2.0A as its
transfer level protocol, cutting out resource-intensive layers such as HTTP and IIOP. In
addition, the communication stack allows real-time CAN traffic to share the network with
agent communication language messages. Finally, the HARP middleware embeds a peer-to-
peer task manager in each agency, allowing systems which are built using the artificial cells
and HARP middleware to autonomously reconfigure in the event of failures.
The Satellite Stem Cell architecture, which entails the artificial cell hardware and HARP
middlware, represents a compromise between fully centralised, and fully decentralised,
architectures. It mimics the two-tiered architecture of simple multicellular organisms such
as jellyfish, which have no central brains. Task allocation is coordinated in a peer-to-peer
fashion at a cellular level, while task execution occurs at the protein level. Thus, it does not
have a potential single point of failure, while also leaving its processing elements (proteins)
unburdened from system-level decision making. What distinguishes the Satellite Stem Cell
architecture from other multi-tiered architectures is the blurry line between the tiers. Since the
macromolecular machinery, which represents the top tier, is composed of the same hardware
as the proteins (bottom tier), the system can continuously reconfigure in the event of failures
to ensure the two-tiered architecture remains functional. Furthermore, the Satellite Stem
Cell architecture represents more than a computational system, as every protein has its own
generic I/O hardware, allowing complex sensor/actuator systems to be developed without
additional electronics.
In Chapter 6 the theoretical reliability of multicellular systems was investigated and compared
to systems with traditional forms of reliability. First, a reliability equation for multicellular
systems was derived, based on an extension of k-out-of-n system theory. Each cell is
evaluated as an independent, multi-state, k-out-of-n system, before the full system reliability
is calculated through the convolution of the individual cell results. Determining the optimal
configuration of cells per system and proteins per cell proved to be complex, as different
configurations were shown to be optimal at different points during a system’s lifetime.
Nevertheless, trends were identified and compiled into a set of guidelines for multicellular
system development. These include the advice that the benefits of multicellular architec-
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tures increase as the system complexity increases, and that heavy system loading favours
configurations featuring fewer, larger cells. Overall, the analytical reliability equations
predict promising improvements over traditional forms of reliability, provided the system is
configured correctly.
To verify the derived analytical reliability equations, a MATLAB-based, multicellular system
simulator was developed. The simulator features a graphical user interface and allows Monte
Carlo simulations to be run. Using the same simulator, the effect of peripherals on the
reliability of multicellular systems was investigated. The ability to interface directly to
a variety of peripherals is one of the most important features of the Satellite Stem Cell
architecture. However, adding peripherals to a system causes a negative deviation from the
analytically predicted reliability, as the peripheral interfaces limit reconfigurability. However,
it was shown that the derived reliability equations can still be used to reasonably predict the
reliability of a multicellular system with peripherals, provided the peripheral ratio stayed
below 1/6.
To complement the established theoretical reliability benefits of multicellular architectures,
Chapter 7 investigated their practical feasibility. Two systems based on multicellular concepts
were successfully implemented. The first implementation forms the payload interface
computer of the SMESAT CubeSat. While it does not feature generic I/O circuitry or the
HARP middleware, it nonetheless allowed a complex subsystem to be developed by a single
engineer, working part-time, in under a year. Additionally, it allows SMESAT to sustain
partial hardware failures without losing all experimental output.
The second implementation forms a complete Satellite Stem Cell architecture testbed. Based
on four ARM Cortex M0 MCUs, each 10 x 10 cm testbed cell offers 120 DMIPS of user
processing capacity and consumes approximately 390 mW. An implementation of the HARP
middleware, which executes on top of the free, real-time operating system FreeRTOS, was
developed for the testbed hardware. With a compiled size of only 28.7 kB, the HARP
middleware is one of the smallest agent platforms.
A set of experiments were conducted to demonstrate the full functionality of the Satellite Stem
Cell architecture, and to measure its overheads and scalability. Due to the large overheads
incurred by ACL communication, the current hardware limits practical health-check rates
to < 1Hz and maximum AMS requests to 20 per second. Nevertheless, the testbed system
demonstrated recovery from partial hardware failures within 30 seconds, which is acceptable
for most earth-orbiting satellites.
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Chapter 7 concluded with two case studies which were based on the concept of cellularising
sets of traditional satellite avionics using the testbed cells. While CubeSat-scale systems
proved to be a poor fit for cellularisation, due to insufficient complexity and available power,
cellularised microsatellite-scale systems were shown to benefit from enhanced reliability and
reduced overheads.
Thus, despite the limitations of the current artificial cell hardware, the Satellite Stem Cell
architecture was shown to form a practical and feasible alternative to current low-cost satellite
architectures. The initial development of the proposed architecture is more complex than that
of a system based on unique, discrete subsystems. However, once the artificial cell hardware
is in production and the middleware has been fully tested, the development of future systems
becomes streamlined. This process should simply involve determining the required number
of cells, based on processing capacity, I/O, and redundancy requirements, and developing a
set of template-based agents to perform system tasks.
8.1 Publications
The work described in this thesis has been (or is expected to be) published in the following
journals and fully peer-reviewed conference proceedings:
• A. O. Erlank and C. P. Bridges, ’A Hybrid Real-Time Agent Platform for Fault-Tolerant,
Embedded Applications’ revision submitted for manuscript acceptance to the Journal
of Autonomous and Multi Agent Systems [revision under review].
• A. O. Erlank and C. P. Bridges, ’Reliability Analysis of Multicellular System Ar-
chitectures for Low-Cost Satellites’ submitted for manuscript acceptance to Acta
Astronautica [revision under review].
• A. O. Erlank and C. P. Bridges, ’The satellite stem cell architecture,’ 2016 IEEE
Symposium Series on Computational Intelligence (SSCI), Athens, 2016, pp. 1-8.
• A. O. Erlank and C. P. Bridges, ’A multicellular architecture towards low-cost satellite
reliability,’ 2015 NASA/ESA Conference on Adaptive Hardware and Systems (AHS),
Montreal, QC, 2015, pp. 1-8.
• A. O. Erlank and C. P. Bridges, ’Satellite stem cells: The benefits & overheads of
reliable, multicellular architectures,’ 2017 IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, MT,
2017, pp. 1-12.
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In addition, work related to the cellularised payload interface computer on SMESAT was
presented at the 8th European CubeSat Symposium in 2016.
8.2 Future Work
Areas for future work include predicting the downtime of multicellular systems, investigat-
ing alternative task allocation strategies, implementing a semantic language, developing a
complementary agent-based ground station, and building the next generation of artificial
cells.
8.2.1 Downtime Prediction
In Chapter 6, analytical reliability equations for predicting the lifetimes of multicellular
systems were derived. This work could be extended by developing techniques for predicting
system downtime, or recovery time. Given the current system configuration, failure rate
models, and the probabilistic times required to complete each phase of the recovery pro-
cess (e.g. Fault detection, based on health check rate, and reprogramming time, based on
program size), an absorbing Markov chain could be derived to model the recovery process.
Using this model, the probabilistic time required to recover from the next failure could be
calculated.
8.2.2 Specialised Task Allocation Strategies
The currently implemented, greedy task allocation strategy, explained in Section 5.2.2, is
not globally optimum, but was chosen for its simplicity and robustness. Several alterna-
tive task allocation strategies, optimised for different situations, could be investigated and
implemented. Potential aims of these strategies include:
1. Minimising inter-cellular bus traffic by grouping related tasks on common cells.
2. Maximising reliability by monitoring protein processor upset rates over time and
matching task priority to processor reliability.
3. Load and priority balancing across cells to minimise recovery time after the failure of
individual cells.
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Development and evaluation of alternative task allocation strategies can be done in the
MATLAB-based, multicellular system simulator, described in Section 6.4.
8.2.3 Semantic Language
As described in Chapter 5, the HARP middleware does not currently implement a semantic
language. The addition of a semantic language is required to unlock the full potential of agent
computing. A semantic language gives structure to the ACL message contents, allowing
diverse, intelligent agents to have complex interactions. Through a semantic language, agents
can express beliefs and desires, and cooperate to find solutions to high-level problems. Well-
documented semantic languages include Knowledge Query Manipulation Language (KQML)
and FIPA Semantic Language (SL). Both languages already have C implementations freely
available. Thus, to extend the FIPA middleware with a semantic language would simply
involve feeding the ACL message contents into the semantic language interpreter.
8.2.4 Agent-Based Ground Station and Communication Gateways
The utility of on-orbit agents can be enhanced by having them interact with an agent-based
ground station. In this way, many of the operational and planning tasks normally performed
by ground station personnel could be automated. For example, ground-station agents could
find weather predictions online and communicate this information to on-orbit agents for
planning payload operations. Similarly, ground station agents could monitor online sources
for information regarding solar weather and warn on-orbit agents to reconfigure the satellite
into a safe mode in anticipation of solar flares. An agent-based ground station can be based
on a traditional, FIPA-compatible agent platform, such as JADE, and communicate with
HARP agents via a gateway. Since the HARP protocol stack is FIPA compatible from the
bitwise-encoding layer upwards, a gateway would be simple to implement. The gateway
could be in the satellite’s transceiver, or, more likely, in the ground station.
8.2.5 Next Generation Artificial Cells
The current-generation artificial cells have proven the practical feasibility of a reconfigurable
hardware building block. However, several areas of the design have room for improvement.
The generic I/O circuitry output MOSFETs must be replaced as they have too much parasitic
capacitance, preventing high-speed digital peripherals from being reliably cross-strapped. In
173
Conclusions
addition, analogue and digital switches could be included to configure each channel, which
would remove the current need for minor component modifications between operating modes.
To implement a semantic language and other middleware improvements, the flash memory
of the protein processors must be increased, as the current version of the HARP middleware
occupies 90% of the available memory. Increases in the CAN bus speed would be beneficial,
too, as ACL traffic is expected to rise as agents become more intelligent.
Finally, it would be interesting to investigate the theoretical reliability and practical feasibility
of a cell implemented mostly in a single FPGA or ASIC. Such a design may show improved
reliability as components and solder joints are minimised. However, in a traditional FPGA,
this advantage may be outweighed by the vulnerability of the common and support circuitry
around a set of softcore protein processors. Furthermore, while a small number of mixed-
signal FPGAs exist, such as the original Actel SmartFusion, the included analogue circuitry
is not capable of dealing with high-power signals. An ASIC solution, however, has the same
advantages of reduced components and solder joints, while allowing the inclusion of power
MOSFETs and carefully designed common and support circuitry.
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Appendix A
Parametric CubeSat Database
A simplified version of the CubeSat database used in Chapter 2 is presented here. The full
database, with all sources listed, is available at [118].
185
Size (U) State Architecture Redundancy COTS Subsystems ADCS dev time (months)
1  DOA 0 star
2 Beacon 1 bus
3  2Way Comms 2 multimaster
4 Partial Suc
5 Full Suc
7 12/02/2002 MEPSI Aerospace Corporation mil 2 2 0 0 0 none 21
8 6/30/2003 AAU CUBESAT 1 University of Aalborg uni 1 2 0 0 COMM act mag 24
9 6/30/2003 CANX-1 UTIAS (University of Toronto)uni 1 1 0 0 0 act mag 22
10 6/30/2003 CUBESAT XI-IV (CO-57) University of Tokyo uni 1 4 0 sep beacon 0 pass mag 20
11 6/30/2003 CUTE-1 (CO-55) Tokyo Institute of Technologyuni 1 5 0 0 0 none 24
12 6/30/2003 DTUSAT 1 Technical University of Denmarkuni 1 1 0 0 0 act mag 29
13 6/30/2003 QUAKESAT 1 Stanford University uni 3 5 0 0 Radio,OBC pass mag 18
14 10/27/2005 CUBESAT XI-V (CO-58) University of Tokyo uni 1 5 0 sep beacon 0 pass mag 60
15 10/27/2005 Ncube 2 Norweigan Universities uni 1 1 45
16 10/27/2005 UWE-1 University of Würzburg uni 1 3 0 0 Radio pass mag 24
17 2/21/2006 CUTE 1.7 Tokyo Institute of Technologyuni 2 3 0 dual OBC/ func COMMS OBC act mag 25
32 9/22/2006 HITSAT (HO-59) Hokkaido Institute of Technologyuni 1 4 0 Tx Radio/bat Radio act mag
33 12/16/2006 GENESAT (GeneSat 1) Stanford University civ 3 5 0 Radios Radios pass mag 32
34 12/20/2006 MARSCOM US Naval Academy uni 1 5 pass mag
35 12/20/2006 MEPSI (MEPSI 2A) Aerospace Corporation mil 2 5 0 0 Radio 3 axis rw 47
36 12/20/2006 RAFT (NO 60) US Naval Academy uni 1 5 pass mag
37 4/17/2007 AEROCUBE 2 Aerospace Corporation com 1 3 0 0 Radio 3 axis rw 39
38 4/17/2007 CAPE 1 University of Louisiana uni 1 3
39 4/17/2007 CP3 Cal Poly uni 1 1 1 COMMS 0 act mag 22
40 4/17/2007 CP4 Cal Poly uni 1 3 1 COMMS 0 act mag
41 4/17/2007 CSTB 1 Boeing com 1 5 Radios Radios act mag
42 4/17/2007 LIBERTAD 1 University of Sergio Arboledauni 1 2 OBC, Radio
43 4/17/2007 MAST Tethers Unlimited. Inc.; Pumpkin. Inc. (bus)com 3 1 0 51
44 4/28/2008 AAUSAT 2 University of Aalborg uni 1 5 2 0 0 3 axis rw 59
45 4/28/2008 CANX 2 UTIAS (University of Toronto)uni 3 5 OBC, func comms 0 act mag 1 rw 40
46 4/28/2008 COMPASS 1 Fachhochschule Aachen uni 1 5 2 0 0 act mag 48
47 4/28/2008 DELFI C3 (DO-64) Technical University of Delft uni 3 5 0 0 OBC pass mag 52
48 4/28/2008 SEEDS 2 (CO-66) Nihon University uni 1 5 0 0 none 52
51 11/15/2008 PSSC-Testbed 1 Aerospace Corporation mil 2 5 Radio spin stabil 22
52 1/23/2009 KKS-1 (KISEKI) Tokyo Metropolitan College of Industrial Technologyuni 1 3 58
53 5/19/2009 AEROCUBE 3 Aerospace Corporation mil 1 3 0 heritage radio pass mag 1 rw 16
54 5/19/2009 CP 6 Cal Poly uni 1 4 1 COMMS 0 act mag 16
55 5/19/2009 HAWKSAT 1 Hawk Institute for Space Sciencesciv 1 1 0 0 OBC, EPS, Radio none
56 5/19/2009 PHARMASAT Stanford University civ 3 5 sep beacon Radio pass mag
57 7/15/2009 BEVO 1 University of Texas uni 1 1 51
58 7/15/2009 DRAGONSAT 2 (AggieSat 2) Texas A&M University uni 1 4 51
59 9/23/2009 BEESAT Technical University of Berlinuni 1 5 2 OBC, COMMS,EPS,ADCS COMM 3 axis rw 54
60 9/23/2009 ITu-pSAT 1 Istanbul Technical University uni 1 2 0 sep beacon EPS,OBC,Radio pass mag 33
61 9/23/2009 SWISSCUBE (SwissCube 1) Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanneuni 1 4 2 sep beacon 0 act mag 36
62 9/23/2009 UWE-2 University of Würzburg uni 1 2 0 0* Radio pass mag
63 5/20/2010 HAYATO (K-SAT) Kagoshima University uni 1 2 0 GG
64 5/20/2010 NEGAI-STAR (Negai-Boshi) Soka University uni 1 5 sep beacon
65 5/20/2010 WASEDA-SAT2 Waseda University uni 1 1 sep beacon Radio
66 07/12/2010 STUDSAT Indian university consortium uni 1 2 0 sep beacon EPS act mag 42
67 07/12/2010 TISAT 1 Scuola universitaria della Svizzera italianauni 1 5 2 OBC 0 pas mag 66
68 11/20/2010 O/OREOS NASA Ames civ 3 5 0 sep beacon Radio pass mag
69 11/20/2010 RAX 1 (USA 218) University of Michigan uni 3 4 sep S band Radio pass mag 26
70 12/08/2010 Mayflower-Caerus University of Southern Californiauni 3 2 sep beacon Pumpkin Bus COMM 3 axis rw 6
71 12/08/2010 PERSEUS 000 Los Alamos National Laboratorymil 2 5 6
72 12/08/2010 PERSEUS 001 Los Alamos National Laboratorymil 2 5 6
73 12/08/2010 PERSEUS 002 Los Alamos National Laboratorymil 2 5 6
74 12/08/2010 PERSEUS 003 Los Alamos National Laboratorymil 2 5 6
75 12/08/2010 QBX 1 Naval Research Laboratory mil 3 5 paylaod COMM  colony 1 EPS OBC ADCS 3 axis rw
76 12/08/2010 QBX 2 Naval Research Laboratory mil 3 4 paylaod COMM  colony 1 EPS OBC ADCS 3 axis rw
77 12/08/2010 SMDC-ONE 1 MilTec mil 3 5 EPS pass mag 12
78 1/17/2011 NANOSAIL-D-002 NASA Ames civ 3 5 sep beacon OBC, radio pass mag 6
82 7/20/2011 PSSC-2 Aerospace Corporation mil 2 5 3 axis rw
83 10/20/2011 JUGNU Indian Institute of Technology Kanpuruni 3 4 func OBC, sep beacon OBC 3 axis rw 46
84 10/28/2011 AubieSat1 (AO-71) Auburn University uni 1 3 0 COMM 0 118
85 10/28/2011 DICE 1 (DICE X) Utah State University uni 2 5 0 EPS,OBC,COMM act mag, spin stab 34
86 10/28/2011 DICE 2 (DICE Y) Utah State University uni 2 5 0 EPS,OBC,COM act mag, spin stab 34
87 10/28/2011 HRBE (Explorer-1 PRIME) University of Michigan uni 1 4 sep beacon 0 pass mag 29
88 10/28/2011 M-Cubed (w/HRBE) Montana State University uni 2 2 0 0 OBC, Radio pass mag 53
89 10/28/2011 RAX 2 University of Michigan uni 3 5 0 COMM Radio pass mag 37
90 2/13/2012 e-st@r Politecnico di Torino uni 1 2 EPS, Radiometrix act mag 49
91 2/13/2012 Goliat University of Bucharest uni 1 2 0 EPS, sep beacon, func OBC OBC, Radio 2 rw 85
92 2/13/2012 MaSat 1 (MO-72) Budapest University of Technology and Economicsuni 1 5 0 OBC,COMM,EPS 0 pass 53
93 2/13/2012 PW-Sat 1 Warsaw University of Technologyuni 1 2 func COMM 0 none 97
94 2/13/2012 ROBUSTA University of Montpellier II uni 1 2 2 0 0 none 72
95 2/13/2012 UniCubeSat-GGs University of Rome "La Sapienza"uni 1 2 0 0 EPS, Radio,OBC* GG pass mag
96 2/13/2012 XaTcobeo University of Vigo uni 1 5 1 exp radio EPS, COMMS none 61
97 9/13/2012 Aeneas University of Southern Californiamil 3 3 sep beacon colony 1 , Radio 3 rw 32
98 9/13/2012 AeroCube 4.0 Aerospace Corporation mil 1 5 COMM Radio 3rw
99 9/13/2012 AeroCube 4.5A Aerospace Corporation mil 1 5 COMM Radio 3rw
100 9/13/2012 AeroCube 4.5B Aerospace Corporation mil 1 5 COMM Radio 3rw
101 9/13/2012 CINEMA 1 CINEMA consortium civ 3 3 0 0 OBC,EPS,Radio act mag spin 37
102 9/13/2012 CP5 Cal Poly uni 1 3 68
103 9/13/2012 CSSWE Colorado LASP uni 3 5 0 0 OBC pass mag 44
104 9/13/2012 CXBN Kentucky Space uni 2 3 0 0 Radio act mag spin 12
105 9/13/2012 Re (STARE) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratoryciv 3 3 Boeing C2B Bus 3rw star trac
106 9/13/2012 SMDC ONE 1.1 MilTec mil 3 5 EPS pass mag
107 9/13/2012 SMDC ONE 1.2 MilTec mil 3 5 EPS pass mag
108 10/04/2012 F1 FPT Technology Research Instituteuni 1 1 COMM Yaesu VX-3R pass mag
109 10/04/2012 FITSAT-1 (NIWAKA) Fukuoka Institute of Technologyuni 1 5 func OBC, COMMS COMM pass mag 18
110 10/04/2012 Raiko Tohoku University uni 2 5 0 COMMS 0 act mag 24
111 10/04/2012 TechEdSat San Jose State University uni 1 4 2 Func OBC, sep beacon, COMM COMM pass mag 6
112 10/04/2012 We Wish Meisei Electric Co com 1 5
113 2/25/2013 AAUSAT 3 University of Aalborg uni 1 5 2 Func ADCS 0 act mag 59
114 2/25/2013 STRAND-1 University of Surrey uni 3 4 0 Func OBC OBC, EPS gom 3axis rw 37
115 4/19/2013 BeeSat 2 Technical University of Berlinuni 1 4 2 OBC,COMM,EPS,ADCS COMM 3 axis rw
116 4/19/2013 BeeSat 3 Technical University of Berlinuni 1 1 0 0 COMM pass mag 49
117 4/19/2013 Dove 2 Planet Labs com 3 5 func COMM act mag 28
118 4/19/2013 OSSI 1 Hojun Song com 1 1 1 sep beacon 0 pass mag 88
119 4/19/2013 SOMP Technical University of Dresdenu i 1 3 0 func COMM 0 pass mag 64
120 4/21/2013 Alexander (PhoneSat 2 beta) NASA Ames civ 1 5 0 sep beacon Radio 3axis rw 47
121 4/21/2013 Bell (PhoneSat 1c) NASA Ames civ 1 5 0 0 COMM none 47
122 4/21/2013 Dove 1 Planet Labs com 3 5 sep beacon act mag 28
123 4/21/2013 Graham (PhoneSat 1b) NASA Ames civ 1 5 0 0 COMM none 47
124 4/26/2013 CubeBug-1 Ministry of Science Technology & Productive Innovationciv 2 4 1 OBC+funcOBC, func COMM COMM, EPS act mag, 1 rw 16
125 4/26/2013 NEE 01 Pegaso EXA civ 1 4 0 pass mag 49
126 4/26/2013 TURKSAT 3USAT Istanbul Technical University uni 3 3 0 func EPS, func OBC, COMM sep beaconOBC,EPS,COMM pass mag 40
127 05/07/2013 ESTCube-1 University of Tartu uni 1 4 0 OBC 0 act mag 59
129 11/19/2013 ArduSat 1 NanoSatisfi com 1 3
130 11/19/2013 ArduSat X NanoSatisfi com 1 4
131 11/19/2013 PicoDragon Vietnam National Satellite Centerciv 1 4 0 sep beacon COMM none 40
132 11/20/2013 Black Knight US Military Academy uni 1 1 pumpkin cubesat kit 36
133 11/20/2013 CAPE 2 University of Louisiana uni 1 4 MCU pass mag 47
134 11/20/2013 ChargerSat University of Alabama-Huntsvilleuni 1 1 0 0 0 GG 43
135 11/20/2013 COPPER Saint Louis University uni 1 1 0 sep beacon COMM,OBC,EPS none 35
136 11/20/2013 DragonSat Drexel University uni 1 1 0 0 EPS,COMM,OBC GG 59
137 11/20/2013 FireFly NASA Goddard civ 3 4 0 0 OBC,COMM,EPS act mag, GG 62
138 11/20/2013 Ho'oponopono-2 University of Hawaii uni 3 1 sep beacon COMM GG 59
139 11/20/2013 Horus (STARE-B) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratorymil 3 1 Boeing C2B Bus 3rw star trac
140 11/20/2013 KYSat II Kentucky Space uni 1 4 0 0 COMM, EPS pass mag 35
141 11/20/2013 Lunar Vermont Technical College uni 1 4 0 0 EPS,OBC,COMM pass mag 47
142 11/20/2013 NPS-SCAT Naval Postgraduate School uni 1 3 0 sep beacon COMM,EPS,OBC none 71
143 11/20/2013 ORS Tech 1 Johns Hopkins APL mil 3 4 mom biased
144 11/20/2013 ORS Tech 2 Johns Hopkins APL mil 3 4 mom biased
145 11/20/2013 ORSES MilTec mil 3 4 EPS pass mag
146 11/20/2013 PhoneSat 2 NASA Ames civ 1 3 0 sep beacon COMM 3 axis rw 54
147 11/20/2013 Prometheus 1.1 Los Alamos National Laboratorymil 2 4 colony 2 bus 26
148 11/20/2013 Prometheus 1.2 Los Alamos National Laboratorymil 2 4 colony 2 bus 26
149 11/20/2013 Prometheus 2.1 Los Alamos National Laboratorymil 2 4 colony 2 bus 26
150 11/20/2013 Prometheus 2.2 Los Alamos National Laboratorymil 2 4 colony 2 bus 26
151 11/20/2013 Prometheus 3.1 Los Alamos National Laboratorymil 2 4 colony 2 bus 26
152 11/20/2013 Prometheus 3.2 Los Alamos National Laboratorymil 2 4 colony 2 bus 26
153 11/20/2013 Prometheus 4.1 Los Alamos National Laboratorymil 2 4 colony 2 bus 26
154 11/20/2013 Prometheus 4.2 Los Alamos National Laboratorymil 2 4 colony 2 bus 26
155 11/20/2013 SENSE SV1 Boeing mil 3 4 colony bus 2, COMM 3 axis rw 18
156 11/20/2013 SENSE SV2 Boeing mil 3 4 colony bus 2, COMM 3 axis rw 18
157 11/20/2013 SPA-1 Trailblazer University of New Mexico com 1 1 1 0 OBC,EPS,COMM pass mag 12
158 11/20/2013 SwampSat University of Florida uni 1 1 0 0 EPS,COMM CMGs 71
159 11/20/2013 TechEdSat-3 San Jose State University uni 3 4 2 Func OBC, sep beacon, COMM COMM pass mag
160 11/20/2013 TJ3Sat Thomas Jefferson High Schooluni 1 1 0 0 OBC, COMM none 83
161 11/21/2013 CINEMA 2 (KHUSat-1) KyungHeeUniversity civ 3 3 0 0 OBC,EPS,Radio act mag spin 52
162 11/21/2013 CINEMA 3 (KHUSat-2) KyungHeeUniversity civ 3 3 0 0 OBC,EPS,Radio act mag spin 52
163 11/21/2013 CubeBug 2 (Manolito) Ministry of Science Technology & Productive Innovationciv 2 4 0 OBC+funcOBC, func COMM COMM, EPS act mag, 1 rw 23
164 11/21/2013 Delfi-n3Xt Technical University of Delft uni 3 5 1 func comm,OBC COMM 3 axis rw 73
165 11/21/2013 Dove 4 Planet Labs com 3 4
166 11/21/2013 First-MOVE Technical University of Munichuni 1 3 0 0 COMM,EPS pass mag 95
167 11/21/2013 FUNcube 1 Amsat-UK civ 1 4 0 0 EPS gom pass mag 59
168 11/21/2013 GATOSS (GOMX 1) GOMSpace com 2 4 1 0 EPS,OBC,COMM act mag
169 11/21/2013 HiNCube Narvik University College uni 1 1 1 0 EPS,COMM,OBC act mag 95
170 11/21/2013 HumSat-D University of Vigo uni 1 4 0 EPS none
171 11/21/2013 ICube 1 Institute of Space Technology Islamabaduni 1 2 pass mag 59
172 11/21/2013 NEE 02 Krysaor EXA civ 1 4 0 pass mag 56
173 11/21/2013 OPTOS INTA civ 3 3 2 0 EPS mom biased 71
174 11/21/2013 PUCP-SAT 1 Pontifical Catholic University of Peruuni 1 3 pass mag + 2rw 48
175 11/21/2013 Triton 1 ISIS-BV com 3 4 COMM, EPS,OBC
176 11/21/2013 UWE 3 University of Würzburg uni 1 4 0 OBC,COMM COMM mom biased
177 11/21/2013 VELOX-P 2 Nanyang Technological Universityuni 1 3 0 act mag 59
178 11/21/2013 ZACUBE 1 Cape Peninsula University of Technologyuni 1 4 0 OBC,EPS act mag 49
179 12/06/2013 Aero-Cube 5a Aerospace Corporation mil 1 4 COMM Radio 3rw
180 12/06/2013 Aero-Cube 5b Aerospace Corporation mil 1 4 COMM Radio 3rw
181 12/06/2013 ALICE Air Force Institute of Technologymil 3 4 Colony 1 Bus act mag
182 12/06/2013 CUNYSat-1 City University of New York uni 1 1 sep beacon 59
183 12/06/2013 FIREBIRD 1 Montana State University uni 2 4 0 0 OBC, EPS,COMM pass mag
184 12/06/2013 FIREBIRD 2 Montana State University uni 2 4 0 0 OBC, EPS,COMM pass mag
185 12/06/2013 IPEX Cal Poly civ 3 4 pass mag 23
186 12/06/2013 M-Cubed-2 University of Michigan uni 1 4 0 0 COMM pass mag 78
187 12/06/2013 SMDC-ONE 3.1 missing 2.1 and 2.2MilTec mil 3 4 12
188 12/06/2013 SMDC-ONE 3.2 MilTec mil 3 4 12
189 12/06/2013 SNAP 1 Naval Postgraduate School mil 1 4
190 12/06/2013 TacSat-6 AFRL mil 3 4

Appendix B
Artificial Cell Schematics
The full schematics of the testbench artificial cell, described in Chapter 7, are given
here.
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